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ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION:
THE TOPICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Jack M. Balkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional construction is the part of constitutional
interpretation in which interpreters implement and give effect to
the Constitution—for example, by creating doctrines, practices,
and institutions. The idea of constitutional construction is central
to the New Originalism, which divides constitutional
interpretation into two tasks. Interpretation (in the narrower
sense) ascertains the text’s original meaning; construction
implements the text, giving it effect in practice.1 What most people
call constitutional interpretation includes both interpretation, in
the narrower sense of ascertaining the meaning of the text, and
constitutional construction, which creates and applies doctrines
and practices that implement the Constitution.2
The distinction between interpretation and construction
highlights an important problem in constitutional theory. What
authorizes constructions of the Constitution that may be
consistent with the text but are not required by the text? For
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan3 created a constitutional privilege that requires public
officials suing for defamation to prove “actual malice.”4 Sullivan

* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law
School. My thanks to Philip Bobbitt, John Harrison, Jill Hasday, Sanford Levinson,
Richard Primus, and members of the 2018 San Diego Originalism Works-in-Progress
Conference for their comments on previous drafts.
1. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 455–58 (2013).
2. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4–5 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, The New
Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 645–46 (2013).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Id. at 279–80.
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purports to follow from the text of the First Amendment.5 But this
construction of the First Amendment is by no means the only
possible rule that is consistent with the text.6 So what makes the
rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan a good—much less the
best—construction of the Constitution?
Two features of legal practice help ensure that construction
is guided by and furthers the Constitution. The first is an
interpretive attitude of fidelity to the Constitution and to the
constitutional project. The second is a set of rhetorical techniques
for analyzing problems and devising legal arguments, techniques
that originated in the common law.
Lawyers and politicians adapted common law techniques for
interpreting legal texts to the U.S. Constitution once it became a
legal document. American lawyers still employ descendants of
these techniques today. These techniques are what classical
rhetoric calls topoi or “topics” that are characteristic of American
constitutional law. These topics are tools for analyzing legal
problems and generating legal arguments. They involve
commonplace but incompletely theorized justifications for
constitutional interpretation. They help interpreters perform the
work of constitutional construction.
The point of understanding constitutional construction in
terms of topics is not to put an end to disputes about contested
questions of constitutional law. Legal disputes will continue as
long as our Constitution continues to function. The point, rather,
is that constitutional interpretation rests on shared rhetorical
techniques
and
commonplaces
about
interpretation.
Constitutional topics structure constitutional argument in our
legal culture. They connect the text of the Constitution to its
implementation. And they allow people with very different views
to argue that their proposed interpretations are faithful
interpretations of the Constitution and further the Constitution.
A. CONSTRUCTION IS INEVITABLE
All theories of constitutional interpretation must account for
constitutional construction in one form or another, whether they
5. Id. (arguing that “[t]he constitutional guarantees require” the actual malice rule).
6. Some critics might argue that the result is not even consistent with the text,
because it applies to judge-made law, id. at 265, and not to a law made by Congress. See
infra note 253. But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276–77 (rejecting the
argument).
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are originalist or non-originalist, and whether or not they
recognize the idea of constitutional construction. The distinction
between interpretation and construction merely makes this
problem especially salient.
In some versions of originalism—for example, in the New
Originalism—the importance of construction is obvious. My own
theory of “living originalism” or “framework originalism,” for
example, argues that the object of constitutional interpretation (in
the narrower sense) is the Constitution’s basic framework. The
basic framework consists of the Constitution’s original public
meaning plus the text’s choice of rules, standards, and principles.7
The original public meaning consists of the original semantic
meaning of the text, plus any generally recognized legal terms of
art, and any inferences from background context necessary to
understand the text. Constitutional construction builds on and
implements the basic framework.8 Most disputed questions of
constitutional law involve construction.
This is a relatively thin version of original public meaning.
The thicker the account of original meaning, the narrower is the
zone of constitutional construction. The thinner the account, the
more questions must be decided in the construction zone.9 The
most important distinction in originalist theory, therefore, is not
whether one should follow original intention, original
understanding, or original meaning. It is how thin or thick is one’s
account of original public meaning, and therefore how often one
must turn to construction to answer contested constitutional
questions.
Some forms of originalism deny any role for construction.10
Everything is a question of interpretation that, in theory, can be
derived from a close inspection of original public meaning. But
these forms of originalism still must account for the role of
precedent, for applications to new facts and circumstances, for
long-standing custom, for the development of conventions of
practice (including whether and when to accept them), and for
7.
8.
9.
10.

Balkin, supra note 2, at 646.
Id.
Id. at 646–47.
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13–15 (2012); id. at 15 (“[T]he supposed distinction
between interpretation and construction has never reflected the courts’ actual usage.”)
(emphases omitted); JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND
THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 15, 139–40 (2013) (rejecting the distinction).
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doctrinal elaboration and evolution of the Constitution.11
Grappling with these issues is an inevitable result of attempting to
implement a Constitution over time.
This is not simply a question of what to do with nonoriginalist precedents decided by non-originalist judges—the
central focus of most originalist writing on the question.12 The
point, rather, is that even if all courts always attempt in good faith
to apply the original meaning in changing circumstances, there
will likely be reasonable disagreements about the best account of
the Constitution’s meaning and how to implement that meaning
in practice. Later courts must then decide whether to defer to
earlier views.13
Suppose, for example, that a court decides that a new
technology involves or does not involve a “search or seizure”
affecting “persons, houses, papers and effects” covered by the
Fourth Amendment. Or suppose that a court decides that a new
technology involves or does not involve “speech” or “press”
protected by the First Amendment. Should later courts decide the
issue of original meaning afresh each time they consider a new
case involving the First and Fourth Amendments? Or should they
defer to and reason from the previous determination of the
Constitution’s meaning, unless there are very good reasons to
abandon it? The latter approach is more consistent with
American practice. One could generate similar examples for
many different parts of the Constitution. Therefore, much as
originalists may try to avoid the term “construction,” they must
engage in something like it to implement the Constitution in
practice.
Non-originalists also try to dispense with the distinction
between interpretation and construction, but for the opposite
reason. They do not recognize original meaning as having a
11. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 154–96 (offering a detailed theory
for treating precedents consistent and inconsistent with original public meaning); id. at 84–
85 (approving application of Constitution to new technologies while rejecting judicial
updating); Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1921 (2017) (explaining Justice Scalia’s theory of precedent).
12. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 175–96 (explaining when to
reject non-originalist precedents); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994) (arguing that all non-originalist
precedents must be rejected).
13. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
519, 527–39 (2003) (discussing Founding-era ideas of “liquidation” of unclear texts.)
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special legal status in interpretation. Hence for non-originalists,
all constitutional interpretation is a kind of construction, with
original meaning forming one consideration among many others.
B. CONSTRUCTION IS AN ENGINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
People often imagine the distinction between interpretation
and construction as a division between two separate tasks. But the
idea of construction is important for a second reason: it also
reflects a division of labor among different institutions. This
division of labor generates constitutional change over time.
Both judges and the political branches (including state and
local government officials) engage in constitutional construction.
Constitutional construction by different branches of government
generates different kinds of constitutional development. When
judges engage in construction, the result is a sequence of decisions
and doctrine. When the political branches engage in construction,
the result is a series of laws, administrative regulations, political
conventions, and institutions.
The political branches assert that their constructions are
faithful to the Constitution. Often these assertions are
controversial. Throughout American history, people have
challenged the constitutionality of political branch constructions
before the judiciary. When this happens, the judiciary decides
whether these constructions are consistent, partially consistent, or
inconsistent with the Constitution. Judges apply the
Constitution’s text and judicial constructions to decide these
questions, producing new constitutional constructions in the
process. Some political branch constructions, however, are never
challenged before the judiciary, or the judiciary refuses to
consider the challenges, because of judicial constructions about
the role of the judiciary and the separation of powers.
Thus, the American system of constitutional development
involves competing constructions that interact through struggles
between the various branches (and levels) of government, and
especially through the process of judicial review. This ongoing
process of interaction between the political branches and the
judiciary is the dialectic of construction.14 It is a dialectic because
14. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and Change in the United States: The
Official and the Unofficial, 14 JUS POLITICUM 1, 9–10 (2015) (Fr.),
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both the judiciary and the political branches assert that their
constructions are faithful to the Constitution, and the interaction
between them affects the development of constructions by both
sides.
The continuous process of construction by the political
branches and the judiciary, and their interactions over time,
generates constitutional development. Any theory that recognizes
constitutional construction or its equivalent must also recognize
that significant elements of the Constitution-in-practice change
over time. That is why I have argued that originalism and living
constitutionalism are two sides of the same coin.15 Whatever
aspect of the Constitution-in-practice arises from construction is
living constitutionalism.
The question, therefore, is not whether we will have living
constitutionalism in the United States, but what kind of living
constitutionalism we will have, because all constitutional theories
must account for constitutional implementation, application to
changing facts and circumstances, and the accumulation of
precedents and conventions, whether or not they call this process
construction.
Thus, the account of construction offered in this Article will
be useful regardless of whether one is an originalist or a nonoriginalist, and whether one regards original public meaning as
binding or merely as one consideration among many others.
Similarly, this Article’s account of construction is useful whether
one distinguishes between interpretation and construction or
simply labels everything as interpretation.
C. CONSTRUCTION REQUIRES GOOD FAITH AND EMPLOYS
RHETORICAL TOPICS
Constitutional construction has two central features. The first
is interpretive attitude. The second is interpretive technique.
Interpretive attitude concerns how interpreters understand what
they are doing: they must place themselves on the side of the
Constitution and attempt to further it in good faith. But what
kinds of interpretive techniques further the Constitution? The
majority of the Article takes up this second question.
http://juspoliticum.com/uploads/5709f15cf28c4-jp14_balkin.pdf (describing the dialectic of
legitimation that occurs as a result of construction).
15. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 20–21.
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American constitutional culture employs a series of standard
rhetorical moves—what classical rhetoric calls topoi or topics—to
interpret and implement the Constitution in practice.16 These
rhetorical topics rest on widely accepted justifications for
interpretation. Within each topic are a vast range of subtopics for
arguing about the Constitution.
Because American constitutional interpretation is based on
rhetorical topics, it involves what rhetorical theory calls
invention.17 Rhetorical invention means the use of shared topics
and tools of understanding to analyze problems and offer
solutions. People turn to rhetorical invention to analyze and
answer certain kinds of questions—these are the sorts of
questions that cannot be demonstrated with mathematical
certainty but instead concern what is most plausible and
reasonable in a given community.
The most well-known account of the rhetoric of
constitutional argument is Philip Bobbitt’s theory of modalities.18
His theory has two parts. The first part is a list of standard forms
of argument, which he calls modalities. The second is a
sophisticated and elaborate theory of constitutional legitimacy
that argues that legitimacy arises from adherence to practice.
Bobbitt maintains that all constitutional theories (other than
Bobbitt’s own theory) that try to legitimate our practices, or that
attempt to prescribe the correct way to interpret the Constitution,
are either futile or impossible.19
This Article revisits and rethinks the idea of modalities of
constitutional argument. It accepts Bobbitt’s descriptive claim—
with some modifications—but rejects his underlying theoretical
apparatus and his general dismissal of constitutional theory.

16.
17.
18.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE]; Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869 (1994)
[hereinafter Bobbitt, Reflections]; Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233
(1989) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?].
19. As Dennis Patterson puts it, “there is nothing more nor less to constitutional law
than the practice itself.” Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 270, 270 (1993) (reviewing BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra
note 18).
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As a descriptive matter, Bobbitt’s list of modalities is
incomplete. It is also not well designed for explaining how lawyers
use history in constitutional argument. For example, Bobbitt calls
arguments about original intention “historical” arguments.20 This
is unhelpful in two respects. First, most originalist arguments
these days concern original public meaning rather than original
intention. Second, most uses of history in constitutional argument
do not concern either original intention or adoption history.21
I agree with Bobbitt that lawyers and judges employ standard
forms of argument as a shared practice; I also agree that this
shared social practice contributes to a limited form of sociological
and procedural legitimacy, one that operates largely within the
legal profession itself.
However, most of Bobbitt’s theoretical views do not follow
from this fact. These include his claims that (1) his list of six
modalities is complete and comprehends all legitimate
constitutional argument; (2) the modalities are incommensurable;
(3) conflicts between different modalities can only be resolved by
recourse to individual conscience; and (4) all constitutional theory
that attempts to legitimate our practices is either ineffectual or
mistaken.22
My view of constitutional argument is different: the
modalities are a group of widely used rhetorical topics that help
constitute American legal culture. They rest on (largely
undertheorized) commonplaces about what makes a
constitutional argument plausible or persuasive. People use these
topics to engage in constitutional interpretation (and hence
constitutional construction).
Nothing about these facts undermines the project of
constitutional theory. In any case, the boundary between
constitutional theory and constitutional practice is ill-defined and
20. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 9 (defining “[h]istorical
arguments” as those which “depend on a determination of the original understanding of
the constitutional provision to be construed”); BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 13 (“A[] historical modality may be attributed to
constitutional arguments that claim that the framers and ratifiers [of a constitutional
provision] intended, or did not intend . . . .”); id. (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision
is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”).
21. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, supra note 2, at 656–57, 657
n.35, 660–61; see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 113–121.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 197–231.
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porous. Legal practice includes plenty of claims about
constitutional theory, about the proper way for judges to behave,
and about the correct methods of constitutional interpretation.
This is hardly surprising. Lawyers want to win arguments; so they
will make theoretical claims about constitutional interpretation,
and about how and when to engage in judicial review, whenever
they think it will make their arguments more persuasive to their
intended or imagined audiences (or cast doubt on the arguments
of their opponents).
This rhetorical approach to constitutional interpretation has
several advantages. It explains how different interpreters can
disagree about the Constitution while attempting to be faithful to
it. It explains how disputes about policy and politics that are
external to law are reflected in disagreements about the proper
interpretation of the Constitution that are internal to law. And it
explains how attempts at constitutional fidelity over time generate
both constitutional disagreement and constitutional change.
These are characteristic features of the processes of constitutional
decision making. At any point in time they help generate a
constrained or bounded disagreement about constitutional
questions and a process of change through repeated attempts at
implementation in changing factual circumstances.
Lawyers with very different constitutional theories will use
the same common topics. It is precisely because lawyers hold the
topics in common that they are able to disagree about underlying
theories of interpretation and still reason together. Thus, a shared
system of rhetoric is consistent with many different kinds of
constitutional theories, not merely Bobbitt’s. Our system of
constitutional rhetoric involves orthopraxis (correct practice)
about constitutional argument, but not orthodoxy (correct belief)
about constitutional theory. Bobbitt is correct that the shared use
of rhetorical topics helps generate sociological legitimation
among lawyers and judges. But this orthopraxis among legal
professionals does not ensure sociological legitimacy among the
general public, much less moral, procedural, or democratic
legitimacy.23 Nor—as Bobbitt himself would emphasize—do
shared forms of argument guarantee convergence on correct
answers in contested cases.24
23.
24.

See infra text accompanying notes 279–291.
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 27–28.
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II of
the Article explains the interpretive attitude of fidelity. Part III
discusses the use of rhetorical topics in construction. Part IV
considers the relationship of constitutional construction to
constitutional theory. It reconsiders and critiques Bobbitt’s theory
of the modalities and argues for a different account of
constitutional argument based on rhetorical topics. A brief
conclusion follows.
II. INTERPRETIVE ATTITUDE AND
INTERPRETIVE TECHNIQUE
A. WHAT CONNECTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION TO
THE CONSTITUTION?
People sometimes describe constitutional construction—
especially by judges—as deciding what to do when original
meaning “runs out.”25 But the metaphor of “running out” is
misleading. It suggests that in constitutional construction,
participants have complete discretion to construct in any possible
way, and that the zone of construction is a zone of complete
freedom for decisionmakers, whether members of the political
branches or members of the judiciary. This raises a problem: it
implies that there is no connection between the Constitution and
the constitutional constructions laid upon it.26

25. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
65, 70 (2011) (“[I]t is not originalism that is doing the work when one selects a theory of
construction to employ when original meaning runs out, but one’s underlying normative
commitments.”); id. (“So, just as originalists need a normative theory to explain why we
today should adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution, they also need a
normative theory for how to construe a constitution when its meaning runs out. There is
no escaping this.”)
26. See John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 917–18
(2016) (arguing that if the original meaning “runs out” in the construction zone, judges
must defer to legislatures and may not invalidate laws that fall within the construction
zone); Mike Rappaport, Does a Judge Who Decides a Matter Within the Construction Zone
Enforce the Constitution? A Question About Construction, LAW AND LIBERTY (Aug. 4,
2015),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/08/04/does-a-judge-who-decides-a-matterwithin-the-construction-zone-enforce-the-constitution-a-question-about-construction/
(“[I]f a judge employs values that are outside the Constitution to decide a matter, is he
deciding the matter based on the Constitution?”); Mike Rappaport, More on Construction:
A Response to Larry Solum, LAW AND LIBERTY (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.
libertylawsite.org/2015/08/07/more-on-construction-a-response-to-larry-solum/ (arguing
that New Originalists have not adequately explained how construction is connected to the
Constitution).

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION

7/21/18 3:15 PM

155

The Constitution delegates constitutional construction to
successive generations. But what kind of delegation is this? Is it a
delegation for later generations to do whatever they want as long
as they maintain logical consistency with the original meaning of
the Constitution? Or does construction entail greater
responsibilities than avoiding a logical contradiction? If so, what
are these responsibilities, and what constrains or guides
constitutional construction?
One can restate the problem in two different ways: First, why
is construction a construction of the Constitution rather than
simply the construction of law that furthers present values and
policy preferences? Second, how is constitutional construction
guided in any way by the Constitution?
New Originalists are not the only theorists who face these
problems. They apply to all originalists who accept that the
Constitution requires further implementation in order to apply it
to new cases, for example, through executive branch practice and
through the creation and application of judicial doctrine. In fact,
Article III of the Constitution, which gives the federal judiciary
the power to hear cases involving the Constitution, and Article
VI’s Supremacy Clause, which requires state courts to apply the
Constitution, seem to presuppose the development of judicial
doctrine that implements the Constitution.
But if this is the case, all originalists face the same basic
problem as New Originalists do. What connects judicial
development of doctrine to original meaning? Why is doctrinal
development a development of the Constitution? Why is it guided
by the Constitution?
One might try to avoid this problem by claiming that the
content and application of the Constitution are essentially closed
at the time of its adoption. Original meaning, properly
interpreted, leaves essentially no room for judicial discretion in
the development of doctrine. All questions of judicial doctrine
can, in theory, be answered by a sufficiently careful inspection of
original public meaning.27
27. This is how John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport attempt to resolve the
problem. Using original legal methods significantly narrows the range of possible
applications of the text; then interpreters should employ the reading that is supported by
the most evidence, even if it is only barely more likely than not. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT,
supra note 10, at 142. Rappaport calls this the “51/49 rule.” Mike Rappaport, Original
Methods Originalism Part III: The Minimization of the Construction Zone Thesis, LAW
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This solution seems unpersuasive. Take the area of First
Amendment doctrine, by now a luxurious forest of rules,
exceptions, sub-exceptions, differing levels of scrutiny, burdens of
proof, constitutional privileges, scrutiny rules, and four and fivepart tests. Does original meaning specify whether judges should
employ a rule or a standard? Does it specify the choice between a
constitutional privilege (as in defamation law) or a scrutiny rule
(as in public forum doctrine)? In most cases, it does not.
These doctrines, and others like them, have sprung up not
because judges are power-hungry tyrants or officious bureaucrats,
but because applying the principles of the First Amendment in a
wide variety of different institutional contexts and ever-changing
factual circumstances is quite difficult. Doing so requires
considerable amounts of judgment, balancing of multiple factors,
and administrative and institutional considerations. It is
implausible that the original meaning, no matter how thickly
postulated, specifies uniquely correct answers to all of the
technical constitutional questions that appear before the courts.
Judicial elaboration of doctrine is necessary, and the elaboration
of doctrine means that constitutional law will be path-dependent.
Thus, all originalists, and not merely New Originalists, need
an account of constitutional development that shows how it is not
merely logically consistent with the original public meaning of the
Constitution, but is also guided by the Constitution and furthers
the Constitution. New Originalists will phrase this answer in terms
of construction; other originalists will phrase the answer in terms
of interpretation (including original legal methods).
Non-originalists must also face this question—perhaps
especially so, because they do not even require logical consistency
with original public meaning.
The answer I propose in this Article, with suitable
adjustments in terminology, should be helpful to both originalists
and non-originalists of every kind. But in order to give the right
answer, it is important to be clear about the question.

LIBERTY (June 2, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2017/06/02/original-methodsoriginalism-part-iii-the-minimization-of-the-construction-zone-thesis/ (explaining that
under “the 51/49 rule that we believe was applied at the time of the Framing. . . . an
interpreter would decide close cases by selecting the interpretation that was better
supported by the evidence, even if it was only by a little”).
AND
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B. CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO THE LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION
One might imagine that the most important question about
construction is what constrains it and makes it predictable and
determinate. But constraint, predictability, and determinacy in
and of themselves are not the goal. Political science and sociology
suggest that political forces and social norms constrain how judges
behave; they also shape the direction of constitutional doctrine in
the long run.28 My own scholarship on constitutional development
argues that technological and economic change, social and
political mobilizations, evolving social norms, and partisan
entrenchment of the judiciary shape how members of the
judiciary decide constitutional cases in relatively intelligible and
predictable ways.29
Thus, one might well argue that modern Commerce Clause
decisions like United States v. Darby30 were highly probable, if not
inevitable, given changes in industrial and transportation
technology and the pervasiveness of national markets. One might
also argue that these decisions were very likely given a succession
of appointments by a liberal Democrat, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, whose party championed New Deal reforms. In like
fashion, one might argue that something like Griswold v.
Connecticut31 was very likely in light of the sexual revolution and
the invention of safe and effective birth control for women.
This is not the kind of constraint that most constitutional
theorists—including originalists—are usually looking for.
Constitutional theorists want something more than an account of
mechanisms of social influence that make judges’ decisions
28. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); C.
Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute
Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916–88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460 (1991); see
also Linda Hamilton Krieger, et al., When “Best Practices” Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic
Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Cases, 40
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 843, 844–49 (2015) (summarizing multiple literatures from political
science and sociology on the predictability of judicial behavior).
29. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 277–339; Balkin, supra note 14.
30. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing right of marital privacy
in the use of contraceptives).
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predictable. They want constraint according to law. To be sure,
legal reasoning often may take account of changes in social and
political realities—as well as changes in technology and
underlying factual assumptions. So judges deciding cases such as
Darby or Griswold might justify their decisions by pointing to
changes in society and technology. But for construction to be
according to law, law must guide or constrain construction
through the application of legal methods, legal doctrines, and
forms of legal reasoning.
Even this is not enough. Constitutional construction must not
be merely guided by law. It must also be guided by and further the
Constitution. Constitutional construction must draw on resources
provided by the Constitution and promote its purposes. An
account of constitutional construction, in other words, must
explain how later interpreters can remain faithful to the
Constitution over time.
Constitutional construction has two aspects. The first is a
particular interpretive attitude about the task of construction. The
second is a series of authorized legal techniques of construction.
When interpreters construct, they must have a certain attitude
about what they are doing—they must want to further the
Constitution rather than simply use the Constitution as an excuse
for doing whatever they want to do. They must also employ the
kinds of generally recognized legal techniques that allow them to
explain to their fellow citizens why their arguments are guided by
and connected to the Constitution.32
These two elements—interpretive attitude and legal
technique—will combine in practice: Ideally, people should have
the right interpretive attitude as they employ the appropriate
techniques. Nevertheless, these two dimensions of construction
are analytically distinct; hence it is important to describe them
separately.
C. THE INTERPRETIVE ATTITUDE OF FIDELITY: PUTTING
OURSELVES ON THE SIDE OF THE CONSTITUTION
I begin with interpretive attitude. Most theories of
constitutional interpretation focus on discovering and elaborating
32. Cf. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
13, 18–19 (1990) (constitutional interpretation presupposes methods that give interpreters
authority to speak in the name of the Constitution).
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the appropriate techniques for interpreting the Constitution.
Many debates among originalists revolve around proper legal
techniques for correct interpretation—whether one should look
to intentions, understandings, or public meaning, how one should
ascertain them, and what methods one should use in the process.
A focus on correct interpretive techniques describes much of
non-originalist theory as well. For example, Ronald Dworkin
argues that interpreters should employ a moral reading and apply
the method of law as integrity;33 David Strauss counsels that
people engage in common law reasoning;34 John Hart Ely
emphasizes the protection of democracy.35
Interpretive attitude, however, is equally important. The goal
of interpretation is fidelity to the Constitution. Fidelity is more
than a set of techniques or methods—it means having the right
attitude toward one’s task.
In constitutional interpretation, fidelity is not just a good
thing. It is the whole point of the enterprise. But fidelity is not
simply a property of an interpretation; nor is it merely a
correspondence between one’s interpretation and the thing one
interprets. Rather, fidelity is also a feature of the self who
interprets. Fidelity is an attitude that people have toward the
object of interpretation and about the process of interpretation.36
We attempt to be faithful to the Constitution by putting
ourselves “on the side of” the Constitution in order to make it
work and to further its purposes and structures.37 To put ourselves
on the side of the Constitution means that we regard it as having
its own intelligible set of norms, principles, and purposes that are
external to ourselves, and are not simply an extension of our own
values and policy preferences. Our job is to apply and fulfill these
norms, principles, and purposes in the present, rather than using
the task of interpretation as an excuse to engage in a kind of
Constitutional ventriloquism—that is, to make the Constitution
into a dummy that miraculously speaks our values.
33. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
34. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
35. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
36. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 103–04 (2011).
37. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 78.
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An interpretive attitude of fidelity to the Constitution
requires more than maintaining a bare logical consistency with the
text of the Constitution and its original public meaning. It requires
a good faith attempt (1) to assess the Constitution’s values and
purposes; and (2) to develop constructions that remain consistent
with the original public meaning of the text and further its
underlying principles and purposes in our contemporary context.
Fidelity also demands charity toward the object of
interpretation. It requires that we try to view the Constitution as
articulating a coherent set of norms that are also sensible and even
valuable.38 We may not succeed in this attempt. Some laws are
simply unjust. The Constitution may turn out to be, as William
Lloyd Garrison once said, a covenant with death and an
agreement with hell.39 Or it may turn out to be incoherent and
impractical. But we must begin with charitable presuppositions. If
we do not, then we cannot be sure that the evils, deficiencies, and
incoherence we perceive in the Constitution are due to the
Constitution itself or to our own failure adequately to understand
it.40
D. FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT MEAN LACK OF
DISAGREEMENT
People with very different views will often see different
things in the Constitution. They may understand the point or the
effect of constitutional provisions quite differently. And when the
Constitution features a tension between different values and
principles—as it so often does—different people may resolve
those tensions differently, all the while claiming to be faithful to
the Constitution. This should hardly be surprising. When we
interpret, we bring ourselves to the task of understanding,
equipped with our own values and perspectives. We cannot
interpret—indeed, we cannot think—without doing so. As long as
different people interpret and apply the Constitution, and
interpret and apply it at different times and places, disagreements

38. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 41–42, 48, 51 (constitutional interpretation requires
constitutional faith, which requires charity and optimism).
39. WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM.
LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963) (“That the compact which exists between the North and
South is ‘a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell’—involving both parties in
atrocious criminality; and should be immediately annulled”).
40. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 107.
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about constitutional interpretation—even by participants who
seek to further the Constitution in good faith—are unavoidable.
Does fidelity to the Constitution mean the separation of law
from politics? Not exactly. Sanford Levinson and I have
distinguished between “high politics” and “low politics” in
constitutional interpretation (which, in this context, includes
constitutional construction).41 “High” politics is a dispute over the
animating vision, purposes, and principles of the Constitution.
“Low” politics is a struggle for political or material advantage for
one’s self or for one’s political allies.42
Constitutional fidelity surely requires a separation of
constitutional construction from “low politics.” Yet even when all
participants act in good faith with a view to furthering the
Constitution and its purposes, struggles over high politics are
inevitable in constitutional interpretation. To this extent, fights
over constitutional interpretation are “political.” Large political
principles are often at stake in constitutional disputes. Even so,
participants must not treat the task of interpretation as simply the
advancement of their values or the values of their political allies.
It may often be difficult to tell the difference. Because of the
effects of ideology and mechanisms of social cognition, people
may confuse their values with the Constitution’s values. No doubt
some participants are insincere; they only want to pursue their
own values under the guise of interpreting the Constitution. Even
so, hypocrisy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue. In order
to persuade others, people must argue as if they were attempting
to be faithful to the Constitution.
Because people may disagree in good faith, the interpretive
attitude of fidelity does not guarantee convergence on a single
answer, although, at any point in time, it may narrow the range of
answers. The interpretive attitude of fidelity imposes a subjective
constraint—that is, it requires people to act in good faith. This
constraint operates in addition to—but sometimes in opposition
to—the sociological and political constraints described above.

41. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2001) (offering “a distinction between . . . ’high
politics,’ which involves struggles over competing values and ideologies, and ‘low politics,’
which involves struggles over which group or party will hold power”).
42. Id.
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E. INTERPRETATION BY CITIZENS AND BY GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick have offered a theory of
good faith constitutional construction.43 They argue that
constitutional construction requires an attempt to realize both the
“letter” and the “spirit” of the Constitution.44 They derive this
obligation from three ideas. The first is the fiduciary duty that
government agents—including judges—owe to the people they
govern.45 Fiduciaries owe a duty of good faith to those whose
affairs they manage.46 Second, Barnett and Bernick argue that
government officials, because of their oaths of office, take on a
moral obligation to act in good faith.47 Third, Barnett and Bernick
analogize the Constitution to a contract that gives judges and
other government officials discretionary power over people—a
power that can easily be abused.48 Government officials—
including judges—must interpret and perform their obligations
under the agreement in a spirit of good faith.49
I would go further. A duty of fidelity in interpretation applies
even if one is not a government official and even if the
43. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory
of Originalism, SSRN (Oct. 9, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3049056.
44. Id. at 2; see also id. at 3 (good faith originalist construction seeks to implement
that meaning “faithfully” by seeking to ascertain and adhere to the “original functions,”
ends, purposes, or objectives for which that text was adopted—what we call its “spirit”).
45. Id. at 20–21; see also id. at 22–23 (arguing that the Constitution was designed as a
fiduciary instrument and that officials have a duty to act in good faith on behalf of the
public).
46. Id. at 17; see also id. at 19 (“Because we are all vulnerable to judicial decisions
that bring the government’s coercive power to bear upon us to our detriment, or that
prevent the government’s power from being used to our benefit, federal judges ought to
be understood to be fiduciaries, with corresponding duties.”).
47. Id. at 21 (“[O]fficials who are entrusted with power over other people that they
would not otherwise possess in virtue of a voluntary promise to adhere to the terms of that
document are morally bound to keep that promise.”); see also id. (“[A]n oath to support
the Constitution creates a morally binding promise ‘to adopt an interpretive theory
tethered to the Constitution’s text and history.’” (quoting Richard M. Re, Promising the
Constitution, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 299, 323-4 (2016))).
48. Id. at 30–33 (“The common evil of opportunism that both the contractual and
fiduciary duty of good faith are designed to thwart, taken together with . . . [the danger of]
the opportunistic abuse of discretionary power . . ., suggests the utility of Burton’s theory
of good-faith contractual performance . . . [to] guid[e] constitutional construction by our
judicial fiduciaries.”)
49. See id. at 26 (“The common evil of opportunism that both the contractual and
fiduciary duty of good faith are designed to thwart, taken together with [the danger of] the
opportunistic abuse of discretion[ary power,] . . . suggests the utility of Burton’s . . . [theory
of good-faith contractual performance in] guiding constitutional construction.”).
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Constitution is not best analogized to a contract. In Living
Originalism and in other work, I have argued that interpretation
by citizens is the standard case, and interpretation by government
officials is merely a special case.50 So our account of constitutional
fidelity—and thus of constitutional construction—must be one
that applies to citizens, and not merely to government officials.
Citizens must interpret the Constitution in good faith even if they
lack fiduciary duties because they do not hold public office.
Interpretive fidelity is not simply an obligation that comes with
holding office, or being a party to a contract; it is a presupposition
of constitutional interpretation. As I have argued:
Fidelity is not a virtue but a precondition. It is not just a good
thing, but the point of the practice of constitutional
interpretation. To claim to interpret the Constitution is already
to claim to be faithful to it. Conversely, insisting that one does
not care about fidelity does not simply put one at a severe
disadvantage in convincing others to one’s point of view; it
takes one outside of the language game of constitutional
interpretation. It is to announce that one is doing something
else—whether it is political theory, economics, or sociology,
but most assuredly not constitutional law. When we say that
fidelity is not important to us, we are no longer interpreting the
Constitution, we are criticizing it. Indeed, even when we
criticize the Constitution, we are in some sense offering what
we believe to be a faithful interpretation of it. We are saying
that this is what the Constitution really means and that we find
it wanting. When [William Lloyd] Garrison called the
Constitution an agreement with hell, it was because he assumed
that a faithful interpretation protected slavery.51

On the other hand, constitutional fidelity may require more
from government officials than from citizens precisely because
government officials have responsibilities to the public that
ordinary citizens do not, and these responsibilities are especially
important because the legal system clothes government officials
with the power of the state and charges them with enforcing the
law against private citizens. These obligations of public officials
concern not only the duties of good faith and fiduciary obligation
that Barnett and Bernick describe, but also the importance of
stability and predictability, the promotion of rule of law values,
the need to take into account existing constitutional doctrine, the
50.
51.

BALKIN, supra note 2, at 17.
BALKIN, supra note 36, at 106.
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practices and expectations of other government officials, and the
public’s expectations about legality and fairness.
Constitutional change occurs as positions that were once
considered “off-the-wall” later become “on-the-wall” and even
widely accepted or orthodox. Private citizens, motivated by
individual conscience or political zeal, and legal scholars, in their
quest to advance scholarship, are generally free to make whatever
constitutional claims they believe are the best interpretations of
the Constitution, even if their views are widely considered off-thewall. Our constitutional system protects and values the claims of
constitutional dissenters, because constitutional dissenters
sometimes turn out to be the prophets of the constitutional law of
the future.52 Attorneys representing private citizens may also
make off-the-wall claims, consistent with norms of professional
responsibility and their duties to represent their clients zealously.
But when government officials enforce the law (as opposed to
making political statements), and especially when they enforce
the law against private citizens, people expect them to limit
themselves to official constitutional interpretations that are onthe-wall, even if disputable and controversial.53 In Section III, I
will argue that the expectation that government officials make
claims that are on-the-wall offers an additional, intersubjective
constraint on constitutional construction.
F. FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES FAITH IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT
Fidelity to the Constitution also requires a certain degree of
faith in the Constitution.54 To be faithful to something or someone
is to believe in something or someone. Fidelity, in this sense, is a
relationship between ourselves and another. You are faithful to
the other because you expect them to be faithful to you, even
52. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 95–96.
53. As Barnett and Bernick note, this creates a possible tension between the duties
of government officials. Government officials may believe that their fiduciary obligation
to the original purposes of the Constitution require a significant departure from existing
law, even changes that are currently considered off-the-wall. Barnett and Bernick argue
that government officials nevertheless have a duty to implement such a change, even if
doing so defeats the expectations of citizens, lawyers, and fellow government officials. See
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 43, at 21 n. 107 (arguing that officials have a fiduciary duty
to enforce the Constitution at the time of adoption and not the public’s understanding of
the Constitution at the time they take their oaths).
54. The argument in the next five paragraphs is drawn from BALKIN, supra note 36,
at 2, 124–25; and BALKIN, supra note 2, at 77–81.
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when you cannot be certain of this. Thus, fidelity involves a degree
of trust, a leap of faith. Conversely, to be faithless means both to
lack faith and to betray a trust. When one is faithless, one becomes
untrustworthy; often because one has lost faith in the other.
In much the same fashion, constitutional fidelity requires a
leap of faith in the Constitution. If you do not have faith in the
object of interpretation, then you will be likely to treat it as an
obstacle or inconvenience, something to get around by clever
argumentation. This approach to constitutional interpretation
lacks an attitude of fidelity toward the Constitution.
Saying that we have faith in the Constitution does not mean
merely that we have faith in a particular text. It means that we
have faith in the constitutional project of government under the
Constitution. This project is the work of many generations. It
began before us, and, we hope, it will continue after us. Thus,
when we say that we have faith in the Constitution, what we are
really saying is that we have faith in the American people living
under the Constitution, and that we have faith in the development
of the institutions of self-government through adherence to the
Constitution. There is no guarantee, however, that the
Constitution—that is, the project of constitutionalism in the
United States—will turn out to be worthy of our faith. The
constitutional system may be deeply unjust and never get much
better. Even if it is broadly acceptable, things may fall apart.
Constitutional institutions may decay. The Constitution may fail,
as it did once before in the 1860s. Despite all of our best efforts
and those of later generations, the Constitution may turn out to
be a covenant with death and an agreement with hell.
This constitutional faith may not be much of a gamble if we
think that the Constitution-in-practice is basically just and our
system of government legitimate and worthy of respect. But even
if the Constitution-in-practice is currently very unjust, and even if
we believe that our institutions of democracy have decayed or are
under threat, constitutional faith means that we continue to
believe the constitution-in-practice and our constitutional
democracy will be redeemed. An attitude of constitutional fidelity
presupposes that we think that fidelity is worth the effort, even
when we know—or suspect—that others do not behave in the
same way.
In sum, constitutional fidelity is not simply a correspondence
between an interpretation and a text. It is an attitude toward the
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Constitution and the project of self-government under the
Constitution. Fidelity to the Constitution requires faith in the
Constitution, and—especially when things are going badly—in the
redemption of the Constitution. What is redeemed, however, is
not simply a set of rules or promises in a document, but a transgenerational constitutional project and a people. Behind a
constitution are the people who live within its political
framework. To make a leap of faith in the Constitution is to
believe in the people who engage in politics within it.
Constitutional fidelity requires constitutional faith, which is a
species of political faith. And political faith is a bet not on
particular words but on the members of a political community
who chose to live by those words.
G. FIDELITY REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING ONE’S POSITION IN
HISTORY
Constitutional fidelity also requires understanding one’s
position in history. As people live within a constitutional system,
they move further and further from the moment of adoption, and
a history of interpretations and counter-interpretations
accumulates. That is why constitutional construction is not simply
making up things however one likes. Constitutional construction
is a multigenerational project. Later interpreters do not write on
a blank slate. They operate within an ongoing tradition of
readings and re-readings of the Constitution, in the shadow of a
history of arguments and counter-arguments about the
Constitution, and against the background of previous statebuilding constructions, and good or bad things done in the name
of the Constitution. To be sure, later generations build on the
work of previous generations and can correct their errors and
mistakes. But usually they leave in place as much as they correct.
Each successive group of interpreters finds itself at the end
of a line of previous readings and disputes. Their position does
not make them the culmination of the constitutional tradition, but
merely the latest installment. Their position in history should,
however, affect their interpretive attitude.
Being later in time does not guarantee that one is wiser or
more moral than earlier generations. But later generations have
(at least potentially) access to more history than earlier
generations; they may be able to know more about how the
Constitution functions in different circumstances, and especially
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under conditions of stress, emergency, conflict, and rapid change.
There is no guarantee, however, that later generations will take
advantage of this history. Indeed, precisely because later
generations are born later, they have not experienced the same
crises and dangers, and they may forget (or be unable to
comprehend) old and hard-won lessons.
Because every generation emerges as the latest installment
of a line of previous readers, their position in time demands a
particular interpretive attitude about the constitutional project,
expressed through the ideas of redemption, coherence, selfeducation, humility, and charity.
The concept of redemption in constitutional interpretation
means that in interpreting the Constitution, we should do our best
to fulfill the Constitution’s purposes and promises in our own day.
Redemption may be necessary because previous generations have
fallen short of the Constitution’s promises, or because we
ourselves have fallen short.
Coherence means that we should strive to see the
Constitution as articulating a coherent scheme of political values.
To do this, we may have to accept some parts of the tradition as
worth preserving and reject other parts.
A duty of self-education also follows from being last in line.
The central advantage of later readers over earlier ones is not that
they are wiser but that they have access to more information
about what the Constitution has meant to people and about how
the Constitution operates over time in multiple situations.
Therefore we, as the latest readers in the line, should try to
understand the history of previous constitutional controversies,
including, but not limited to, the controversies of the Founding
era.
The idea of interpretive humility is backward-looking and
forward-looking. Backward looking humility means that
contemporary interpreters should recognize that earlier
interpreters of the Constitution have something to teach them
about its principles and purposes, even if they disagree with them.
Forward looking humility is the recognition that we will be judged
by later generations, often in ways we cannot yet imagine.
Finally, interpreters have obligations of charity in
interpretation. Later readers have an obligation of charity both to
the adopting generation and to each successive generation. They
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should try to understand why people did what they did in the
context of their time and try to see what was valuable and useful
in previous readings of the Constitution. Previous generations
may have done very unjust things, and later interpreters should
not hesitate to recognize them as unjust. After all, the U.S.
Constitution was founded as a republic that permitted and
protected the institution of slavery. Even so, later interpreters
should attempt to view the work of previous generations in its best
light; they should try to understand its lessons for the present even
when they find it wanting or morally wrong.
This charity also connects to our position in time. We are the
inheritors of the readings of previous generations, and we will
bequeath our own readings to later generations who will someday
take our place at the end of the line. It is very likely that later
generations will consider some of what we do to be unjust, morally
compromised, and even depraved. If we want later generations to
view our own work with charity, we must be willing to view earlier
generations with the same degree of charity.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TOPICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION
The techniques of constitutional construction are the
standard forms of common law argument. Once the Constitution
was adopted, people began to treat it as law. Accordingly, they
used the techniques for construing texts that they had inherited
from the common law.55 These techniques are among the original
legal methods for interpreting the Constitution and they also form
part of the original “law of interpretation.”56
55. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION supra note 18, at 5 (“Since the
Constitution was a written law, it had to be construed, and this was to be done according
to the prevailing methods of legal construction . . . the forms of common law argument,
those forms prevailing at the time of the drafting and ratification of the U.S.
Constitution.”); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1753, 1758–62 (1994) (arguing that in the process of making the Constitution a
political as well as legal document, the Founding generation adapted a range of different
legal methods); cf. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE 1815-35, at 112–18 (1988) (noting the wide range of sources that early jurists drew
on and adapted to constitutional argument).
56. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1079, 1131-32 (2017) (“The ‘original legal methods’ are, in our view, the law of
interpretation as it stood at the Founding.”). Thus, there are important points of
connection between the account of constitutional construction I offer in this Article and
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s claim that interpreters should employ original
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The most famous account of these techniques is Philip
Bobbitt’s theory of “modalities” of constitutional interpretation.
He identified a list of six styles of argument which have become
more or less standard in constitutional theory: text, history,
structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethos.57 Later on in this Article,
I will offer a different list, better designed to explain how lawyers
use history when they engage in constitutional construction.58
Because Bobbitt’s account has been so influential, legal
theorists may tend to associate the use of modalities of
constitutional argument with the whole of Bobbitt’s theory. That
theory is both inconsistent with originalism and generally offered
as a pluralist alternative to it.59 It also argues that when different
modalities of analysis conflict, interpreters must decide by resort
to individual conscience.60 Hence people may assume that any
theory of construction that employs common-law modalities of
argument is (1) non-originalist; and (2) bestows considerable
freedom on interpreters to decide constitutional questions
according to their individual consciences. Neither of these
assumptions is correct.
This Part argues that the standard forms of constitutional
argument are rhetorical topics. This account does not require that
one accept Bobbitt’s entire system, and it is consistent with both
originalist and non-originalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation. In Part IV, I discuss Bobbitt’s theory and its
differences from my account in more detail. For the moment, it is
sufficient to note that one may detach most of Bobbitt’s
theoretical apparatus from his central insight: Constitutional
argument is structured in terms of recurring forms of argument;
these forms of argument provide a kind of know-how that helps
lawyers analyze constitutional problems and make constitutional
claims. These recurring forms of argument originate in the
common law, and people adapted them to constitutional
argument when the Constitution became law. Although these
forms of argument may have evolved a bit over time (in ways I
legal methods and William Baude and Stephen Sachs’ arguments about the law of
interpretation. I will discuss the similarities and differences between our approaches later
in this essay. See infra text accompanying notes 129–155.
57. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12–13.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 109–121.
59. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 25 (arguing that
originalism is circular).
60. Id., at 114, 168; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1873–74.
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will discuss later on), people have employed the standard forms
of argument more or less continuously from the Founding
onwards.
A. THE MODALITIES AS RHETORICAL TOPICS
The history and theory of rhetoric offer the best way to
understand the modalities of constitutional argument. The
recurring forms of argument in constitutional law are what the
rhetorical tradition that begins with Aristotle calls topics or
topoi.61 In particular these forms of argument are what Aristotle
and later rhetoricians would call “special topics.”
In rhetoric, a topic is something to talk about, and therefore
a way of approaching a question, analyzing it, and constructing
arguments to discuss it.62 The use of rhetorical topics to make
arguments is known as the rhetorical art of invention.63
61. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 44–46 [1358a]
(George A. Kennedy, trans., 2d ed., 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC];
MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST
HERITAGE 27 (2005); David Fleming, Becoming Rhetorical: An Education in the Topics,
in THE REALMS OF RHETORIC: THE PROSPECTS FOR RHETORIC EDUCATION 93, 95–97
(Joseph Petraglia & Deepika Bahri eds., 2003); J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The
Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
62. ARISTOTLE, Topica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 187, 188 [100a]
(Richard McKeon, ed., W.A. Pickard-Cambridge trans., 1941) (“Our treatise proposes to
find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally
accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing
up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us.”); Balkin, supra note 61, at
213 (“The point of identifying topics, making lists of them, and committing them to
memory was to have at one’s immediate disposal a checklist of things to talk about no
matter what subject one was presented with and no matter what problem of analysis one
faced.”).
63. The classical study of rhetoric was organized into canons or characteristic skills:
invention (inventione in Latin, heurisis in Greek); arrangement (dispositio, taxis); style
(elocutio, lexis); memorization (memoria, mnémé); and delivery (pronunciatio, hypokrisis).
Cicero, De Inventione, I.9 in 2 CICERO 1, 18-19 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949); [Cicero],
Rhetorica Ad Herennium I.2, in 1 CICERO 6–7, 7 n.a (Harry Caplan trans., 1954)
[hereinafter [Cicero], ad Herennium]; Balkin, supra note 61, at 212, 273 n.4.
The first canon of rhetoric, invention, is the art of discovering what to say. It is
the skill of “discovering and formulating arguments on any subject, opinions on the
resolution of any problem, or reasons for or against any proposed course of action.” Id. at
212. Viewed from this perspective, the art of rhetoric is not primarily about ornament or
display. Rather, it is a pragmatic art. First, we must understand the situation before us;
then we must find ways to analyze problems, solve them, and explain to others what we
have found and what should be done. Id.
Aristotle distinguished between deliberative, judicial, and epideictic rhetoric.
Deliberative rhetoric argues for what we should do; judicial rhetoric attempts to analyze
what has happened; both focus on practical reasoning and on making decisions. Epideictic
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The Greek word topos means “place,” and it has several
interlocking connotations. First, topics are metaphorical places
where one might look for arguments; alternatively, they are
signposts along a journey to find arguments.64 Some writers have
compared topics to places in the mind in which one searches for
arguments and from which one fetches formulas and ideas.65 And
just as things appear differently from different locations, one can
also think of topics as perspectives or distinctive ways of looking
at things.66
The concept of topoi connects the study of rhetoric with
practical reasoning. Topics are not only recipes for making
speeches; they are also methods of analysis and problem-solving.
Viewed as a form of practical reason, rhetorical invention is the
art of discovering the most plausible and convincing arguments
for a given audience.67 The realm of rhetorical invention concerns
the kinds of questions that cannot be demonstrated for certain, as
in mathematics, but for which there are a range of possible
answers, some more plausible and more reasonable than others.
Plausibility, as Aristotle says, means plausible to some person or
rhetoric, by contrast, is about offering praise or blame, and although it may require
practical reasoning, it does not call for immediate action. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC,
supra note 61, at 46–50 [1358b-1359a]; Iain Scobbie, Rhetoric, Persuasion, and
Interpretation in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 66
(Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015).
64. Fleming, supra note 61, at 96; Michael C. Leff, The Topics of Argumentative
Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius, 1 RHETORICA 23, 24 (1983)
(“[T]he rhetor is a hunter, the argument his quarry, and the topic a locale in which the
argument may be found”).
65. See CICERO, TOPICA, II.6–II.8, in 2 CICERO, supra note 63, at 375, 386–87, 386
n.b, (describing topoi as places from which one might fetch different kinds of arguments);
Fleming, supra note 61, at 96. Because topics are often organized into checklists, one might
also compare them to memory palaces. Guenther Kreuzbauer, Topics in Contemporary
Legal Argumentation: Some Remarks on the Topical Nature of Legal Argumentation in the
Continental Law Tradition, 28 INFORMAL LOGIC 71, 74-75 (2008) (citing Christof Rapp,
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 1, 2010),
https://plato-stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/).
66. See Balkin, A Night in the Topics, supra note 61, at 213 & 273 n.6 (comparing
topoi to a horizon or perspective in hermeneutical theory; this horizon is formed by the
place where one stands or the direction in which one looks at things.).
67. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 37 [1356a] (defining rhetoric as
“the ability … to see the available means of persuasion” in a given case.); id. at 39
[1356a](“Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we show the truth or
apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”); cf. ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 62, at 936
[1094b] (“it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just
so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable
reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.”).

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

172

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/21/18 3:15 PM

[Vol. 33:145

some audience.68 Hence rhetorical invention involves finding
ways to convince other people in our community—or our
audience—about the most reasonable solution to a problem, or
the best way to go forward.
This account of rhetoric as problem-solving and practical
reasoning contrasts with familiar ideas of rhetoric as mere
technical display, emotional appeal, or the devious arts of the
demagogue or con artist. Moreover, this substantive vision of
rhetoric presumes what Chaim Perelman called a “realm of
rhetoric.”69 It envisions
[A] large intellectual sphere in which it is meaningful to speak
of arguments that are “reasonable” and “unreasonable” and in
which discussion is perceived as useful and meaningful. This
realm of rhetoric, of civil and reasonable discourse, lies
between the extremes of a world of certain truth and a world
of arbitrary wills, each of which exists in a world without
discussion, the one because catechism—deduction and
demonstration—has taken the place of discussion, and the
other because nothing remains that can be meaningfully
discussed.70

We turn to rhetoric, and thus to topics, when we must
consider questions whose answers cannot be known for certain,
and when we ask instead what is more or less reasonable, and
more or less plausible to our audience. This is the realm of legal
and constitutional argument.71
Aristotle and later rhetoricians divided topics into general
and special.72 General topics (topoi and koinoi topoi) are concepts
68. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 41 [1356b].
69. CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (1982).
70. Bernard E. Jacob, Ancient Rhetoric, Modern Legal Thought, and Politics: A
Review Essay on the Translation of Viehweg’s “Topics and Law,” 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1622,
1644 (1995) (reviewing THEODORE VIEHWEG, TOPICS AND LAW (W. Cole Durham, Jr.,
trans., 1993) (footnote omitted)).
71. Giambattista Vico, who sought to rehabilitate the classical study of rhetoric in
the early modern period as an alternative to Cartesian rationalism, held that topical
reasoning was crucial for reasoning both in law and in what we would now call the
humanities. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME 15 (Elio
Gianturco trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709) (“Those who know all the loci [Latin
for topoi], i.e., the lines of argument to be used, are able . . . to grasp extemporaneously
the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case.”).
72. Aristotle sometimes uses topoi generally to speak of all kinds of topics. More
specifically, he sometimes uses topoi to refer to general strategies of argument in Book I of
the Rhetoric, and koina or koinoi topoi to refer to common subjects of argument featured
in Book II. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 50 (commentary by George A.
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and strategies for argument that offer people ways to invent
something to say about almost any subject. Aristotle gives as
examples (1) part and whole; (2) more and less; (3) opposites; (4)
time; (5) definitions; (6) categorization; (7) cause and effect; and
(8) possible and impossible.73 More contemporary examples are
the reporters’ familiar set of questions: who, what, why, where,
when, and how. Because general topics are so abstract, and can be
used for almost any question, they have little substantive
content.74
Special topics (idia) are strategies and concepts that are
relevant to a specific body of knowledge, subject matter or
professional practice. They are modes of analysis associated with
a field of knowledge such as medicine or law.75 Special topics
allow people to make arguments within a particular field of
knowledge. Diagnostic criteria are special topics in medicine;
doctrinal categories are special topics in law. These topics are
special in the sense of “specialized.” For example, medicine, and
law have topics that are useful for discussing and studying these
particular subjects but may not be relevant to others.76
Examples of contemporary topics in American law are (1)
burden of proof; (2) rules versus standards; (3) justified reliance;
(4) cheapest cost avoider; (5) fiduciary obligation; (6) the political
safeguards of federalism; and (7) discrete and insular minority.
Some of these topics are drawn from legal doctrines; others are
drawn from familiar theories about legal doctrine.

Kennedy; Fleming, supra note 61, at 97–98. For present purposes, I group both the
common strategies and the common subjects together as general or common topics.
73. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 51 [1359a], 65 [1363b], 172–184
[1397a–1400b] (offering catalogs of common topics).
74. For example, if asked to give a speech on elephants, one could talk about the
parts of the elephant, the size of elephants, the definition of an elephant, the differences
between elephants and other species, and so on. As this example suggests, these abstract
and general topics only help begin the process of discovery. In most cases a speaker has to
add a great deal more substance (and do considerably more research) to construct an
interesting argument. Balkin, supra note 61, at 213.
75. Aristotle mentions physics as an example. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra
note 61, at 45 [1358a]. A significant portion of Book I of Aristotle’s Rhetoric lists special
topics (idia) about politics, ethics, and psychology. Id. at 51–110 [1359a–1377b].
76. Just as there is some dispute about how Aristotle divided up the class of topics,
—for example, whether there are actually three categories rather two—there are disputes
about how he characterized the difference between general and special topics. Fleming,
supra note 61, at 97–100. In any case, the rhetorical tradition following Aristotle
distinguished between general topics relevant to (virtually) all questions and special topics
relevant to more specific or specialized fields of study (like law).
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As one can see from these examples, “any theoretical
enterprise tends to develop its own set of special topics as soon as
it creates its own set of distinctive concepts and approaches.”77
Usually, the set of special topics in any area of thought is not
closed. As time goes on, participants will add new concepts and
theories. Although American lawyers still argue using topics that
existed in the British common law before independence, most
legal topics developed later on. Moreover, the preponderance and
dominance of certain topics may change over time. Some topics
may recede in importance, while other topics become increasingly
prominent.
Topics are an aspect of culture and a reflection of culture.
The accumulation, prominence, and development of topics in a
given culture reflect that culture’s growth and evolution. For
example, one way of measuring the influence of other disciplines
on law is to note how often or how pervasively topics from other
disciplines (such as economic concepts and theories) become part
of the discourse of legal scholars, administrators, and judges.
Topics have a dual character. On the one hand, they are
concepts or propositions; on the other, they are strategies or
problem-solving techniques for argument. Topics often serve as
devices for diagnosing and solving problems, or for the
organization and exposition of ideas. Usually topics can be
summed up or memorized in a few words, a checklist, or a
formula. (Think about legal outlines and lists of legal categories.)
Viewed from this perspective, topics are heuristics; they offer a
starting point or a roadmap for analyzing problems and proposing
solutions.78 The use of topics in law, Theodore Viehweg has
explained, “is a technique of problem oriented thought that was
developed by rhetoric.”79
Topics are useful because people can base arguments on
them and because they are generally regarded as plausible
grounds for making arguments. Topics, in other words, draw on
knowledge and beliefs held in common in a given community,
whether a knowledge community (for example, an academic
discipline or profession), a political community, or a religious
77.
78.
79.

Balkin, supra note 61, at 213.
Id. at 214.
THEODOR VIEHWEG, TOPICS AND LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO BASIC
RESEARCH IN LAW 1 (W. Cole Durham trans., 1993); id. at 25 (“The function of topoi . . .
is to serve the discussion of problems.”) (emphasis omitted).
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community.80 This suggests another duality: Topics both involve
strategies for analysis and reflect conditions of shared belief.
Communities of knowledge and the topics they regularly employ
in reasoning and argument are mutually constitutive. To be a welltrained lawyer in the United States is to be able to use a certain
set of topics in persuading other lawyers and to find these
approaches plausible and persuasive.
Some special topics are commonplaces. Commonplaces are
ideas, views or expressions that are held in common in a given
culture. Such commonplaces include “concepts, subjects and
maxims that are widely shared in the culture or are associated with
wisdom that has been distilled into commonsense.”81 They also
include widely held beliefs and opinions in a political, religious,
professional, or scholarly community.82 One should distinguish
these “commonplaces” from what Aristotle originally meant by
koinoi topoi or common topics. Aristotle’s common (or general)
topics apply universally to any question; commonplaces are
widely agreed on beliefs or presuppositions in a given community
or within a given area of inquiry. They may be special topics in
Aristotle’s original sense—for example commonplaces about
politics.83 As I shall explain, the standard forms of constitutional
argument rest on commonplaces about constitutional
interpretation.

80. Guenther Kreutzbauer explains the idea of topics along similar lines: “Topoi are
general propositions or concepts that provide premises of arguments used in a certain
discourse and are collectively accepted by the participants in the discourse as being
plausible. They can tackle problems of abstract philosophy, of a specific profession or of
human life in general. They usually have fixed structure and are linguistically expressed by
one (or a few) word(s) or sentence(s), have a fixed structural and linguistic design, and are
generally formulated in a rhetorically elaborate style.” Kreuzbauer, supra note 65, at 79
(2008).
81. Balkin, supra note 61, at 212; see also Leff, supra note 64, at 23 (“[R]hetoricians
must draw their starting points from accepted beliefs and values relative to the audience
and the subject of discourse. When these beliefs and values are considered at a high level
of generality, they become ‘commonplaces’ or ‘common topics’ for argumentation . . . .”).
82. Thomas J. Darwin, Pathos, Pedagogy, and the Familiar: Cultivating Rhetorical
Intelligence, in THE REALMS OF RHETORIC: THE PROSPECTS FOR RHETORIC
EDUCATION, supra note 61, at 23, 28 (“Topical ‘reasoning’ involves the ability to adapt
and manipulate one’s repertoire of cultural common sense (expressed in commonplaces)
to fit new or tenuous situations.”).
83. Cf. Fleming, supra note 61, at 103 (“[W]hat recent rhetoricians have described as
the “special” topics—the particular practices and beliefs of specific communities seen from
a vantage point outside of them—could just as easily be seen as “common” topics when
seen from a vantage point inside of them.”).
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In sum, in a given field of knowledge special topics include
(1) key ideas and concepts; (2) commonplaces and widely shared
assumptions; and (3) problem-solving tools and diagnostic
checklists.
In the ancient world, lawyers and statesmen studied legal
argument in terms of topics. Cicero and Quintilian wrote treatises
on rhetoric with lists of topics for the benefit of advocates.84 Many
of Cicero’s topics—and his applications of them—were designed
to be used in legal disputes in the Rome of his time.85 This is hardly
surprising: it exemplifies the close connections between legal
practice and topical reasoning. The goal of memorizing and
practicing topics was to allow advocates to analyze factual
situations as legal problems and then to make arguments about
how to characterize both the facts and the law.
Today in American law schools, law students answer “issue
spotters,” exam questions that test their ability to recall key
doctrinal concepts (which themselves are legal topics) and apply
them creatively to factual situations. The very notion of the “issue
spotter” as the standard form of legal examination shows how
lawyers use topical categories to reason and to make arguments.
Most legal doctrines generate special topics for legal analysis,
argument and judgment. That is not because legal doctrines are
nothing more than rhetorical topics; rather it is because legal
doctrines produce categories and tests that are helpful to think
with. They provide methods for the organization of social
experience when viewed through the eyes of the law. For the same
reason, doctrinal categories and tests also serve as problemsolving devices. Thus, “legal doctrine has a dual nature, both as
authority and as topos. Because legal doctrines and distinctions
are backed by the authority of the state, they help constitute what
a legal problem is in a given legal culture.”86
Analyzing fact patterns, classifying them in terms of legal
categories, and then using these facts and categories to argue for
one’s position is what legal advocates have done from Cicero’s
84. Cicero, supra note 63; CICERO, supra note 65; [Cicero], supra note 63;
QUINTILIAN, THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION (Donald A. Russell trans., 2002).
85. See sources cited supra note 84; FROST, supra note 61, at 27–30 (explaining that
classical rhetoricians devised topic catalogs based on the needs of legal advocates). The
section of Aristotle’s Rhetoric on judicial rhetoric also offers a list of topics for arguing
legal cases. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 83–110 [1368a-1377b].
86. Balkin, supra note 61, at 219.
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day to our own. In the twentieth century, two legal scholars,
Chaim Perelman and Theodor Viehweg, sought to revive the
classical tradition of rhetoric by focusing on invention and topical
argument.87 Significant parts of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s
The New Rhetoric are a contemporary topic catalog.88
Viehweg’s 1953 book Topics and Law argued that much legal
reasoning is problem-oriented reasoning using topics.89 This
argument was controversial in civil law countries like Viehweg’s
Germany because the civil code appears to be a systematic and
deductive system of reasoning.90 It is easier to see the force of
Viehweg’s argument in common-law jurisdictions like the United
States. In common law systems, much of doctrine is structured in
terms of topics, new precedents often create new topics for legal
analysis, and lawyers naturally argue using the topics they find in
previous precedent. In fact, the West Keynote System, developed
in the twentieth century to help American lawyers find relevant
precedents, is an elaborate topic catalog.91
During the heyday of critical legal studies, Duncan Kennedy
and I helped create a field called legal semiotics.92 Legal semiotics
87. CHAIM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969);
VIEHWEG, supra note 79; see also Jacob, supra note 70.
88. See Barbara Warnick, Two Systems of Invention: The Topics in the Rhetoric and
The New Rhetoric, in REREADING ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 107 (A.G. Gross & A.E.
Walzer eds., 2000) (comparing Aristotle’s and Perelman’s topic catalogues).
89. VIEHWEG, supra note 79, at 69–85. On the influence of Viehweg and the Mainz
school that he created, see Katharina Sobota, System and Flexibility in Law, 5
ARGUMENTATION 275 (1991); W. Cole Durham, Translator’s Foreword to VIEHWEG,
supra note 79, at xix–xxii.
90. Balkin, supra note 61, at 219; W. Cole Durham, Translator’s Foreword to
VIEHWEG, supra note 79, at xix–xxv.
91. See Explanation of How the Topic and Key Number System Works, WESTLAW,
https://lawschool.westlaw.com/marketing/display/RE/24 (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (“The
American system of law is broken down into Major Topics. . ..Each of those topics is
divided, in greater and greater detail, into individual units that represent a specific legal
concept . . . .”).
92. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Balkin, supra note
61, at 216; J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831 (1991);
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Semiotics]; J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and
Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1990); J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE
L.J. 1669 (1990) (book review) [hereinafter Balkin, Nested Oppositions]; J.M. Balkin, The
Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Balkin,
Crystalline Structure]; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Jennifer Jaff, James Boyle, and Jeremy Paul also made
important contributions. See Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1779 (1991); Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 (1988); Jennifer Jaff,
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identifies recurrent argument forms in different fields of law such
as contracts, torts and criminal law.93 Examples in tort law are
arguments from fault, causation, rights, incentives, consequences,
rules versus standards, and consent.94 These standard forms of
argument, in turn can be transformed or flipped to produce
opposed sets of legal arguments.95 These forms of argument recur
at more general and more specific levels of doctrine; they are even
useful in debating the application of doctrine to specific fact
patterns. As a result, legal doctrine often has a fractal or
crystalline structure, in which debates about general features of
doctrine are replicated at more specific levels of articulation and
application.96 The recurrent argument forms that legal semiotics
studies are special topics for these fields of law. Indeed, one of my
first law review articles is essentially a catalog of legal topics and
legal arguments in tort and criminal law.97
Roughly around the same time in the 1980s, Philip Bobbitt
and Richard Fallon offered what are now well-known catalogs of
the standard forms of constitutional argument that lawyers and
judges regularly employ. Bobbitt said that constitutional
arguments came in six different forms: text, history, structure,
prudence (including consequences), doctrine (including judicial
decisions and interbranch conventions), and ethos.98 Fallon said
that constitutional arguments came in five basic versions: text,
historical intent, theory (including a wide range of different
justifications), precedent, and value (including moral theory,
political theory, and natural law).99 Bobbitt’s list of modalities

Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal
Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1986); James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34
AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1985).
93. Balkin, supra note 61, at 216–17.
94. Id. at 217–18; Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 92.
95. Kennedy, Semiotics, supra note 92.
96. See Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 92; Kennedy, Semiotics, supra note
92 (describing “nesting”); Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 92.
97. Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 92.
98. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 7–8; BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12–13. Although the first of these
books was published in 1982, Bobbitt first presented his list of modalities in his Dougherty
Lectures in April 1979. Philip C. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1980).
99. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244–46, 1252–58 (1987) [hereinafter
Constructivist Coherence]. Robert Post has offered another categorization of kinds of
appeals to authority in constitutional argument, which is a subset of Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s.
Post, supra note 32, at 18–19 (discussing three different ways that the Constitution gains
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provides a useful shorthand for teaching students about different
approaches to constitutional interpretation, and it has been
especially influential in constitutional theory.
Bobbitt adopted the term “modalities” because he wanted to
make an analogy to modal logic, which concerns the relationship
between different modes of truth such as actuality, possibility, and
necessity.100 Analogously, Bobbitt claimed that the modalities of
constitutional argument represented the different ways in which
propositions of constitutional law could be true, and because they
represented different modalities of truth, they were
incommensurable.101 Since Bobbitt coined the term in his 1982
book, Constitutional Fate, “modalities” has caught on as the
standard way to describe the basic forms of argument in
constitutional law.
In fact, the modalities of constitutional argument do not have
very much to do with modal logic. Bobbitt and Fallon were simply
continuing the basic approach of classical rhetoric. Like Kennedy
and me, they were reinventing the wheel—a very ancient wheel—
by providing topic catalogues for modern constitutional
discourse.102
The “modalities” of American constitutional discourse are
rhetorical topics. More precisely, they are a class of special topics
for American constitutional law; and they have all of the
characteristics of special topics. First, the modalities offer
authority before the public—through the authority of consent (original intent), the
authority of law (precedent), and the authority of our national ethos or tradition).
Jamal Greene has offered a catalog of legal arguments with two dimensions. Jamal Greene,
Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389 (2013). One
dimension consists of topics for invention: text, history, structure, doctrine, and
consequences. Id. at 1424. A second dimension consists of modes of address to the
audience: logos (appeals to reason), ethos (appeals based on the character or integrity of
the speaker), and pathos (appeals to emotion). Id. at 1398–99, 1443; see also Colin Starger,
Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1347, 1360–62 (2016) (critiquing
Greene’s account and offering a different classification scheme). Greene’s second
dimension, the three modes of address, do not focus on how to analyze and solve a
problem—the concern of this Article—but rather on how to win over an audience through
various kinds of appeals.
100. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 11–12.
101. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12
(“[C]onstitutional modalities [are] the ways in which legal propositions are characterized
as true from a constitutional point of view.”); id. at 164 (noting the “incommensurate
nature of the various modalities of argument”).
102. This is also how I understand Karl Llewellyn’s work on techniques of precedent
and canons of statutory interpretation. See infra note 249; see also Starger, supra note 99
(arguing that Bobbitt’s modalities are actually rhetorical topics).
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standard ways to discover and invent arguments for proposed
interpretations of the Constitution. Second, the modalities rely on
widely shared views about what justifies a proposed constitutional
interpretation or makes an argument about constitutional
interpretation both valid and plausible. In other words, they rest
on commonplaces about constitutional interpretation. Third, the
modalities serve as a heuristic or diagnostic tool. They operate as
a checklist for analyzing situations and making arguments about
the Constitution. Faced with a novel problem of constitutional
law, students can work their way through the standard forms of
argument, just as a journalist can organize a story by asking who,
what, why, where, when, and how.
American constitutional law has hundreds, if not thousands
of other special topics besides the modalities: justiciability, levels
of scrutiny, less restrictive alternatives, clear and present danger,
limited and enumerated powers, smoking out unconstitutional
motivation, the concept of commercial speech, the Central
Hudson test for regulating commercial speech,103 and so on. Some
of these topics emerge from existing doctrine; others reflect
widely used ideas in constitutional theory.
Most doctrinal categories in constitutional law are special
topics, but they only apply to certain questions. Youngstown
analysis—which classifies Executive Branch action into one of
three different boxes104—applies to separation of powers
questions, but not to many other constitutional questions—for
example, whether the Constitution protects the right of same-sex
marriage. Other doctrinal frameworks, like levels of scrutiny, and
multi-part tests, are special topics that help us analyze some
constitutional questions but not others. In addition to doctrinal
topics, theoretical concepts in constitutional law like “processprotection,” “smoking out invidious motivation,” “clear and
present danger,” “the states as laboratories for experimentation,”
or “the political safeguards of federalism,” are also special topics,
but, again, they are relevant only to some questions in
constitutional law.
103. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
563–66 (1980) (offering a four-part test for determining the constitutionality of regulations
of commercial speech.).
104. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (offering a three-part test for determining the constitutionality of executive
action in foreign affairs).
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The modalities of constitutional argument, on the other
hand, are a distinctive subset of the special topics in American
constitutional law. First, they involve commonplaces about
constitutional interpretation—that is, they rely on widely shared
views in American legal culture about what makes a
constitutional interpretation valid.105
Second, the modalities offer general ways to create and
justify legal interpretations of the Constitution irrespective of the
subject at hand. More correctly, they represent classes of roughly
similar approaches to interpretation. Within each modality or
class of arguments there are many more specific forms—which we
might call “subtopics.” For example, John Hart Ely’s theory of
representation-reinforcement is a subtopic of the more general
modality of structural argument;106 Alexander Bickel’s theory of
“the passive virtues,”107 and Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial
minimalism108 are subtopics of the more general class of
prudential argument; and the various common law canons of
interpretation are subtopics of the more general category of
textual argument.
The modalities, in short, are the most general of the special
topics about interpretation in American constitutional law. They
are most general not because they are the most abstract, but
because they are the most general-purpose. One can use them to
generate arguments about most constitutional issues, and they are
relevant to almost every constitutional question, because we
employ these topics whenever we want to understand the
Constitutional text or the Constitution as a whole. If we think of
topics as strategies for argument, then the modalities are the basic
moves of legal exegesis in the American constitutional tradition.
That is why they seem so elemental, and that is why Bobbitt
viewed them as central features of the practice of constitutional
argument. For these reasons, I will continue to use Bobbitt’s term
“modalities” to distinguish these “most general special topics
105. Cf. Post, supra note 32, at 19 (explaining that each form of argument “appeals to
a different conception of constitutional authority”).
106. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 133 (noting
Ely’s connection to previous structural theorists such as Chief Justice Marshall and Charles
Black).
107. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1961).
108. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
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about interpretation” from the many other special topics in
American constitutional law.
If we understand the modalities as special topics, much of
Bobbitt’s theoretical system becomes unnecessary, as I will
explain more fully in Part IV. In particular, we need not accept
Bobbitt’s view that there are six and only six categories, and that
they are incommensurable. Rhetorical topics do not have a fixed
number, nor do they have natural boundaries. Topics are
pragmatic classifications by people within a culture (or field of
knowledge) of standard ways of analyzing problems and making
arguments within the culture. A culture’s topoi are useful for
persuasion precisely because they are common tools of analysis
that reflect shared cultural assumptions.
The list of topics in a given culture will grow and evolve as
the culture grows and evolves. Moreover, depending on the
problem before us, it might be helpful to divide up these topics in
different ways. My list of topics is different than Bobbitt’s because
his list is not very good for thinking about the different ways that
lawyers use history, whereas I created mine specifically for that
purpose.
The evolution of special topics in constitutional law is the
history of legal analysis and problem solving by people arguing
about the Constitution. New doctrinal and theoretical categories
are added all the time, while others fall into desuetude. But the
most basic of these special topics—the modalities—have been
with us from the beginning.
B. THE COMMONPLACES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
I divide constitutional arguments into eleven different topoi
or modalities.109 They represent eleven different ways that lawyers
argue about the Constitution. They are distinctive because they
presuppose eleven different but widely-shared theories—that is,
commonplaces—about how to justify a constitutional
interpretation. For the same reason, they offer eleven different
ways to employ history in constitutional argument.
Most lawyers’ arguments about the Constitution fall into the
following basic categories:

109.

The list of topics is taken from Balkin, supra note 2, at 659–61.
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1. Arguments from text. These include arguments about
definitions of the words and phrases in the text; arguments that
compare and contrast different parts of the text; arguments that
compare the text with other texts; and arguments that employ
traditional canons of statutory interpretation.
2. Arguments about constitutional structure and the
structural logic of the constitutional system. These are arguments
about how the constitutional system as a whole should operate
and how the various parts of the system should interact with each
other. These include arguments about the proper functioning of
federalism, the separation of powers, democracy, and republican
government.
3. Arguments from purpose. These are arguments about the
point or purpose of the Constitution. They include arguments
about the purposes, intentions, and expectations of the people
who lived at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and its
subsequent amendments, as well as purposes attributed to the
Constitution over time.
4. Arguments from consequences. These are arguments about
the likely consequences of interpreting the Constitution in one
way rather than another. Arguments from consequences include
arguments of institutional prudence: arguments that consider the
political and practical consequences of a proposed interpretation
(or implementing doctrine), the likely responses of other
institutions or persons if the interpretation were accepted, and
how well or how badly other actors will be likely to administer the
interpretation in the future.
5. Arguments from judicial precedent. These are arguments
based on previous judicial decisions, about what is holding and
what is dicta, about what is controlling authority and what is
merely persuasive authority. They include familiar common law
arguments for distinguishing cases, generalizing from cases,
reasoning from case to case, and reasoning by analogy.
Arguments from precedent include arguments based on the
doctrinal topics that previous precedents generate. As a result,
arguments from judicial precedent collectively form a very large
family of topics and subtopics.
6. Arguments from political convention. These are arguments
about political conventions and settlements that arise within
institutions or branches of government (for example, within the
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Executive Branch); or among institutions or branches of
government (for example, conventions that arise between the
Executive Branch and Congress).
7. Arguments from the people’s customs and lived
experience. These arguments consider the public’s customs,
expectations, and ways of life and whether a proposed
interpretation of the Constitution will conform to, vindicate,
assist, defy, or disrupt them.
8. Arguments from natural law or natural rights. These
arguments concern rights that governments exist to secure and
protect (natural rights); as well as arguments about what kinds of
laws are necessary to protect human flourishing (natural law).
9. Arguments from national ethos. Arguments from ethos
appeal to the character of the nation and its institutions and to
important, widely shared and widely honored values of
Americans and American culture.
10. Arguments from political tradition. Arguments from
political tradition appeal to cultural memory, to the meaning of
key events in American political history, and to the lessons to be
drawn from those events.
11. Arguments from honored authority. Arguments from
honored authority appeal to the values, beliefs, and examples of
culture heroes in American life. Examples of culture heroes
include the founders as a group and key founders like George
Washington and James Madison; or important historical figures
like Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King.
Because the modalities are topics, one of their central
purposes is to help us analyze situations and create arguments.
One can think of these modalities as a checklist, a series of
questions that a lawyer or law student might run through to
analyze a case or a constitutional question. Accordingly, I have
divided up the arguments in a way that makes it easy for a lawyer,
judge, or law student to run through them in search of things to
say.
In many cases, an argument might reasonably fall into more
than one category: structural arguments, for example, are often
also either arguments about constitutional purposes or arguments
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about consequences. Moreover, many originalist arguments are
hybrids that simultaneously employ more than one category.110
One could expand the list of topics further, or combine or
divide the classes of arguments differently. For example, one
might separate arguments from natural law from arguments from
natural rights. Conversely, one might group different categories
together. Consider the last three topics, 9 through 11: arguments
from ethos, political tradition, and honored authority. These
arguments are especially important to lawyers’ use of history;
many arguments that invoke history are (also) arguments from
ethos, political tradition, and honored authority.111 Because these
categories appeal to cultural memory and to the social meaning of
persons and events, the three categories tend to fade into each
other. Hence, one might group them together and refer to them
collectively as arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored
authority. Then there would be nine topics rather than eleven.
C. TOPICS AS IMPLICIT THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION
How one divides up arguments into topics depends on what
one is trying to achieve. I divide classes of arguments according to
their implicit theories of justification. Each modality refers to a
different theory about why a particular kind of argument furthers
and implements the Constitution.112
Earlier I noted that the many special topics are
commonplaces—widely accepted premises in a culture that
people use to justify their positions. The modalities of
constitutional argument rest on commonplaces about
constitutional interpretation. Each modality offers an implicit
theory for why arguments of a certain kind should be accepted as
valid or as persuasive when people interpret the Constitution, and
why such arguments further the Constitution and are faithful to
the Constitution. The reason why people think it is appropriate to
make arguments from text in interpreting the Constitution are
different from the reasons why they believe it is appropriate to
make arguments from structure or consequences, for example.
Hence, we can restate each of the modalities in terms of a
commonplace theory of justification:
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 652–53, 700.
Id. at 672–679.
Id. at 651–52, 658–59, 664.

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

186

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/21/18 3:15 PM

[Vol. 33:145

1. Arguments from text: One should interpret a written
Constitution consistent with the meaning of its text and inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from the text.
2. Arguments from constitutional structure: One should
interpret the Constitution according to its structural logic and
consistent with the proper operation and interaction of the
different parts of the constitutional system; conversely, an
interpretation is improper if it undermines the structural logic of
the system and the proper operation or interaction of its various
parts.
3. Arguments from purpose: One should interpret the
Constitution according to its purposes, including the purposes,
goals, understandings, and expectations of those who drafted,
adopted, or ratified it.
4. Arguments from consequences: Where the constitutional
text is otherwise unclear, ambiguous, or vague, one should
interpret the Constitution so as to produce the best consequences;
moreover, in implementing the Constitution, one should consider
the political and practical consequences of a proposed
interpretation, how other actors will administer it, and the likely
responses of other institutions or persons.
5. Arguments from judicial precedent: In interpreting the
Constitution, one should follow, develop, and apply existing
doctrines according to the rule of law, general and impartial
reasons, and the practices of judicial precedent.
6. Arguments from political convention. All other things
being equal, in interpreting the Constitution, one should defer to
settled precedents, practices, and conventions within and among
the political branches.
7. Arguments from custom and lived experience: All other
things being equal, interpretations of the Constitution should be
guided by the customs, expectations, and ways of life of those who
live under it; conversely, interpretations that disrupt or
undermine people’s expectations, customs, and ways of life should
be suspect.
8. Arguments from natural law or natural rights: One should
interpret the Constitution to protect those rights that
governments are or should be instituted to preserve and protect;
one should interpret the Constitution consistent with the
requirements of human flourishing and human nature.
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9. Arguments from national ethos: One should interpret the
Constitution consistent with the character of the nation and its
institutions and with important, widely shared and widely
honored values of Americans and American culture.
10. Arguments from political tradition: One should interpret
the Constitution consistent with the values of the American
political tradition and the meaning and lessons of important
events in American history.
11. Arguments from honored authority: In interpreting the
Constitution, one should look to the values, statements, and
examples of honored figures in American life, including the
Founding generation and important historical figures like George
Washington and Abraham Lincoln who symbolize American
values and teach valuable lessons.
D. DIFFERENCES IN CLASSIFICATION
My focus on underlying theories of justification explains the
differences between my list of eleven common topics and
Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s topic catalogs. In some cases, I classify
arguments differently. For example, Bobbitt does not treat
arguments from original meaning as textual arguments; textual
arguments, he says, concern only contemporary meaning.113 He
also does not accept as valid constitutional arguments based on
natural rights or natural law.114 I disagree on both counts. In other
cases, Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s lists do not crisply distinguish
between what I consider to be quite different theories of
justification. For example, Bobbitt’s modality of “doctrinal”
argument appears to lump together appeals to judicial doctrine—
which gain their authority from rule-of-law values—with
arguments from political settlements and interbranch
conventions, social customs, and cultural traditions.115 In my view,

113. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 26.
114. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911, 1913, 1916–17.
115. This is because in each situation the interpreter crafts a set of applicable rules or
principles out of past practices; for example, one might infer the existence of an
interbranch convention by noting how Congress and the President have interacted in
certain situations over long periods of time. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION supra note 18, at 78–79 (“The most important doctrinal approach … is
not one simply applying a test from precedent, but, . . . crafting a test from precedential
materials.”).
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each of these arguments rest on different kinds of justifications.116
Fallon has two fairly capacious categories in his list: arguments
from “theory” and arguments from “value.”117 These categories,
as Fallon himself recognizes, comprehend a wide array of
different and potentially incompatible justifications.118
A second reason why my list of topics looks different from
Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s is that their catalogs are not very good at
explaining how lawyers use history in constitutional
interpretation. When it came to history, Bobbitt and Fallon were
heavily influenced by the debates over originalism that were just
getting started in the early 1980s. Each of them described a
category of “historical” arguments, but they identified arguments
from history with arguments about the intentions or
understandings of the framers.119
By speaking in this way, they encouraged people to think that
historical arguments were just arguments about adoption history,
and, in particular, arguments about original understanding or
original intentions. Each of them associated historical argument
with originalism, and originalism with historical argument. Given
the debates that were roiling law schools at the time, this may have
been an excusable oversight. But it fostered unnecessary
confusion.
First, lawyers use history in many other ways than simply
inquiring into original intention or original understanding.

116. It is also possible, as Ernest Young has urged, that none of Bobbitt’s modalities
actually covers customs, conventions, settlements, or other nonjudicial precedents. See
Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects
of Historical Practice In Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 546–47 (2016).
117. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1200–02 (describing different
types of arguments from constitutional theory); cf. id. at 1204–09 (describing a wide range
of different kinds of philosophical theories that might generate arguments from value).
118. Id.
119. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 9 (defining “[h]istorical
arguments” as those which “depend on a determination of the original understanding of
the constitutional provision to be construed”); BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 13 (“A[] historical modality may be attributed to
constitutional arguments that claim that the framers and ratifiers [of a constitutional
provision] intended, or did not intend . . . .”); id. (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision
is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”). Similarly, Richard Fallon’s list of constitutional
arguments refers to “[a]rguments of historical intent,” which he identified with “the intent
of the framers.” Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1244, 1254. Both
Bobbitt and Fallon wrote at a time when the focus of originalist theory was shifting from
original intention and understanding to original meaning.
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Lawyers look to post-adoption history as well as adoption history.
And when they look to history, they are not always trying to
discover commands in the past that bind us in the present. For
lawyers, history may serve as a negative example rather than a
positive command. It may explain how things came to be. It may
emphasize what has changed and how different the past is from
the present.
Second, calling a certain class of originalist arguments
“historical” arguments tends to suggest that originalism is the only
approach to constitutional law that is genuinely “historical,” and
that those who reject originalist arguments also reject a historical
approach. That has never been the case.
Third, identifying historical arguments with arguments from
original intent encouraged the idea that “originalism” is centrally
about discovering original intentions. But even as Bobbitt and
Fallon wrote, originalism was changing, and most originalists
today focus on original public meaning rather than original
intentions.
Fourth, Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s lists suggested that
originalism, i.e., “historical” argument, was a single, distinctive
mode of argument. But originalism is actually a large family of
competing theories, not a single theory. In addition, there is not a
single style of argument called “originalist” argument. Lawyers
use adoption history to make originalist arguments that employ
each of the standard modalities of constitutional argument.120
Perhaps the most important difference between my list of
arguments and Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s is that there is no separate
class of “historical” arguments. That is not because no forms of
argument use history; rather, it is because all of them can use
history and usually do. Each mode of justification makes different
kinds of history relevant, and shapes the way that lawyers search
for, describe and use history.
For each modality of constitutional argument—text,
structure, purpose, consequences, and so on—there is a different
way to use history. Because I divide arguments into eleven
different categories, it follows that there are (at least) eleven
different distinctive uses of history in constitutional argument.

120.

Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, supra note 2, at 691–707.
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One can compare Bobbitt and Fallon’s approach with mine
using these two diagrams:121
Figure 1: Modalities of Constitutional Argument

Bobbitt’s model of modalities of constitutional argument.

In Bobbitt’s model, historical argument is a separate
modality: it concerns Framers’ intent or understanding, and
focuses on the history of adoption. Note also that arguments from
judicial precedent, tradition, political convention, and custom are
treated as a single type of argument.
Figure 2:
Construction

Historical

Argument

in

Constitutional

A basic model of styles of argument in constitutional construction.

121.

Id. at 661.
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By contrast, my catalogue of topics classifies and separates
arguments according to different ways of justifying a position.
Note that there is no separate modality of historical argument;
instead, history is available to support each style of justification.
Moreover, history is not limited to the Framers’ intentions,
meanings, or understandings; no distinction is made between
adoption and nonadoption history.
E. THE MODALITIES ARE INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED
JUSTIFICATIONS

The standard topics that lawyers use in constitutional
argument are useful because they rest on commonplaces about
constitutional interpretation—their underlying theories of
justification are widely accepted. In fact, these theories are widely
accepted only when stated in the most general way—for example,
that “one should follow the text.” Lawyers often disagree about
theories of interpretation, about which kinds of considerations are
the most important, and about how to justify constitutional
claims. These disagreements are also part of legal culture and of
the practice of constitutional argument.
First, as one can see from the above list, the implicit
justifications underlying the modalities are fairly shallow and
undeveloped. That is often true of rhetorical commonplaces. They
are widely accepted precisely because people don’t think very
deeply about why they are so.
Second, people might disagree about the scope and the
boundaries of these widely shared theories. Everyone might agree
that one should follow the text. But people might disagree about
what constitutes a valid argument from the text. Some people
(like Bobbitt himself) might argue that textual arguments concern
only the contemporary meaning of the text;122 others might insist
that the only legitimate arguments from the text concern its
original meaning. (In my view, both qualify as textual arguments,
although contemporary meanings are only relevant to
construction.) Some people might argue that one must interpret
the constitutional text as an ordinary person would understand

122.

BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 25–26.
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it;123 while others might insist that the text must be read in the way
that a well-trained lawyer (at the time of adoption) would read
it.124 All of these contrasting views fall within the general class of
textual argument.
Arguments from text usually include arguments that employ
familiar canons of construction. But people might disagree about
the nature and scope of these canons. They might disagree about
whether the canons of interpretation can be conclusive, especially
because in many cases canons have counter-canons. People might
distinguish between canons that are default assumptions or
common-sense assumptions about how to read language, and
other, more substantive canons of construction, which state a
preference for certain kinds of policies where the text is unclear.
(An example is the rule of lenity in criminal law.) Linguistic and
grammatical canons, they might argue, should be included as part
of textual argument, but not substantive canons. Finally, people
might disagree about which canons are appropriate or legitimate
in constitutional interpretation and about the best way to state
and apply them. For example, some people might argue that
canons that are appropriate for statutes, wills, contracts, or
treaties are not appropriate for constitutional interpretation
because constitutions have a different nature than these other
legal documents. One could find similar disagreements within
each of the modalities.
Third, even if people agree that a particular form of
argument is valid, they might still disagree about why it is valid.
Take arguments from purpose. At the most general level, most
lawyers might agree that lawyers should interpret the
Constitution according to its purposes. But there might be many
different competing theories explaining why people should
interpret according to purpose. Disagreements about why one
should interpret according to purpose, in turn, may connect to
disagreements about what kinds of purposes should count as
123. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (“In interpreting this
text, we are to be guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their natural and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.’”).
124. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 751,
770–72 (2009) (arguing that it is “mistaken” to apply the meanings of ordinary persons
rather the meanings of well-trained lawyers, who can explain the Constitution’s operation
to the public).
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relevant. For example, people might disagree about whose
purposes are relevant (framers, adopters, the general public).
People might disagree about whether one should look to actual
beliefs or merely to a constructed purpose inferred from the text.
Finally, people might disagree about the level of generality at
which to state purposes or intentions. Each of these
disagreements about the scope of arguments from purpose may
reflect deeper theoretical disagreements about why purpose
counts in interpreting the Constitution.
In his work on legal reasoning, Cass Sunstein explains the
phenomenon of “incompletely theorized agreements.”125 He
notes that people with very different moral or political theories
can still converge on what he called “narrow” or “shallow”
agreements on substantive issues.126 Commonplaces in rhetoric
operate in an analogous way. Topics like the modalities allow
people with very different theories of legal authority to use
common forms of argument to make legal arguments that are
comprehensible (and potentially persuasive) to each other.
People don’t have to completely agree about the scope of textual
arguments or even why textual arguments are valid in order to
make them. People can switch from abstract to concrete accounts
of purpose as they move from case to case; they can offer
arguments about constitutional structure without agreeing in all
respects on the correct theory of constitutional structure, and so
on. Hence, we might call the theories of justification associated
with the modalities incompletely theorized justifications.
The difference from Sunstein’s model is that we are not
converging on specific substantive conclusions in constitutional
law, but rather on ways of arguing for particular positions in
constitutional law.127 Under Sunstein’s account, for example, most
lawyers can agree that racial discrimination violates the
Constitution, but still disagree about what constitutes racial
discrimination and the reasons why discrimination violates the
Constitution. My point is that most lawyers will agree that
arguments from purpose are a valid way to justify a constitutional
125. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733
(1995).
126. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 10–11 (1999).
127. Sunstein, supra note 125, at 1734–37 (explaining that incompletely theorized
agreements refer to agreements about outcomes or results, backed by different
justifications).
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interpretation, but they may still disagree about what constitutes
a valid argument from purpose and why we should accept these
arguments. The modalities offer a common language for lawyers
both to persuade others and to disagree with them.
There is one other important difference: Sunstein offered the
idea of incompletely theorized agreements to explain why judges
should make minimalist decisions—decisions that are either
narrow in their scope or shallow in their theoretical
ramifications.128 But the incompletely theorized justifications we
find in constitutional topics do not give us any particular reason
for adopting minimalism. One can use the very same modalities
to argue for maximalist positions as well as minimalist positions.
Rather, we should understand Sunstein’s argument for judicial
minimalism as itself an example of how lawyers use rhetorical
topics in making theoretical claims. Sunstein’s argument for
judicial minimalism is an argument of institutional prudence that
asserts that a minimalist approach to interpretation will have the
best consequences.
F. THE MODALITIES, ORIGINAL LEGAL METHODS, AND
ORIGINAL LAW

Constitutional construction uses the commonplaces of
constitutional argument. These commonplaces originate in the
common law at the time of the Founding. Bobbitt pointed out that
“we have the modalities we do because the Anglo-Americans
took the forms of argument at common law and superimposed
these on the state when they imposed a written, limiting
constitution on the state.”129
This claim connects my arguments about the use of topics in
constitutional construction with two alternative versions of
originalism. The first is original legal methods originalism,
championed by John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport;130 the
second is original law originalism, introduced by William Baude
and Stephen Sachs.131

128. SUNSTEIN, supra note 126, at ix–xiii, 4–6.
129. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1891.
130. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10.
131. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV L.
REV. 1079 (2017); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349
(2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 817 (2015).

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION

7/21/18 3:15 PM

195

McGinnis and Rappaport argue that we should interpret the
Constitution according to the original legal methods that lawyers
at the time of adoption would have used; we should use the
methods of 1787 for the original Constitution, the methods of the
1860s for the Reconstruction Amendments, and so on.132
In Living Originalism, I offered several criticisms of this
approach. Drawing on the work of several historians of the
Founding era, I pointed out that there may have been no
consensus about the interpretive methods that people should use
to interpret the new Constitution, because nothing like the 1787
Constitution had been enacted before, and there was some
dispute whether the proper analogy was to contracts, trusts, wills,
treaties, or previous state constitutions.133 There was also a
dispute about whether the text, or parts of the text, should be
interpreted as ordinary language accessible to citizens or as
specialized legal language.134 A final problem is that McGinnis
and Rappaport were trying to set out the basic theory of original
legal methods rather than give a detailed account. Although they
offered a few suggestions based on readings of Blackstone and
other authors,135 they did not attempt serious historical research
into discovering the original legal methods of 1789, much less the

132. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 116, 138 (“If enactors of subsequent
amendments deemed other rules applicable to those amendments, those interpretive rules
would apply.”).
133. See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyers’ Constitution:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 295 (2011); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912–13 (2008); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555–56, 561, 571–73 (2003); BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 47 n. 18, 353–56. See also Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the
Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 161 (2015) (reviewing MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT,
supra note 10) (denying that there were pre-existing methods for interpreting the new
federal Constitution, because no such constitution had ever existed before).
134. Compare Cornell, supra note 133, at 304–05 and LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–7
(2004) (arguing for popular understandings) with MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note
10, at 130–32 (arguing that lawyers’ understandings count over popular understandings)
and John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the
Law
(2017)
(San
Diego
Legal
Studies
Paper
No.
17-262),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928936 (arguing that most of the
Constitution’s language involves legal terms of art). See also Baude & Sachs, The Law of
Interpretation, supra note 131, at 1141–42 (arguing that the question of whether elite
lawyers’ interpretive rules control is itself a legal question.).
135. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 133–38.
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original legal methods of 1865, 1868, and so on.136 Nor did they
take into account the possibility of serious differences in
perspective between 18th and 21st century lawyers in how they
understood the practice of interpretation.137 Instead, McGinnis
and Rappaport assumed that even though they were 21st century
lawyers, the practices of 18th century lawyers were sufficiently
intelligible to them that they could understand and reproduce the
same moves that these lawyers made.
Despite these concerns, I did share one point of agreement
with McGinnis and Rappaport. I noted that if all they meant by
“original legal methods” were the standard forms of legal
argument inherited from the common law, there would be a great
deal of convergence between their views on constitutional
interpretation and my views on constitutional construction.138 In
Living Originalism, I argued that in constitutional construction,
lawyers should use familiar common-law modalities of
argument.139 In fact, the only examples of original legal methods
that McGinnis and Rappaport identified in their 2013 book
Originalism and the Good Constitution were common law
modalities: arguments about the original meaning of the text,
arguments from canons of statutory construction, arguments from
structure, and arguments from purpose or intention.140
McGinnis and Rappaport deny that there is any evidence of
construction in the Founding period;141 yet at the same time, they
point to evidence that lawyers used standard common-law forms
of argument—the very techniques that I assert are used in

136. Id. at 133 (“We do not have space to provide a comprehensive account of the
original interpretive rules.”); id. at 138 (assuming no significant changes in interpretive
rules at least until the beginning of the 20th century).
137. See, e.g., JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (forthcoming 2018).
138. Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, U. ILL. L. REV. 815,
824–25 (2012).
139. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 4, 46, 89, 129, 205, 229, 256–57,
272, 333, 341–42 (explaining that in constitutional interpretation and constitutional
construction interpreters should use all of the traditional modalities of constitutional
argument).
140. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 133–38 (arguing that original
methods included textualism and intentionalism); id. at 142 (“When the interpretation of
language was unclear, the interpreter would consider the relevant originalist evidence—
evidence based on text, structure, history, and intent—and select the interpretation that
was supported more strongly by that evidence.”).
141. Id. at 144–45 (citing to Blackstone and Joseph Story).
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constitutional construction! This suggests that our approaches
have more in common than one might think.
The central difference between our approaches, I think, does
not concern original legal methods but original legal meanings.
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the Constitution is a lawyer’s
document, and that most of its language involves legal
terminology.142 Accordingly, they ask how 18th century lawyers,
applying original legal methods, would have understood and
applied the legal meaning of the Constitution. They assume that
in most cases lawyers would have converged on a single legal
meaning of the Constitution’s words and phrases.143 They argue
that this professional legal meaning does not change over time,
although, of course, it may produce unexpected results given
changes in facts. By contrast, I argue that we are not bound by
Founding-era lawyers’ initial constructions of the text, although
their constructions should surely inform our own. Rather, each
generation must engage in construction of the text, building on
the constructions of previous generations dating back to the time
of adoption.144
Should we conclude that the above list of eleven topics
constitute original legal methods or are part of original legal
methods? I want to make a more modest claim: These eleven
topics are the descendants in contemporary legal practice of the
various methods that Founding-era lawyers used to argue with
each other. We can trace examples of these topics back to the
Founding, and for that matter, to Reconstruction. Lawyers may
employ these arguments in different ways today than they did at
the Founding. But I maintain that there is nothing inappropriate
about lawyers using contemporary versions of these topics in
interpreting the Constitution today.
I offer this more modest claim for two reasons. First, I expect
that as historical research proceeds, we will find considerable
differences between how we think about law, legal argument and
constitutions today and the way that lawyers at the Founding (or
142. McGinnis & Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, supra
note 134.
143. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 140 (“[T]he evidence suggests that
ambiguity and vagueness were resolved by considering interpretive rules that resulted in a
single interpretive meaning.”).
144. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 227–28 (arguing that we
do not have to accept lawyers’ initial constructions of the Reconstruction Amendments on
questions of race).

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

198

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/21/18 3:15 PM

[Vol. 33:145

Reconstruction) did.145 Second, I believe that even if our practices
of argument have changed in important respects, it is still
perfectly legitimate to apply them in constitutional construction.
That is because these contemporary methods are part of our
contemporary “law of interpretation,” to use Baude and Sachs’
phrase.146
Even without extensive historical research, we have at least
some evidence that the way lawyers used common topics at the
Founding may not correspond in all respects to the way that
people would use them today.
Three examples will illustrate the point. First, H. Jefferson
Powell famously argued that the Founding generation, following
British practice, did not make arguments from legislative
intention; rather, they made arguments about the purpose or
intent of a statute drawing from the text of the statute.147 A few
arguments based on the original intention of the framers or the
understanding of the ratifiers did appear in the 1790s; for
example, in the debate over the Jay Treaty.148 Today, however,
arguments from original intention are commonplace. Arguments
from original intention and legislative history are subtopics of the
larger class of arguments from purpose and intention. These
subtopics became commonplaces in constitutional argument only
after the Founding. Even so, I would count them as valid forms of
argument in constitutional construction today.
Second, although the Founding era certainly knew how to
make arguments from consequences, a certain class of arguments,
namely arguments about judicial prudence and restraint, develop
during the first half of the 20th century. Such arguments are most
famously associated with progressive Justices like Frankfurter
and Brandeis (for example, in Ashwander v. TVA).149 Foundingera lawyers had arguments that we might today call arguments for
judicial restraint, but they were based on a different conception of

145. GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 137.
146. See supra note 131.
147. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 897–98, 903 (1985).
148. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 360–65 (1996).
149. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring); BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 64–67; BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 101–02.
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the judicial role.150 We speak of judicial restraint today precisely
because the role of the judiciary has evolved from the Founding
era.151 The modern subtopics of judicial restraint and institutional
prudence become common topics in constitutional law many
years after the Founding; even so, I consider them valid
arguments in contemporary constitutional construction.
Third, arguments that employ public choice theory or
political science literatures on representation and voting systems
are subtopics within structural argument: they show how different
kinds of institutional designs have different kinds of effects for
republican government. But the framers did not have access to
this literature and they did not use this terminology, even though,
of course, we may attempt to translate the arguments they did
make into contemporary political science terminology. These
subtopics developed long after the Founding. But this makes them
no less valid for constitutional construction today. (The same is
true of many doctrinal topics—for example, Youngstown analysis,
and the idea of representation reinforcement made famous by
footnote 4 of Carolene Products).152
We can generalize this point. Because special topics in law
(or the sciences) inevitably rest on the growth of professional
knowledge, the number and kind of subtopics may evolve as
knowledge develops. Hence many subtopics in common use today
would have been unknown at the Founding, but they are valid
arguments in constitutional construction today.
How lawyers make arguments today may not correspond in
all respects to the way that lawyers made arguments at the
Founding precisely because Founding-era lawyers lived in a
different world with a different set of assumptions about the law
(including the common law), the nature of constitutions, and the
nature of government.153 They tended to speak in terms of
150. See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 34–38 (1990).
151. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 5, 120–23 (2001) (arguing that the modern conception of judicial restraint
emerged during the New Deal period from the acceptance of a very powerful Court that
was effectively supreme in the field of constitutional interpretation, in contrast to the
Founding-era model of departmentalism and popular constitutionalism).
152. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
153. GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 137.
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discovering what the common law always already required; today
we speak of developing the common law in a principled fashion.
What an argument meant to them in the context of their times
might not be what it means to us in the context of our own. The
way we argue today has evolved in legal practice from the kind of
arguments that earlier lawyers made; even so, these changes in
jurisprudential outlook do not render our common topics invalid
for contemporary construction.
William Baude and Stephen Sachs’s conception of original
law originalism is closer to this position. They argue that
interpreters should apply the law at the time of the Founding, the
legal methods that existed at the time of the Founding, and the
common law legal doctrines of interpretation that existed at the
time of the Founding. But they add that interpreters should also
apply any legitimate changes in law, in legal methods, or in the
law of interpretation that have occurred since the Founding.154
Like McGinnis and Rappaport, Baude and Sachs have not yet
attempted a thorough historical study of the original legal
methods, or the original law of interpretation at the Founding.
Nor have they done significant historical research into all of the
moments of change in interpretive rules that have occurred since
the Founding and whether each of these changes were legitimate.
Instead, they appear to work on the assumption that unless there
is evidence to the contrary, contemporary lawyers are using the
legitimate descendants of original legal methods and the original
law of interpretation.155 They operate on a defeasible presumption
of continuity and legitimacy.

154. See Baude & Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, supra note 131, at 1127 (arguing
that canons of interpretation apply if they existed at the Founding or resulted from
legitimate changes in interpretive rules since the Founding); see also id. at 1130 (“[A]t a
first approximation, we’d say that the appropriate theory of construction is simply to apply
the law of interpretation.”). Baude and Sachs argue that some kinds of interpretive
practices are “application rules,” because they explain what future decisionmakers should
do at the time of application. Id. at 1133. Because they operate at the time of application
and not at the time the text is enacted, “a change to an application rule can have full effect
in all future cases to which the rule applies, even if they involve texts that were adopted
long ago.” Id. at 1134. According to this account, to the extent that topics for construction
involve application rules, even if they change over time, interpreters may still use them to
apply the Constitution to new fact situations.
155. See id. at 1132 (suggesting that if the interpretive rules are understood correctly,
there may have been much less change than one might imagine.).
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G. THE TOPICS IN JAMES MADISON’S SPEECH ON THE FIRST
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
The casebook that I co-edit with Sanford Levinson, Akhil
Amar, and Reva Siegel emphasizes the role of the modalities in
interpreting the Constitution.156 We begin the book with James
Madison’s 1791 speech on the constitutionality of the First Bank
of the United States.157 We do so precisely because it mentions so
many of the modalities. Madison’s speech is useful not merely
because he is a famous founder, but because of what his speech
reveals about the practice of constitutional argument at the
Founding. Madison’s speech relies on commonplaces about
interpretation; he assumed that he and his audience shared many
assumptions about how to analyze a constitutional problem and
make a constitutional argument. Here are the principles that
Madison says we should consider in interpreting the Constitution:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
Government cannot be just.
[2] Where the meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever
they may be, are to be admitted—where doubtful, it is fairly
triable by its consequences.
[3] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a
proper guide.
[4] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties.
[5] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only
the degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to be
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this
will depend the probability or improbability of its being left to
construction.158

Proposition (1) describes structural argument; (2) an
argument from consequences; (3) and (4) could be arguments
from text or from purpose and intention; and (5) is a subspecies
of structural argument resting on the idea that the federal
government is one of limited and enumerated powers.

156. BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (7th ed.
2018).
157. Id. at 29–32 (reprinting James Madison’s Speech to the House of Representatives
(1791), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 480–90 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999)).
158. Id. at 29.
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Textual arguments include arguments that compare different
parts of the text as well as arguments from widely shared canons
of construction. Later in his speech, Madison employs common
law canons of construction to argue that we cannot imply the
power to create a bank from enumerated powers like the Coinage
Clause.159 Madison uses the canon of redundancy—that, all other
things being equal, we should not interpret a text so that its
provisions are unnecessary or redundant.160 This canon counsels
against the argument that Congress has whatever powers might
be related to or implied by the list of enumerated powers, because
a broad reading of implied Congressional power would make
several of the enumerated powers redundant: “Congress have
power ‘to regulate the value of money’; yet it is expressly added,
not left to be implied, that counterfeiters may be punished.”
Similarly, “[t]he regulation and calling out of militia are more
appurtenant to war than the proposed Bank to borrowing; yet the
former is not left to construction.”161
Madison also makes arguments from purpose and intention
to explain the proper interpretation of the necessary and proper
clause: “The clause is in fact merely declaratory of what would
have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and,
as it were, technical means of executing those powers. In this sense
it has been explained by the friends of the Constitution, and
ratified by the State Conventions.”162 He also points to the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as concurrent expositions that provide
evidence of the adopters’ purpose to restrict federal power.163
Madison also rejects the argument for a broad reading of
implied powers because of its consequences: “If implications, thus
remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may
be formed that will reach every object of legislation, every object
within the whole compass of political economy.”164
Madison also mentions arguments from precedent, or more
correctly, from previous practice by the political branches,
working under the assumption that the new Constitution gives
159. Id. at 30.
160. John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629
(2016) (discussing the interpretive principle “that law should generally be understood or
designed to minimize redundancy”).
161. BREST ET AL., supra note 156, at 30.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 32.
164. Id. at 30.
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Congress all of the powers it enjoyed in the Articles of
Confederation: “The case of the Bank established by the former
Congress has been cited as a precedent.”165 But Madison argues
that it is not an appropriate precedent: “This was known, he said,
to have been the child of necessity. It never could be justified by
the regular powers of the articles of Confederation.”166
Madison concludes his speech with a flurry of different
modes of argument: “It appeared on the whole, he concluded, that
the power exercised by the bill was condemned by the silence of
the constitution [text]; was condemned by the rule of
interpretation arising out of the constitution [same]; was
condemned by its tendency to destroy the main characteristic of
the constitution [structure]; was condemned by the expositions of
the friends of the constitution [to] the public [purpose or
intention]; was condemned by the apparent intention of the
parties which ratified the constitution [same]; was condemned by
the explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves
to the Constitution [same]; and he hoped it would receive its final
condemnation, by the vote of this house.”167
If we look to early decisions of the Supreme Court, we will
find the other modalities of argument. Calder v. Bull makes
arguments from natural law, natural rights, precedent, and
customary practice;168 the various opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia
offer arguments from natural rights, ethos and political tradition,
as well as from structure, purpose, and text;169 Iredell’s dissent in
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 32.
168. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (holding that the Connecticut
legislature did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution by granting a
new trial in a probate case); id. at 388-89 (opinion of Chase, J.) (arguing that legislatures
may not violate principles of republican government, the social compact, and natural law,
but that Connecticut had not done so in this case); id. at 391–92 (arguing for the
construction of Ex Post Facto clause based on precedents of prior state constitutions); id.
at 393 (arguing from British precedents and Blackstone’s Commentaries); id. at 395–97
(opinion of Patterson, J.) (arguing for meaning of Ex Post Facto Clause from established
customs, practices and usages of the state of Connecticut and other states); id. at 399–400
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (arguing from purpose of Ex Post Facto Clause to limit it to criminal
cases).
169. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that citizens of other
states may sue the State of Georgia in federal court); id. at 456–68, 466 (opinion of Wilson,
J.) (arguing from social contract theory and “the principles of general jurisprudence”); id.
at 462–64 (arguing from ethos of American government, which is based on popular
sovereignty and rejects monarchy, as well as from the text of the Preamble); id. at 464–66
(arguing from “the general texture of the Constitution” and from the intentions of the
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Chisholm argues from English common law precedents and from
Blackstone’s account of natural law.170
H. THREE KINDS OF CONSTRAINTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION

The modalities play a special role in constitutional
interpretation. They connect the Constitution’s original meaning
to the practice of constitutional construction. Constitutional
constructions that employ standard modalities of argument rest
on widely accepted theories—commonplaces—about the
permissible ways to justify an interpretation of the Constitution.
The connection between topics and widely accepted justifications
allows us to say that constructions are guided by and attempt to
further the Constitution.
One can therefore say that constructions are connected to the
Constitution, or, in the alternative, that the Constitution guides
and contributes to constitutional construction, when (1) people in
a shared practice of legal argument, (2) employ shared topics for
analyzing, arguing, and solving constitutional problems and
developing constitutional doctrines, and (3) when these common
topics, in turn, rest on widely accepted theories of justification.
Call this the objective constraint on constitutional construction. It
is objective because it depends on the social fact of wide
acceptance of particular topics and justifications.

people who instituted it); id. at 466 (arguing from the text of Article III); id. at 466–68
(opinion of Cushing, J.) (arguing from the text of Article III); id. at 468 (arguing from
federal structure); id. at 470–72 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (arguing from ethos and traditions
of the United States as a government created by a free and sovereign people in which
government officials are agents of the people, in contrast to European states, which are
based on feudalism and monarchy); id. at 473 (arguing from ethos or character of
American government: “the equal rights we claim; with the equality we profess to admire
and maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes”); id. at
474–78 (arguing from text of the Preamble and Article III); id. at 477 (arguing from “the
great and leading principles of a free and equal national government, one of the great
objects of which is, to ensure justice to all: To the few against the many, as well as to the
many against the few”).
170. Id. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is incumbent upon us to enquire, whether
previous to the adoption of the Constitution (which period, or the period of passing the
law, in respect to the object of this enquiry, is perfectly equal) an action of the nature like
this before the Court could have been maintained against one of the States in the Union
upon the principles of the common law.”); id. at 442 (quoting Blackstone’s view that the
sovereign allows lawsuits at his discretion and arguing that this view “is exactly consonant
to what is laid down by the writers on natural law.”).
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This objective constraint is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. As noted in Part II above, when participants engage in
constitutional construction, fidelity to the Constitution requires
them to have a particular interpretive attitude both about the
Constitution and about their work. This interpretive attitude
operates as a subjective constraint on their arguments.
Finally, there is an intersubjective constraint. Professional
legal norms and processes of social influence shape when lawyers
and judges regard proposed constructions as off-the-wall or onthe-wall.171 Good faith constructions, especially by non-lawyers
and political activists, may sometimes be off-the-wall from the
perspective of most lawyers and judges, because of their
professional training and shared professional norms. Therefore
most lawyers and judges will consider these proposed
constructions bad or failed attempts at construction. The
expectation that government officials should limit themselves to
on-the-wall constructions constrains construction in a third way;
it is intersubjective because it relies on what members of the
professional community think about each other’s work. (In fact,
what I have called the “objective” constraint of arguing through
the modalities is also intersubjective.) Lawyers and judges
discipline each other through professional education and
socialization, and through the ways that they argue with each
other.
Nevertheless, people’s views about the plausibility of
particular arguments can change over time. Professional norms
are hardly insulated from the outside world. Processes of social
influence both within and outside of the legal profession allow
constitutional dissenters to try to change people’s minds through
legal and moral argument and through political mobilization.
Sometimes, as a result of these processes, proposed constructions
will move from off-the-wall to on-the-wall, and sometimes they
will even become common sense or orthodox later on.172
At any point in time, intersubjective constraint can keep
constructions of the Constitution within certain limits.
Nevertheless, it can also work at cross-purposes with fidelity to
original meaning. That is because the dominant consensus among
lawyers and judges about the Constitution may be contrary to its
171.
172.

BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 36, at 179–180.
Id. at 181–82.
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original meaning, or to its spirit and underlying purposes. If
lawyers and judges stick only to on-the-wall arguments, they may
actually hinder the enforcement of original meaning.
Constitutional dissent is necessary to rectify these mistakes. Like
other constitutional dissenters, many originalists have made offthe-wall arguments in an attempt to restore the Constitution’s
meaning, spirit, and underlying purposes. This example shows
why constitutional dissent—including arguments regarded as offthe-wall at a given point in time—is an important feature of any
system of constitutional construction.
In sum, constitutional construction is constrained in three
ways: by objective constraints—the use of common topics; by
subjective constraints—interpretive attitudes of fidelity and good
faith; and by intersubjective constraints—the professional norms
and social processes of influence that determine, at any point in
time, which constructions are judged on-the-wall and off-the-wall.
Despite these three kinds of constraints, however, there will still
be many disagreements about the best construction of the
Constitution. For example, several possible positions on a given
question can be on-the-wall at any point in time.
I. CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO THE LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION
In describing these various constraints on constitutional
construction, I do not deny that participants in constitutional
argument may have a range of different political values and policy
preferences, and that they attempt to further those values and
preferences through constitutional argument and constitutional
development. Nor do I deny that the development of
constitutional construction often reflects struggles between
people’s political values and policy preferences. Nothing I say
here is inconsistent with either the perspective of political science
or the legal realist account of constitutional decisionmaking.
Often the development of constitutional doctrine is the result of
struggles over what Sanford Levinson and I call the “high politics”
of constitutional principle and value.173 That “high politics” is
shaped by contemporary problems, interests, and political
mobilizations. So it was in the years immediately after the
Founding; so it is to this day.
173.

See supra note 41.
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I am interested in a different set of questions. First, how can
people, acting in good faith, be guided by the Constitution in their
development of constitutional doctrine? Second, how can people,
acting in good faith, attempt to maintain fidelity to the
Constitution as they adapt to successive waves of political,
economic, demographic, and technological change? Third, how
can people who may have very different values and interests
engage in reasoned discussion and analysis about the best way to
implement and apply the Constitution, so that they can
understand themselves as engaged in a common enterprise?
Fourth, what tools of analysis can people bring to bear for these
tasks? Fifth, how do these tools connect their work—including
their inevitable disagreements—to the furtherance of the
Constitution?
Understanding the modalities as commonplaces and special
topics allows us to answer these questions.
First, the topics help ensure that construction is according to
law. When Madison makes his arguments about the First Bank,
he reasons about the best construction of the Constitution using
standard common law approaches of text (including canons of
construction), purpose, intention, consequences, and so on. He
uses these topics to make legal arguments, apply legal sources,
and draw legal conclusions. In common law systems, the work of
constructing doctrine involves, to a very great extent, employing
standard topics and approaches to articulate legal theories and
offer legal arguments about how best to continue existing
practices.
Second, the use of common topics allows the Constitution to
guide or contribute to construction, even when original meaning
“runs out.” Consider once again Madison’s 1791 speech against
the constitutionality of the First Bank. Madison’s position was not
the only possible construction of the Constitution. The President
and most members of Congress disagreed with him at the time
and his view was ultimately not adopted.174 Indeed, Madison
himself later came to accept the constitutionality of a national
bank. He signed a bill authorizing a Second Bank in light of

174. The standard account of the fight over the First Bank is BRAY HAMMOND,
BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114–43
(1957).

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

208

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/21/18 3:15 PM

[Vol. 33:145

“deliberate and reiterated precedents,” as well as “expediency
and almost necessity.”175
Madison’s proposed construction of the Constitution in 1791
was not required by original meaning; it was only a possible
implementation, one among many others. It also happened, in
1791, to be Madison’s policy preference.176 Many, if not most,
proposed constructions have these features: they are not required
by original meaning and they further an advocate’s policy
preferences (or a client’s interests).
If Madison’s argument about the bank is not the only position
consistent with original public meaning, and if it also happened to
reflect Madison’s preferred policy, what makes his argument a
construction of the Constitution as opposed to merely Madison’s
policy preference? What connects Madison’s use of common law
modalities to the furtherance of the Constitution?
Note that it is not enough to say that Madison’s argument is
a faithful construction of the Constitution because James Madison
made it, because anyone else acting in good faith—including
people who were not among the Founding generation—could
have made the very same argument. It cannot be that a legal
argument is a permissible construction of the Constitution if made
by an honored authority, but it is not a permissible construction if
made by any other citizen.
When lawyers use the topics, they attempt to analyze and
solve legal problems posed by a legal text. Madison’s speech
attempts to resolve the question of whether the United States can
charter a bank by using common law topics, considering
alternative solutions and discarding them. In the process, he tries
to persuade his audience that his analysis and his solutions are the
best ones. These tasks—problem formation, problem analysis,
problem solution, and audience persuasion—are the point of a
topical approach to legal argument.
Madison says, “where [the meaning of the text is] doubtful, it
is fairly triable by its consequences.”177 When the meaning of text
175. Id. at 210.
176. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcising McCulloch: The Conflict-Ridden History of
American Banking Nationalism and Dodd-Frank Preemption, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1235,
1243 (2013) (arguing that behind Madison’s constitutional objections “was a deeper
ideological opposition to high finance, associated with large Northeastern cities” and a fear
that powerful banks would dominate and corrupt politics).
177. BREST ET AL., supra note 156, at 29.
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is doubtful, a problem arises. How do we solve it? Each modality
offers us ways of solving the problem. In this case, Madison says
that we may “try” (i.e., test out) possible solutions by asking what
consequences they might have. (One can do a similar test with
respect to the criteria of each of the modalities.) If the
consequences of a particular solution are bad or absurd, then
perhaps this solution is not the best way to implement the
Constitution. Perhaps adopting this solution is not the right way
to further the constitutional project. Perhaps it is not consistent
with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution.
I say “perhaps” because it is always possible that the best
implementation doesn’t have the best consequences. Topics are
guides for our thinking, tools for analysis and practical judgment.
Because they are only guides or tools, they do not offer necessary
and sufficient conditions for a correct answer. At most we can say
that bad or absurd consequences are persuasive evidence that our
analysis is faulty; they are merely an indicator that we are going
down the wrong path to a solution.
J. THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION CONNECT CONSTRUCTIONS TO
TOPICS, AND TOPICS TO THE CONSTITUTION
What makes an argument that employs one of the standard
topics (text, purpose, structure, consequences, etc.) useful
evidence of what the Constitution requires? What connects
widely-accepted rhetorical topics to the furtherance of the
Constitution?
The answer is that the modalities rest on justificatory
theories. Each modality is premised on an implicit theory of
justification about what makes a constitutional interpretation a
good interpretation.
Take arguments from consequences as an example. The
implicit theory of justification goes something like this: All other
things being equal, when the text is unclear, the best
implementation of the Constitution is the one that avoids bad or
absurd consequences. When we reason this way, we seek to
further the Constitution rather than merely impose our own
policy preferences. To be sure, we may also be arguing for a
position that accords with our policy preferences—but the point
is that we are explaining to other people why our proposal
furthers the Constitution and is a good implementation of the
Constitution.
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Structural arguments assert that, to paraphrase Madison,
proposed interpretations that undermine the Constitution’s
structures and functions are bad interpretations; conversely, we
should endeavor to interpret the Constitution so that its structures
and functions operate properly. Again, to reason this way is to put
ourselves on the side of the Constitution, and attempt to make it
work.
When I introduced the eleven modalities, I also offered a list
of the implicit theories of justification that underlie them. Each of
these theories explains why arguments of that form are valid
interpretations, and why they are a valid way to implement and
further the Constitution.
Hence, whenever we make an argument that uses the
modalities, our arguments always rest implicitly on a theory of
justification that explains how and why our arguments connect to
the work of implementing and furthering the Constitution. To be
sure, just because our arguments rest on a deeper theory of
justification does not mean that our arguments are good
arguments. It merely means that we have proposed one way to
implement and further the Constitution. If we think that a
proposed construction is bad, then we also think that the
argument does not further and implement the Constitution (and
the constitutional project) very well, and that is why it is a bad
argument. On the other hand, if we think that a construction is
particularly good, then we think it does a good job of furthering
and implementing the Constitution (and the constitutional
project), and that is why it is a good argument.
This approach brings together the three kinds of constraints
on construction—objective, subjective, and intersubjective.
Proposed constructions purport to further the Constitution
because they rest on widely shared normative theories about the
kinds of approaches that implement and further the Constitution.
But this by itself is not sufficient. Even if participants act in good
faith, the proposed construction may be a bad one or at the very
least implausible. Nevertheless, what makes a construction
appear good or bad may change over time as people argue about
the Constitution and seek to persuade each other.
K. COHERENCE AND RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE
So far I’ve argued that topics are devices for considering,
analyzing and evaluating proposed implementations of the
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Constitution. These tools for analysis do not exist in splendid
isolation from each other. They are connected. If the
consequences of a proposed solution are bad or absurd, then
maybe this is not what the Constitution is designed to do (it is not
consistent with its structure). And if the consequences are bad or
absurd, perhaps this solution is not what the Constitution is trying
to achieve (it is not consistent with its purposes). Perhaps this is
not the best reading of the text. Perhaps it is not consistent with a
constitution that protects the rights and interests that
governments are designed to protect (natural rights). Perhaps it is
not consistent with the political values underlying the
Constitution (political tradition or ethos). Again, the operative
word is “perhaps;” we are in the world of plausibility, not
certainty.
Arguments from one modality may therefore influence our
judgments about the other tools we employ. The influence is
reciprocal. Consider a reading that we believe is contrary to the
Constitution’s structure, or in Madison’s words, “destroys the
very characteristic of the Government.”178 If a proposed
construction violates constitutional structure, then perhaps it is
contrary to the Constitution’s purposes; it endangers the rights
and interests that governments are designed to protect; it is not
the best reading of the text; and it is not consistent with the
American political tradition, rightly considered, or with the
political values that underlie the Constitution. If a proposed
reading is contrary to the Constitution’s structure, we should
rethink our assumption that it has good consequences. Perhaps it
will have bad consequences in the long run; perhaps we should
rethink how we understand or measure what consequences are
good or bad.
One can express this relationship in positive as well as
negative terms: a construction that protects the rights and
interests that governments are created to protect may also (but
need not) be more likely to be consistent with constitutional
purposes, respect constitutional structures, avoid bad
consequences, be the best reading of an unclear text, and so on.
Often what makes an argument a good argument within any given
modality may be influenced by how we think about the problem
from the standpoint of the other modalities. Take the example of
178.

Id.
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consequences once again. Our judgment of what constitutes
“good consequences” might change once we reflect on the
potential structural damage to our democratic system, to the rule
of law, to our political traditions, and so on.
This suggests an important difference from Bobbitt’s
approach.
Bobbitt
holds
that
the
modalities
are
incommensurable. Our views of the best arguments within one
modality cannot reasonably affect our views of the best arguments
within another modality because the modalities share no common
metric. That position makes the most sense if one accepts his
original analogy between modalities and different ways of being
true. It makes far less sense if one thinks of modalities as
rhetorical topics—that is, as tools for analysis, problem solving,
persuasion and practical judgment. There are not multiple,
incommensurable truths, but a single, practical problem to be
solved. One perspective for solving a problem might well
influence how we think about the problem from another angle.
After all, what we are trying to do is solve a problem, and
persuade others that our solution is the best one. So coherence
between different ways of attacking the problem may be a virtue,
not a vice—much less a logical impossibility.
In contrast to Bobbitt, Richard Fallon argued that lawyers
implicitly approach constitutional argument with a theory of
“constructivist coherence”:179 He meant that lawyers expect, or at
least hope, that their judgments from one perspective can and
should inform their judgments from another, and they should
work toward the most coherent solution that is practically
possible.180 In this respect, the topical approach to constitutional
construction is closer to Fallon’s model than to Bobbitt’s.
L. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION

Madison’s speech on the First Bank suggests how topical
analysis and argument can be guided by the Constitution and
further the Constitution. When Madison spoke, however, there
was not a body of judicial doctrine expounding the Constitution.
179. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1192–93.
180. Id. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 31 (2000) (explaning that originalists and textualists “seek to braid arguments
from text, history, and structure into an interpretive rope whose strands mutually
reinforce”).
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That is not the case today. When lawyers make arguments, and
when judges decide cases, they do so in the midst of a thicket of
previous judicial decisions. How does the analysis apply in these
situations?
It applies in precisely the same way. When I apply the fourpart test for regulation of symbolic speech in United States. v.
O’Brien181 today, I am also constructing according to law and the
Constitution. I use the various modalities of constitutional
argument to apply an existing doctrinal structure that itself
purports to be a construction of the First Amendment. That is, my
proposed construction builds on previous constructions of the
Constitution that, because of the doctrines of precedent, have the
force of law.
Doctrine has a dual nature. It is both existing law and a set of
topics. One can think of previous case law both as law and as a
short cut or heuristic for solving legal problems. Analyzing
problems through doctrine avoids having to reinvent the wheel
when we face a new constitutional problem.
Viewing doctrine as a short cut or heuristic reveals not only
its advantages but also its limitations. Over time, the sequence of
short cuts and heuristics can travel some distance from the
Constitution’s meaning or from the best construction of its
meaning. That is why, especially in constitutional law, existing
doctrine cannot be a conclusive determination of the
Constitution’s meaning in practice.
The term “doctrinal argument” has two senses. The first,
narrower, sense is reasoning from existing precedents and
applying precedents to facts. The second, broader sense of
doctrinal argument means making arguments of any kind and of
any modality in the midst of existing bodies of doctrine. Thus, the
first sense of doctrinal argument is a synecdoche for the second,
broader sense. It is a part that stands for a larger whole.
People may assume that because most contemporary
constitutional law occurs in the context of thick bodies of caselaw,
that lawyers only engage in one modality of argument—doctrinal
argument, in the narrower sense of reasoning from case to case
and applying existing doctrinal structures to new factual
situations. For that reason, one might assume that theories of
181. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (offering four part test governing regulations of symbolic
speech).
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“common law constitutionalism”—like that championed by
David Strauss182—are theories that use only precedential
argument or that elevate this one modality over all of the others.
In fact, arguments within existing doctrine—like those in the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts—often employ many
different modalities of argument, and the best “doctrinalists” are
really the masters of multiple modalities, not a single one.
Lawyers embed considerations of purpose, text, structure,
consequences, past practice, and tradition—among others—
within their discussions of doctrine.183 This is especially so when
lawyers look to the purposes behind existing doctrines in order to
decide how to apply or modify them in new situations. Lawyers
articulate the purposes behind doctrines in terms of the other
modalities of constitutional argument.
Sometimes, in other words, lawyers and judges recognize that
constitutional doctrine is not the Constitution itself but only the
current way of implementing the Constitution. They understand
that doctrine is only a means to a more important end—upholding
and enforcing the Constitution. When this happens, they treat
doctrine’s short cuts and heuristics as short cuts and heuristics,
and they modify them accordingly, using the other modalities to
justify their approach. Even when lawyers and judges merely
apply existing doctrines—without purporting to change them—
they may use the other modalities to justify their applications.
To be sure, much doctrinal argument, especially in lower
courts, operates within the framework of previous caselaw; it
works on the assumption that existing doctrines are (sufficiently)
sound constructions of the Constitution. There are good reasons
why courts should do this, which mesh with larger justifications
for systems of judicial precedent. First, as noted above, doctrinal
constructions save time so that each judge does not have to
reinvent the wheel in deciding a new constitutional case.184
182. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 34.
183. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 55 (“[E]ven
within an appellate opinion that relies on precedent and sees its purpose as crafting
precedent, the various other modalities have important roles”).
184. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149
(1921) (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every
past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”);
Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in
a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal
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Second, doctrinal constructions serve rule of law values to the
extent that they promote predictability and uniformity in the
application of law.185 Third, as a matter of intellectual humility,
and because of their own limited perspectives, later courts should
not lightly assume that their own constructions of the Constitution
are superior to the constructions of earlier courts.186
Everything is a matter of degree, of course: If later courts
come to the firm conclusion that the constructions of earlier
courts are truly inconsistent with what the Constitution requires,
later courts may feel duty bound by their oath to uphold the
Constitution to adjust these earlier constructions. But if earlier
constructions offer reasonable-if-imperfect solutions and remain
workable, courts should continue to work with them and improve
them, imperfect as they are. In addition, lower federal courts have
a special institutional obligation to respect and work within the
boundaries set by the constructions of higher courts. The process
of applying existing constructions to new facts, moreover, will
eventually produce new distinctions and new doctrines, a process
that may move the doctrinal structure closer to better
implementations of the Constitution.
Much doctrinal argument does not rest content with merely
applying existing doctrines to new facts. Rather, it involves selfconscious changes in doctrine by adding new concepts and
distinctions.
In United States v. Lopez,187 for example, the Supreme Court
limited the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause by
creating a new doctrinal distinction between economic and noneconomic activities. It held that Congress could regulate
economic activities that, viewed in the aggregate, had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but not non-economic
activities.188 This decision did not merely apply previous

and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 102 (1989);
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987).
185. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 184, at 595–98 (discussing arguments from fairness
and predictability).
186. Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 212 (2014);
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 845, 857 (2007); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877, 891–95, 902, 913 (1996).
187. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
188. Id. at 559–61.
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precedents; it created a new way of analyzing regulations under
the Commerce Power.
The justification for Lopez, therefore, cannot be that the
Supreme Court was simply following existing doctrine. It is true
that the Court employed a traditional form of doctrinal argument:
it created a new rule from its interpretation of the facts of previous
cases.189 But the Court also employed other modalities of
constitutional argument to support the new rule it created. The
Court offered arguments about the Constitution’s text, structure,
and purpose. It argued that the purpose and structure of the
Constitution, and the enumeration of powers in Article I, section
8, required the Court to maintain boundaries between local and
national subjects of regulation in order to preserve the benefits of
federalism.190 The Court also argued that any reading of the
Constitution that produced the equivalent of a general federal
police power was incorrect, because it would undermine the
Constitution’s basic structural assumptions.191
In sum, “doctrinal argument” is not simply the use of the
modality of judicial precedent. Courts use most if not all of the
modalities of argument when they reason within existing
doctrines; they also use these modalities when they alter old
doctrines or substitute new ones. Viewed as tools for analysis and
argument, the modalities are just as useful within thick bodies of
doctrine as they are in questions of first impression.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TOPICS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
So far I have noted three important differences between the
topical approach to constitutional construction and Philip
Bobbitt’s famous theory of constitutional modalities. First, the list
of standard topics is different, in part because Bobbitt’s model is
not very good for understanding how lawyers use history. Second,
in contrast to Bobbitt’s position, the topics do not have to be
189. Id.
190. Id. at 566–67 (referring the enumeration of powers in Article I, section 8); id. at
567–68 (arguing that the contrary view “would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States
. . . [and] would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does
not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local”).
191. Id.
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incommensurable. Third, I argue that the topics are consistent
with both originalist and non-originalist theories of
interpretation. By contrast, Bobbitt rejects originalism as an
“ideology,” in part because originalists believe that the original
meaning (or intent or understanding) takes precedence over all
other kinds of considerations.192
These differences, in turn, reflect deeper disagreements
about the relationship between constitutional rhetoric and
constitutional theory. This section goes more deeply into these
differences, using Bobbitt’s theory as a foil to state my own views.
First, Bobbitt’s theory asserts that the modalities are
incommensurable: the best argument from modality A can have
no influence on what should be the best argument from modality
B, and vice-versa. My view, by contrast, is that the modalities are
just rhetorical topics that we use to solve problems and persuade
other people. We define their boundaries pragmatically rather
than rigidly, and different problem-solving approaches may fade
into each other. Moreover, because people employ topics to
analyze and solve problems, they may well assume that different
ways of looking at a problem might helpfully converge on a single
answer or a small set of answers. Or people may reason through a
process of reflective equilibirum between different topical
approaches.
Second, Bobbitt’s theory insists that the modalities must have
equal status. But this assumption, too, is unnecessary. Lawyers
and judges embrace multiple interpretive theories, some of which
adopt a hierarchical ordering—for example, that textual
arguments are more important than arguments from narrative
ethos. Topics are tools for thinking, and these tools can fit into
many different kinds of theoretical structures. Lawyers’ use of
topics is consistent with many different kinds of constitutional
theories, including originalist theories. In fact, most theories of
constitutional law— such as process protection, judicial
minimalism, or original public meaning originalism—usually can
be deployed as topics for legal arguments within the practice of
constitutional law.

192. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1255 (describing originalism as an
ideology involving a misplaced search for determinate answers that obviates the need for
moral responsibility).
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Third, Bobbitt maintains that when there are conflicts
between the modalities, the only way to decide cases is by
recourse to individual conscience. My account of legal argument
focuses on the shared assumptions of communities and on social
processes of mutual influence and persuasion rather than on the
private consciences of individuals. This approach better explains
the role of social influence in deciding what kinds of constructions
are more plausible and less plausible at any point in history, and
how positions move from “off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall” over
time.
Fourth, Bobbitt has argued that only his theory of the
modalities explains the legitimacy of constitutional law and
judicial review; and that all other constitutional theories are either
fruitless or impossible. But the very fact that constitutional topics
are widely shared features of constitutional culture suggests a
different perspective on constitutional theory: Common topics
provide a common playing field for theoretical disputes both
within and outside of legal argument. As a result, people with very
different theoretical commitments can and do use the same basic
rhetorical techniques, fitting them into different theoretical
structures. That is why apparently contradictory theories—for
example, originalist and non-originalist theories—share so much
in common, and why lawyers holding these views are able to
participate in legal debates together.
Moreover, arguing about constitutional theory—for
example, about the proper role of the judiciary, and about which
kinds of arguments should control in which kinds of situations—
is a regular feature within legal argument, rather than extraneous
to the practice.193 Many theoretical disputes about the
Constitution are internal to the ordinary practice of legal
argument; they do not lie outside of it. Bobbitt believes that legal
arguments that attempt to justify or provide ground rules for
judicial review are fruitless; yet these arguments appear regularly

193. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265,
2303 (2017) ([Bobbitt’s] view “ignores the permeability of first-order constitutional
argument to second-order debate about appropriate grounds for decision within our
existing constitutional practice. Methodological argument about the premises that should
control constitutional decisionmaking is familiar and intelligible . . . .”); Jack M. Balkin,
The American Constitution as “Our Law”, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 113, 141–43 (2013)
(explaining that the history of constitutional argument is also the history of people arguing
about the best way for judges to interpret the Constitution).
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within constitutional litigation.194 This suggests that they play an
important role within the practice of constitutional argument.
This turns Bobbitt’s position on its head: if practice provides
legitimacy, the practice we actually have involves lawyers making
lots of arguments about what justifies the practice or what would
make the practice better.
Finally, Bobbitt’s account of “legitimacy” is idiosyncratic. It
does not correspond to the way that most political and legal
theorists talk about the various kinds of legitimacy—sociological,
procedural, and moral. As a result, most constitutional theory
asks questions that are orthogonal to what Bobbitt is trying to
demonstrate. In fact, one can accept Bobbitt’s claim that the
practice of constitutional argument generates a certain kind of
legitimacy—in his sense of the word—and still pursue most other
kinds of constitutional theory. And to the extent that
constitutional theorists have different goals than Bobbitt’s—for
example, when they ask which design of constitutional institutions
would best serve certain values or functions—his objections do
not really touch their work.
A. BOBBITT’S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE
To explain these points, it is necessary to describe Bobbitt’s
constitutional theory in some detail. His theory is quite
sophisticated, carefully constructed and has many interlocking
parts. It is also important to recognize that Bobbitt seeks to
answer very different questions than most other constitutional
theorists, and so much of what concerns him is orthogonal to other
constitutional theories.
Perhaps the best place to begin is with Bobbitt’s distinction
between constitutional discourse and constitutional argument.195
Constitutional discourse is ordinary talk about the Constitution
that anyone might engage in. Constitutional argument, by
contrast, is legal argument of the kind made and recognized by
lawyers and judges. In addition, arguments about how to design
194. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1144 (2008) (“[O]ur existing
practices of constitutional adjudication and argument have multiple levels. . . [and] are,
moreover, open and reflexive, permitting and even inviting arguments about what ought
to count as good first-order constitutional arguments even if they are not, now, widely
credited as such.”).
195. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911.
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constitutions, about what justifies constitutions, or about what
features would improve a constitutional system, count as
constitutional discourse, not constitutional argument.196 That is
because they speak from outside the system rather than from
within it. Bobbitt points out, for example, that an argument from
the Federalist, made before adoption of the Constitution about
whether to adopt it, is constitutional discourse. But the very same
set of words offered in the context of a lawyer’s brief about how
to interpret the Constitution is constitutional argument.197
In constitutional argument, Bobbitt believes, there are six
and only six modalities.198 Bobbitt acknowledges that people may
engage in other kinds of reasoning in constitutional discourse, but
he denies that any other forms of reasoning count as
constitutional argument.199
For example, Bobbitt specifically denies that arguments from
natural law and natural rights are part of constitutional
argument.200 Natural rights arguments assert that the purpose of
government (and thus of government under the Constitution) is
to protect certain rights; natural law arguments assert that certain
legal norms are required by human nature and human flourishing.
Bobbitt maintains that no such arguments appear in judicial
decisions or in legal briefs or oral arguments before courts,
although he concedes that they might have appeared in the distant
past, and might still appear today in political theory or in nonlegal conversation.201 When lawyers and judges quote the
196. Id. at 1923–24 (explaining that constitutional discourse involves a normative
assessment of the practice of constitutional argument that is not within the practice and
does not affect its legitimacy); id. at 1951 (“Constitutional interpretation by formal
decisionmakers committed to confine their decisions to legal bases is not the same practice
as constitutional discourse, which, among other things, evaluates those decisions.”).
197. Id. at 1911.
198. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 22 (“There is
no constitutional legal argument outside these modalities.”).
199. Id.; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911–12. See also id. at 1936–37 (“I
derive the modalities that determine the truth status of legal arguments from an
examination of Supreme Court opinions, oral arguments by lawyers, presidential papers,
and congressional hearings because these incidences of constitutional decisionmaking are
constrained by their status as decisions according to law.”).
200. Id., at 1911, 1916–17.
201. Id. at 1916–18 (explaining that natural law and natural rights arguments do not
count because although they have been used in the past, they are rare in contemporary
Supreme Court opinions).
Although Bobbitt denies that appeals to natural law and natural rights are
legitimate part of constitutional argument, a cursory inspection of recent Supreme Court
opinions shows that natural law and natural rights arguments are not all that rare. See, e.g.,

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION

7/21/18 3:15 PM

221

Declaration of Independence, for example, it might seem as if
they were making an appeal to natural rights, but Bobbitt explains
that they are probably really making an argument from
constitutional ethos.202
Bobbitt does not deny that the boundaries of acceptable
constitutional argument might change over time.203 He simply
insists that natural law arguments fall outside the boundary. It was
for this reason that Sanford Levinson and I have called Bobbitt a
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (2016) (arguing that due process requires
states “to adopt those practices that are fundamental to principles of liberty and justice,
and which inhere ‘in the very idea of free government’ and are ‘the inalienable right of a
citizen of such a government’”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (arguing
that same-sex couples’ “immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real
path to this profound commitment” ); id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
invalidates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the transformation
of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for the
Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do
we think we are?”); id. at 2636 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The traditional definition of
marriage has prevailed in every society that has recognized marriage throughout history.”);
id. at 2637–38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should defer to representative
government, which is a device designed to protect people’s natural rights from arbitrary
interference); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The
First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like, and for good
reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of the state but
from the inalienable rights of the person.”); DA’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 93 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is not a creation
of the Bill of Rights….the liberty safeguarded by the Constitution has far deeper roots.
See Declaration of Independence P 2 (holding it self-evident that ‘all men are. . . endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,’ among which are ‘Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness’)”); Washington. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 743 (1997) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“I insist that the source of Nancy Cruzan’s right to refuse treatment was
not just a common-law rule. Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more basic
concept of freedom that is even older than the common law.”).
Moreover, because the Supreme Court has incorporated an inquiry into natural
rights into its doctrines, there are many doctrinal arguments that appeal to those rights that
governments exist to protect. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The inquiry is whether a right involved ‘is of such a character
that it cannot be denied without violating those “fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”’”).
Bobbitt points out that different judges tend to emphasize some modalities more
than others. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 8. Among recent Justices,
Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Thomas have been most attracted to natural rights
arguments. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2637-38 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 at 728 (plurality opinion of Kennedy,
J.); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I had thought it
self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather
than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.”).
202. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1918.
203. Id. at 1919.
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“constitutional grammarian.”204 His theory demands that when
people engage in constitutional argument (as opposed to
constitutional discourse), they must make the correct kinds of
arguments correctly, and much of his work has tried to show that
people have been using the modalities incorrectly or have
misunderstood the kinds of arguments that they have actually
made.205
Next, Bobbitt argues that the six modalities are of equal
importance
in
constitutional
argument
and
wholly
incommensurable.206 The equal status of the modalities means
that, for example, arguments from text can have no greater
priority or importance than arguments from ethos or
consequences.207 The incommensurability of the modalities means
that the plausibility or implausibility of an argument from one
modality cannot properly affect the plausibility or implausibility
of arguments from another modality. If textual arguments, for
example, could help us arbitrate which are the best arguments
from structure, or arguments from original understanding could
settle which textual argument is the best one, the argument forms
would not be, strictly speaking, incommensurable.
Bobbitt claims that the general acceptance of the modalities
explains why the practice of constitutional argument and the

204. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771
(1994).
205. See, e.g., BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 61
(arguing that Justice Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v. Holland has long been misunderstood
as a prudential argument when it is really a doctrinal argument.); id. at 95-101 (arguing
that Judge Robert Bork did not understand that his dominant tendency was prudentialism,
not originalism); id. at 105–06 (arguing that members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
did not understand that Bork was actually a prudentialist and not an originalist); id. at 131–
38 (arguing that Mark Tushnet does not understand the nature of textual, structural, or
ethical argument); Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1245 (“Tushnet often
confuses the various modalities, and this failure to distinguish carefully and consistently
among each of them leads to various analytical errors.”).
206. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1954 (“[I]t is a fundamental part of my
views that the modalities may conflict, that they are incommensurable, and thus that no
decision-procedure can determine the outcome in advance without sacrificing
legitimacy.”).
207. See id. at 1886 (“A theory that was comprehensive and provided certainty by
privileging some modalities, as for example, by a hierarchical arrangement, could not be
complete because it would require the inclusion of new principles to legitimate the
hierarchy, and then new rules to legitimate the operation of these principles, and so on.”).
Equal status follows from Bobbitt’s idea of incommensurability: if the modalities were not
of equal status, then it would be possible to know in advance what to do when a modality
of greater priority conflicts with one of lesser priority.
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institution of judicial review are legitimate. Bobbitt argues that
the practice of constitutional argument, and thus of judicial
review, is self-legitimating.208 Legitimacy arises from the practice
of constitutional argument according to the underlying grammar
of the system.209 Because the practice of constitutional argument
is self-grounding, constitutional discourse outside the practice
does not and cannot bestow legitimacy on it. Legitimacy is not
grounded on and does not depend on any larger political or moral
theory. Indeed, Bobbitt believes that any attempt to ground
constitutional argument on a political or moral theory outside the
practice of constitutional law is fruitless.210
The practice of constitutional argument began when the
Constitution became part of American law. The Founding
generation applied then-existing practices of common law
argument to the interpretation of the Constitution, and ever since
what makes the practice of constitutional argument (and judicial
review) legitimate is that it is our practice and that we continue to
employ this practice as a constitutive part of our legal culture.211
The equal status and incommensurability of the modalities is
a basic feature of the practice. Therefore denying the equal status
of the modalities or attempting to elevate one modality above
another undermines the legitimacy of the system.212
208. Id. at 1938 (“legitimacy flows from following various legal rules. These rules
depend upon modalities of argument—ways in which particular arguments are assessed,
rather than arguments themselves. . . . There is nothing more to legitimacy than that.
Justification comes from external sources and does not establish or undermine
legitimacy.”); id. at 1914 (“Legitimation occurs when actors charged with deciding
according to law frame their appeals and their explanations in the ways of which my sketch
of the modalities is a description.”).
209. Id. at 1914, 1938.
210. Id. at 1938 (arguing that attempts to justify legitimacy are either circular or lead
to a problem of infinite regress). Bobbitt believes that most constitutional theory simply
asks the wrong questions. See id. (“[T]he counter-majoritarian objection has been kept
alive so long because constitutional scholars played a kind of shell game—they questioned
the legitimacy of judicial review by demanding justifications. Had they been willing to
concede the legitimacy of the practice and simply asserted that, though legitimate, they
believed it lacked an appealing political theory, I doubt there would have been much fuss
about the matter.”).
211. Id. at 1952 (“For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the
way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six
forms maintains the legitimacy of judicial review.”); id. at 1914 (“To put it briefly: Practice
legitimates because legitimacy is a matter of practice.”).
212. Bobbitt argued that Robert Bork’s originalism undermined constitutional
legitimacy because Bork asserted that decisions that could not be squared with the original
understanding were not legitimate. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra
note 18, at 107–08. By claiming that one modality trumped the others, Bork was asserting
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From time to time, Bobbitt explains, law professors purport
to ground the practice of constitutional argument and judicial
review on constitutional theories. In his view, all of these theories
are mistaken from the outset. They almost always seize on one of
the forms of common law argument—for example original intent
or consequences—and make it the ground of constitutional
legitimacy.213 This mistakes the true basis of legitimacy—the
practice itself—and converts what is merely one form of argument
into an “ideology.”214 Pragmatism is an ideology that converts
arguments from prudence or consequences into the ground of
constitutional legitimacy; originalism is an ideology that converts
arguments from “history” (i.e., original intention) into the ground
of constitutional legitimacy, and so on.215 Attempting to elevate
one modality among others is an illegitimate move in
constitutional argument, and undermines the legitimacy of the
system.216 This is why Bobbitt opposes all versions of originalist
theory, although, to be sure, he recognizes the legitimacy of the
kinds
of
arguments
(text,
structure,
original
meaning/intention/understanding) that originalists make.
Bobbitt also strongly distinguishes between legitimacy and
justification.217 By “legitimacy,” Bobbitt does not mean “moral
legitimacy,” that is, the degree to which a regime is just and/or
protects human rights; or democratic legitimacy, that is, the
degree to which a regime is responsive to popular will or popular
opinion. Nor is a regime legitimate because there are sound
prudential reasons for maintaining it. Thus, Bobbitt’s concept of
legitimacy has nothing to do with “legitimation”—that is,
providing an apology or justification for a state of affairs.
Rather, by “legitimacy,” Bobbitt means that people generally
accept a legal regime and work and reason within it. He argues
that the other modalities were insufficient to explain constitutional decisions. “[A]n attack
on those modalities is an attack on the legitimacy of the decisions they support.” Id. at 108.
213. Id. at 27–28, 114, 176; Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1234.
214. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18 at 22; Bobbitt, Is
Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1234.
215. Cf. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1251 (arguing that Mark Tushnet
adopts the ideology of pragmatism because he sees everything through the lens of
prudentialism); id. at 1255 (suggesting that originalists turn historical argument into an
ideology that seeks determinative answers).
216. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1924 (explaining that “Tushnet’s sole
reliance on prudentialism is illegitimate as a matter of law,” even if it is a legitimate
approach to “academic assertion and discussion”).
217. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18 at 27–28, 114, 176.
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that the legitimacy of the American constitutional system arises
from the self-grounding practice of making arguments using the
modalities.218
To justify the practice means trying to ground the practice in
some set of reasons that are prior to it. This is what most
constitutional theory tries to do, and Bobbitt argues that when
constitutional theorists attempt this, they confuse justification
with legitimacy.219 We cannot make the practice legitimate by
offering arguments for why it is a good thing or a bad thing.220 The
practice is legitimate because we participate in it, and because
doing so is part of who we are.
It is true that people can justify particular positions within the
practice; they do this by making constitutional arguments
according to the modalities. But these arguments cannot justify
the practice itself.221 Justification within the practice is not
justification of the practice from the outside. Law, and therefore
constitutional law, Bobbitt explains, is something that we do, not
something we have as a consequence of something we do.222 The
continuation of our practices ensures their legitimacy. This is one
explanation of the title of his book Constitutional Fate. It is our
constitutional fate to use the modalities which we inherited from
the common law; doing so legitimates the constitutional system
and the practice of judicial review. Our practice of constitutional
argument is our constitutional fate. Our constitutional fate is our
practice of constitutional argument.
Bobbitt’s account also gives an explanation of constitutional
disagreements and how to resolve them. This is Bobbitt’s theory
of conscience.
Bobbitt argues that within each modality, lawyers use their
professional judgment and the norms of inquiry associated with
each modality to decide which argument is best. So, for example,
218. Id. at 114; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1872, 1952.
219. Id. at 1869 (“For some time, the academic debate about U.S. constitutionalism
has looked for justifications for our practices, believing this would confer legitimacy on
them. In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy from the practices themselves,
reserving the task of justification for other purposes.”).
220. Id. at 1870 (“justification does not assure legitimacy”); id. at 1898 (“It would be
a mistake to think that a political theory (like majoritarianism),which can justify a system,
can also legitimate it.”).
221. Id. at 1952 (asserting that “the various modalities of constitutional argument do
legitimate, but they do not justify”).
222. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 24.
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he argues that professional norms of history will determine which
argument within the modality of “history” (i.e., original intention)
is the best one.223
This approach, however, does not apply to contrasting
arguments from different modalities. To be sure, it is possible that
the best arguments across the different modalities will not
conflict. In that case, there is a correct answer to a particular
constitutional question. But sometimes, perhaps often, the best
arguments among the various modalities do conflict. The best
argument from modality A (judged by norms of inquiry
characteristic to that modality) may conflict with the best
argument from modality B (also as judged by norms of inquiry
characteristic to that modality). In that case, there is no metaprinciple that can decide between the two arguments. The
modalities are completely incommensurable with each other.224
Instead, lawyers and judges must turn to their individual
consciences to decide which argument is the best one.225 Because
the consciences of individuals may differ, the practical result is
that the development of constitutional doctrine—where the
modalities conflict—depends on the conscience of constitutional
decisionmakers.
Bobbitt distinguishes between how we decide cases from how
we explain them to others.226 Within the practice of constitutional
argument, we always explain our decisions to others through the
modalities of constitutional argument, and that is what makes the
practice legitimate.227 But that is not how we decide cases when
the modalities conflict. In these cases, we decide according to
conscience. The distinction between the forms of public
explanation and the process of private decision is most important
when the modalities conflict, as they often do.
Bobbitt views this feature of constitutional argument—that
the modalities are often incommensurable and that individual
conscience is necessary to decide cases —not as a problem for

223. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1923. See infra the discussion
accompanying notes 238–250.
224. Id. at 1954 (arguing that “the modalities may conflict, that they are
incommensurable, and thus that no decision-procedure can determine the outcome in
advance without sacrificing legitimacy”).
225. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 163–64, 183–84.
226. Id. at 114, 153, 163–64, 169.
227. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1914.
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constitutional argument, but as its saving grace.228 This feature
makes individual conscience indispensable to the resolution of
many constitutional disagreements, and thus implicit in the
legitimacy of the constitutional system. An important feature of
Bobbitt’s work is that in constitutional law, the moment of moral
decision, and thus the responsibility of conscience, can be
postponed, but it can never be avoided.229
The role of individual conscience in the practice of
constitutional law is crucial because it allows for the possibility of
justice in the otherwise self-contained and self-legitimating
system of constitutional argument.230 Because the modalities
sometimes conflict, decisionmakers, relying on individual
conscience, can decide to do what is right and just by choosing the
position that furthers justice. The more often the modalities
conflict, the greater the space for individual conscience.
As one can see from the above discussion, conscience is
among the most important ideas in Bobbitt’s system. All of his
other claims about the practice of constitutional argument revolve
around his views about the importance and necessity of individual
conscience. That all constitutional argument occurs within a fixed
set of modalities, that the modalities are of equal status, that they
are incommensurable, and that there is no general principle of
priority among them, are not, in Bobbitt’s view, defects of the
system. Rather, they are important and valuable features of the
system. These features of constitutional argument preserve a role
for individual conscience, and hence for the possibility that our
system of government will achieve a greater degree of justice over
time.231

228. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 114, 163–64,
177; see also id. at 170 (“The justice of the system lies in the extent to which it is able to
confer legitimacy on the right moral actions of its deciders. It is thus in the very fact that
legitimacy rationales do conflict that enables justice to be done.”).
229. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 186 (“We are incapable of making
something that will obviate (rather than suppress) the requirement for moral decision.”).
230. See supra note 208.
231. As Bobbitt explains:
Constitutional Fate asks, “What legitimates judicial review?” and proposes an
antifoundationalist answer. That is, I located legitimation in a particular practice,
rather than in a prior, external rationale. Constitutional Interpretation asks,
“What makes the system of constitutional decisionmaking just?” The answer I
offered was an antirepresentationalist one. Treating the issue as one in which
“just” is a judgment of the system as a whole, I argued that the American system
permits acts of conscience to be decisive, instead of determining that particular
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One can now better understand why Bobbitt insists that all
of the modalities must be on an equal footing and completely
incommensurable; and that no form of argument (say, arguments
from the original public meaning of the text) can be lexically prior
to any others. To assert that one modality was subordinate to any
other, or that the modalities were commensurable with each other
would deny the central role of conscience in arbitrating among
them.232
Bobbitt’s theory leads to considerable freedom for
constitutional interpreters. Indeed, this freedom is virtually
required by his conception of conscience. Bobbitt explains that
this is not the freedom to do whatever one likes, but rather the
freedom to employ one’s conscience in deciding what is truly
just.233
People may therefore assume that any constitutional theory
that utilizes the modalities, or standard forms of constitutional
argument, must depend on conscience in the same way. It must
feature the same degree of interpretive freedom, it must feature
equal and incommensurable modes of argument, and it must be
irredeemably opposed to all forms of originalism. But this is not
the case.
Bobbitt started with an undeniable fact about legal
practice—that lawyers use a set of standard rhetorical methods
inherited from the common law to interpret the Constitution. He
then built a grand theoretical edifice atop of it. But one does not
have to accept the entire edifice to accept his starting point. When
expressed in the language of rhetorical topics, many of his claims
about the modalities are unnecessary, and others seem disputable.
B. TOPICS ARE NOT SILOS
Lawyers employ common topics with an eye to analyzing
situations, solving problems and persuading other people. I agree
with Richard Fallon that lawyers use topics with a defeasible
assumption of coherence: When lawyers ask constitutional
outcomes are just when correlated with the outcome hypothesized by a theory of
justice.
Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1872 (internal citations omitted).
232. Or, as Bobbitt puts it, the creation of an algorithm that would relieve us of moral
decision would be pernicious, because it would disable the power of moral reflection and
choice. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 154–55, 162.
233. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1874.
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questions and attempt to solve constitutional problems, they
operate on the assumption that employing different ways of
looking at a problem can help them converge on a single answer
or a small set of answers.234 This assumption is defeasible because
it may not turn out to be the case; even so, interpreters should
start out by assuming that it is the case and do their best to make
the answers fit together.
Moreover, the process of interpretation is not individual but
social; we do it not only to convince ourselves but also to convince
other people. Therefore, as we test and refine our analyses, we
always have in mind an imagined audience of other people we
want to persuade; we consider their imagined views as we decide
the best way to ask questions and answer them. We hear not only
the imagined voices of people who we think mostly agree with us
but also (and especially) those we think will disagree, because
their arguments most need to be met and rebutted. The imagined
audience not only shapes how we express our arguments; it also
shapes what we think are plausible and implausible claims,
reasonable and unreasonable moves in our arguments.
This approach to interpretation makes more sense of the way
that lawyers actually use the topics in legal argument than
Bobbitt’s theory of incommensurability and individual
conscience. It also better accommodates the roles of mutual giveand-take and social influence in deciding what kinds of
constructions are off-the-wall and on-the-wall at any point in time,
and how positions move from less plausible to more plausible over
time.
My argument will proceed in two steps. First, I will explain
why Bobbitt’s model of incommensurability—which treats the
modalities as rhetorical silos—does not succeed on its own terms.
Then I will argue that the social nature of legal argument—among
members of a community who very often disagree—makes it far
more plausible to understand lawyers as striving for coherence
and reflective equilibrium among the different means of problemsolving and persuasion.

234.

Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1193.
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1. Topics do not have to be incommensurable
Bobbitt’s view that the topics are incommensurable is not a
good account of lawyerly practice. To see why, one might begin
by distinguishing three different claims about legal arguments:
(1) Given arguments from different modalities (i.e., topics),
there is no general formula or decision procedure for deciding
which argument is better when they conflict, even if in some cases
certain arguments are better than others. Instead, we have to
judge each conflict on its own terms, and the argument that proves
better in one context might prove worse in another.
(2) Arguments from one modality should not affect our
judgment about whether arguments within another modality are
more or less plausible. That is, it is not possible to engage in
methods of coherence-based reasoning or reflective equilibrium
to reach a conclusion. No matter how strong we think a textual
argument is, for example, it should not give us any reason to
change our minds about what constitutes the best structural or
prudential argument.
(3) Given conflicting arguments from different modalities—
for example, text and structure—we have no reasons to prefer one
argument to another. Hence the decision between them must be
left to individual conscience. To be sure, we may justify our
decision to others in public by making a textual or structural
argument, but the textual or structural argument is not the basis
of our private decision.
Proposition (1) is not a very controversial claim. It allows for
coherence-based reasoning and reflective equilibrium between
different kinds of arguments. Many people—and even some
originalists—would accept it, at least if one limits it to cases of
constitutional construction, in which original public meaning does
not resolve the question. Proposition (1) does not even rule out
the possibility that some kinds arguments (for example, textual)
are usually more important than others (consequences, natural
law, etc.), as a rule of thumb.
Bobbitt, however, takes a much stronger position than (1).
He appears to hold proposition (2); and sometimes he seems to
argue for (3).235 Proposition (3) makes how people decide
according to conscience somewhat mysterious. If so, it is a mystery
235.

Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1874, 1882–85, 1923.
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that Bobbitt invites. He speaks of conscience as an “unreasoning
decision,”236 and he argues that “[i]t is only when assailed by
doubt—when nothingness prevails and there is no point to further
legitimate judgment—that one resorts to one’s conscience.”237
In any case, Bobbitt’s strong version of incommensurability
between different modalities is untenable because it depends on
a rigid and ultimately untenable distinction between intermodal
and intramodal conflicts.
Intermodal or cross-modal conflicts are conflicts between the
best arguments in two different modalities, for example, between
the best textual and the best structural argument. Intramodal
conflicts are disputes within a given modality about which version
of an argument within that modality is the best one.
For example, an argument that employs an abstract
characterization of the original understanding might conflict with
an argument that employs a relatively concrete characterization
of the original understanding. The petitioner argues that the
framers and adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
ban all class and caste legislation; therefore sex discrimination is
unconstitutional. The respondent argues that the framers and
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to abolish
the common-law coverture rules by which women lost almost all
of their rights on marriage; hence sex discrimination is not
unconstitutional.
Another example of an intramodal conflict would be one
between a textual argument that uses the canon expressio unius
est exclusio alterius and another textual argument that invokes the
absurdity canon. The petitioner argues that the First Amendment
does not apply to the President because it says “Congress shall
make no law;” the respondent applies that this reading would
have absurd results because it would allow both the President and
the federal judiciary to run roughshod over freedom of religion,
speech, and press.
As these examples demonstrate, intramodal conflicts are
ubiquitous in constitutional argument. In fact, whenever we find
a conflict between modalities we can usually find a corresponding
conflict within a single modality.

236.
237.

Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1874.
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Bobbitt argues that we cannot resolve intermodal conflicts
except by conscience. In contrast, he argues that we can almost
always resolve intramodal conflicts by using the norms that are
characteristic of each modality238: “[W]ithin a single modality,” he
explains, “the arguments are entirely comparable; the standards
for the better argument are supplied by the modality itself. For
example, there are well-developed canons of historical assessment
against which can be measured competing historical arguments in
constitutional law.”239 The only exception is where deciding
between two different arguments requires facts that we do not or
cannot know, for example, when there is a gap in the historical
record.240 Then “there is … a role [for conscience], but it is distinct
from that played when the modalities conflict.”241 In this situation,
a legal interpreter turns to conscience not because the arguments
are incommensurable, but because there is a dispute about the
facts and the interpreter lacks sufficient knowledge to resolve it.
However, if one discovers additional facts, then the conflict will
disappear and lawyers can settle on the best argument.242
To justify this difference between intermodal and intramodal
conflicts, Bobbitt must make two further claims, each of which is
implausible.
First, Bobbitt must hold that every kind of legal argument
can be classified according to one and only one modality. Suppose
that a certain type of argument A could be classified as either an
historical argument (i.e., in Bobbitt’s system, an argument from
original intention or understanding) or as a structural argument.
Then by hypothesis A would be commensurable with all other
historical arguments and it would also be commensurable with all
other structural arguments. But that would mean that historical
and structural arguments are commensurable, and so people do
not need to resort to individual conscience to resolve conflicts

238. Id. at 1923. Bobbitt is emphatic on this point. It is, he says, a “gross misreading”
to suggest “[t]he role I reserve for conscience (as that faculty by which we choose among
incommensurables) must be available to choose among competing arguments within a
modality” Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (“The difference between this situation and that of a conflict between (or
among) the modalities, rather than within a single one, is that some fact . . . can always
appear to bring harmony within a modality, whereas no fact can accomplish this among
different forms of argument.”).
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among them. But this is impossible according to Bobbitt’s theory.
Hence each kind of argument can belong to one and only one
modality; all other categorizations of arguments must be
incorrect. Although Bobbitt has sometimes described his
categorization system as merely provisional,243 he cannot really
maintain that view if he wants arguments from different
modalities to be incommensurable.
It is therefore not surprising Bobbitt has had to act as a sort
of constitutional grammarian, correcting other people’s
understanding of their arguments, and insisting on his particular
system of classifications. Bobbitt has disclaimed any intention to
impose his normative views; he insists that he is merely describing
our practices of argument as they really are.244 Yet he must play
the role of constitutional grammarian in order to preserve the
central role of conscience in his system, because a special role for
conscience is unnecessary if the modalities are generally
commensurable.
One can see the point in another way. In this Article I have
mentioned three different ways of dividing up constitutional
argument: Bobbitt’s, Fallon’s and mine. I argue that my division
of the topics better accounts for how lawyers use history in
constitutional argument than either Bobbitt’s or Fallon’s. So if
one focuses on uses of history, one should use my account. On the
other hand, Bobbitt’s catalog has proved very useful for teaching
first-year law students how to make constitutional arguments. My
view, consistent with the classical rhetorical tradition, is that the
way people describe and classify topics should be pragmatic. It
should be driven by one’s practical goals, and not by a belief in
natural kinds of arguments. One need not assume that a complex
social practice has to divide up in a single way; we should use
whichever classification system best helps us achieve our
particular purposes.
At various points, Bobbitt seems to agree.245 But he cannot
be so relaxed on this point, because of his views on
incommensurability and the role of conscience. If one recognizes
more than one classification system, one quickly gets into trouble.
There are any number of arguments that fall under the same
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 1915–16.
Id. at 1913–14, 1917, 1922.
Id. at 1915–16.
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modality in Bobbitt’s model but fall in different modalities in my
topic catalog or Fallon’s; conversely, there are any number of
arguments that Bobbitt treats as falling into different modalities
but that fall into the same modality in either Fallon’s system or
mine. For example, Bobbitt lumps together arguments from
judicial precedent, inter-branch conventions, and custom, while I
treat them as three different kinds of arguments. Bobbitt
distinguishes arguments from original meaning (which form part
of his historical modality) and arguments from contemporary
meaning (which fall into the modality of text), while I lump them
together as textual arguments.246
It follows that many pairs of arguments, A and B, are
commensurable if one uses Bobbitt’s classification system and
incommensurable if one uses Fallon’s or mine, and vice versa.
That is, one can make two arguments commensurable or
incommensurable just by changing the classification system.
(Note that this need not be true of all pairs of arguments, but it
will be true of some of them.) Again, for Bobbitt, this result is
impossible. Hence he must hold that there can be only one correct
way of classifying legal arguments, and all others must be
mistaken.
Put another way, Bobbitt can maintain that the way people
classify arguments is pragmatic and provisional, or he can
maintain that arguments from different modalities are
incommensurable and that conflicts between them can only be
resolved by individual conscience; he cannot maintain both things.
It now becomes easier to see what is at stake in the choice
between Bobbitt’s theory of distinct modalities and my pragmatic
account of rhetorical topics. If Bobbitt is correct that modalities
constitute different and incommensurable ways for a legal
proposition to be true, then they must correspond to clear
distinctions in social practice. But if they are just rhetorical topics,
they are more like a checklist for analysis and argument
construction, a set of commonplaces that people turn to for
invention. They do not have to have clear boundaries, they may
fade into each other, people can divide them up in different ways,
and they need not be incommensurable in the way that Bobbitt
describes.

246.

See text at notes 113-118, supra.
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2. The problem of intramodal conflicts
Bobbitt’s arguments also depend on a second claim, which, if
anything, seems even more implausible. Bobbitt argues that,
absent gaps in the factual record, lawyers must be able to resolve
all conflicts within a single modality by using a set of generally
recognized standards internal to the modality.247
Why is this assumption implausible? Recall my earlier point
that because the modalities are commonplaces, they rest on
incompletely theorized justifications—generalized claims about
the importance of text, structure, and so on, that people can
specify in many different ways. In other words, one can think of
the modalities as big buckets of roughly similar kinds of
arguments that do not have to agree with each other in all
respects.
Within each modality of argument, there are many different
versions and approaches. These are the subtopics of a given
modality. The number of subtopics in any given modality is likely
to increase over time as lawyers build on the sophistication and
creativity of previous lawyers.
Examples of these different subtopics are different ways of
characterizing purpose or intention (for example, general and
abstract accounts of intention; looking to subjective inventions;
looking to objective evidence of purpose); different ways of
characterizing and drawing inferences from texts (for example,
the various canons of statutory construction); different theories of
constitutional structure (for example, dual federalism, processprotection, subsidiarity, unitary executive, political safeguards of
federalism, etc.); different ways of articulating and measuring the
best
consequences
(for
example,
welfarism,
ruleconsequentialism, wealth maximization, individual human
flourishing); different doctrinal techniques for applying
precedents (for example, broad holdings versus narrow holdings,
multiple ways of characterizing holding and dicta, conflicting
methods for distinguishing or expanding precedents); different
doctrinal categories for characterizing a given situation (for
example, clear and present danger, symbolic speech, public
247. Id. at 1923 (“[W]ithin a single modality, the arguments are entirely comparable;
the standards for the better argument are supplied by the modality itself. For example,
there are well-developed canons of historical assessment against which can be measured
competing historical arguments in constitutional law.”).
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forum, compelled affirmation of belief, content-based
regulation); and so on. These subtopics are also special topics in
legal rhetoric; they also serve as ways of characterizing, analyzing,
and solving legal problems.
Because they approach legal questions from different
perspectives, these different subtopics will often generate
conflicting answers. That is why lawyers are often able to respond
to an argument from a given modality by invoking a different
subtopic within the same modality. If petitioner argues from
abstract intentions, respondent might invoke concrete intentions;
if petitioner makes a representation-reinforcement argument,
respondent might invoke the principle of state sovereignty, and so
on.
Nor will lawyers and judges restrict themselves to one
subtopic. They will alternatively adopt and reject different
conceptions of purpose and structure as they move from decision
to decision. It is catch-as-catch-can. This opportunism should
hardly be surprising if one recalls what topics are: resources for
the invention of arguments that can persuade others.
Bobbitt assumes that all conflicts within a modality can be
resolved through well-developed and generally accepted norms
that are characteristic to each modality.248 But in many, if not most
of these situations, there are no such widely accepted norms. If
there were a general way to decide between abstract and concrete
versions of original intention and understanding, lawyers would
have settled on it a long time ago. There is no general decision
procedure for arbitrating between dueling textual canons, even if
there are many situations in which one canon is more persuasive
than another. Bobbitt’s assertion that lawyers (much less
historians) have a well-developed professional set of norms for
arbitrating between dueling interpretations of the same historical
facts seems naive. Not all disputes among lawyers, historians—or
between lawyers and historians—can be blamed on professional
incompetence or missing facts. In fact, the more competent
professionals are, they more likely they are to produce conflicting
arguments within each modality.
Skepticism grows as one moves through the various
modalities. Take arguments from precedent. Common-law
reasoning allows many different ways of characterizing
248.

Id.
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precedents—broadly, narrowly, excluding different classes of
previous cases as mistakes, and so on.249 There are standard and
familiar ways of characterizing facts in different ways, including
both the facts in the case at hand and the salient facts of previous
decisions. This play in the joints is a feature of precedential
argument, not a bug. The notion that common law reasoning
converges on unitary answers about the correct way to read
precedents in contested cases seems implausible.
It is even less clear that ideas internal to legal reasoning can
tell us which account of consequences is the legally correct one.
Philosophers have long debated which version of
consequentialism makes the most sense; even if one restricts one’s
self to professional debates among lawyers, there are many ways
of characterizing and measuring consequences (which
consequences, to whom, and over which area or time period?).
And the notion that “there are well-developed canons of . . .
assessment”250 for Bobbitt’s category of ethical argument is
mysterious, to say the least.
Why does this matter? Well, if Bobbitt’s thesis about
intramodal conflicts turns out to be false, then it may not make
much sense to speak of conflicts between modalities at all. The
very idea of an intermodal conflict assumes that there really is a
single best argument in two different modalities and that these
arguments conflict. But if there is not a demonstrably single best
argument within each modality, then the two modalities do not
actually conflict. Instead conflicts within one modality correspond
to conflicts within another modality. Modalities A and B do not
really conflict if within each modality there are reasonable
arguments on both sides and there is not a single generallyaccepted decision procedure within the modality that can resolve
the conflict between them. Many apparent examples of crossmodal conflict may actually reflect the fact that we have not

249. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 77–91 (1960)
(discussing various permitted moves in doctrinal argument); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 74–75 (1951) (1930) (describing broad and narrow techniques of reading
precedents). One can understand Llewellyn’s work on precedent as more than merely
Legal Realist skepticism, but rather as offering topic catalogs for lawyers; the same applies
to his famous essay on dueling canons of statutory interpretation. See Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes
Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).
250. Id.
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thought hard enough about counter-arguments within each
modality.
The existence of multiple reasonable positions within each
modality helps explain why a coherence-based approach to legal
argument makes more sense than a strong claim of
incommensurability. We don’t have to abandon one modality to
accept another; we just have to switch our allegiances to another
reasonable argument within the modality.
C. PEOPLE USE TOPICS TO REASON BY COHERENCE AND
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
The idea of “incommensurable” justifications might suggest
that the modalities are walled off from each other, as if they were
in separate silos. But this is not how either legal culture or legal
topics actually work.
First, the justifications underlying different topics overlap.
Because structural arguments concern proper function, they
overlap with arguments about purpose (for example, in arguing
how the system is supposed to work) or consequences (in
arguments about whether the system is functioning well or badly).
Arguments from text and purpose may overlap because people
may infer purpose from the text. Arguments from political
tradition can overlap with arguments from purpose, because
people often identify the values of the tradition as purposes of the
Constitution. Arguments from inter-branch conventions may
overlap with judicial precedents about these conventions.
Arguments from custom and natural law may overlap because in
order to understand what makes human beings flourish, one
might want to look to how people arrange their affairs over long
periods of time; custom may reflect the “wisdom of crowds” about
the conditions of human flourishing.
Second, the modalities offer explanations for why other
modalities are good arguments. For example, one might offer
structural reasons to explain why judges should take into account
considerations of institutional prudence. One might argue that
lawyers should look to natural law (1) because doing so produces
the best consequences; (2) because the text of the Constitution
implies it (for example, in the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause); or (3) because the framers
expected that people would look to natural law in interpretation.
One might defend interpretation according to original meaning
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(an argument from text) (1) because it offers the best
consequences; (2) because it is most consistent with the structure
of a constitution grounded on popular sovereignty; (3) because
the framers and adopters expected it; (4) because it is required by
rule of law principles; or (5) because it is characteristic of the
traditions of American legal practice. These examples show how
different commonplaces mutually support each other. Indeed, if
one thinks of the modalities as commonplaces, it would be
surprising if this were not the case.
Third, as noted above, Fallon pointed out that lawyers and
judges often experience arguments from different modalities as
pointing toward the same result.251 The reason is that when we are
trying to decide which argument from modality A is the best one,
our judgments may be influenced by our views about which
version of an argument from modality B is best, and vice-versa.
People may update and modify their initial impressions about
which argument is best after they look at the problem from
another angle. Again, if one thinks of modalities as special topics,
there is nothing mysterious about this. That is precisely what using
different topics achieves: topics offer multiple perspectives for
solving a problem, and as we approach the problem from different
angles, we may update our initial impressions.
Here is a simple example. The First Amendment begins:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”252 Does the First Amendment
apply to the Executive and Judicial branches of government? At
first glance, the text would appear to say no. There is even a
familiar textual canon that supports this result: expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. When one or more things in a class are clearly
specified in a law, the other elements of the class are excluded.
Moreover, because the omission of the Executive and Judicial
Branches would have such important consequences, we must
presume that the omission was deliberate and that the framers
and adopters thought carefully about the wording.253
251. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1193.
252. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
253. Hence, a few law professors have bit the bullet and insisted that the First
Amendment really does apply only to Congress, and not to the President, to the Judiciary,
or to the President and the Senate (as opposed to the entire Congress) in making and
ratifying treaties. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1209, 1250 (2010); GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
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So far it looks as if the best argument from text is that the
First Amendment applies only to Congress. But now consider the
problem from the perspective of the other modalities.254 First
consider consequences: Judges would be able to issue injunctions
and contempt citations against newspapers that criticized or
disrespected them under their contempt power. The President, as
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, could require that all
soldiers pray to the same God.255
Next consider purpose: The goal of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses is to secure religious liberty. But religious
liberty would be thoroughly undermined if government officials
outside Congress could abridge it at will and with impunity.
Next consider structure: The American government is a
republic based on popular sovereignty. Federal government
officials act as agents of We the People. Because they are only
agents, We the People must have the right to criticize their
conduct, which means that citizens must also be able to discuss
public issues freely. It would undermine the structure of
republican government if government officials could punish or
hinder citizens from criticizing official conduct and discussing
matters of public concern. Hence guarantees of speech and press
must apply to all branches of government.256
Next consider precedent: Every federal court that has
considered the issue since the early 19th century has assumed that
the First Amendment applies to all three branches of
government.257
EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42 (2004); Mark P.
Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1201 (1986).
254. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1241 (2015) (using this example to demonstrate that “the same
considerations that are potentially relevant in resolving the meaning of ambiguous text can
also affect the perceived clarity of the text in the first instance.”)
255. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 316 (2005);
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 204–05.
256. Cf. AMAR, supra note 255, at 316 (“[T]he amendment declared certain
preexisting principles of liberty and self-government —’the free exercise of religion’ and
‘the freedom of speech, [and] of the press’—that implicitly applied against all federal
branches (not just Congress) and all federal actions (not just laws).”).
257. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (Baldwin, J.) (arguing
that the First Amendment “wholly prohibits the action of the legislative or judicial power
of the Union on the subject matter of a religious establishment, or any restraint on the free
exercise of religion.”); Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2006)
(majority opinion of McConnell, J.) (“As this history shows, there was no intention to
confine the reach of the First Amendment to the legislative branch.”); Bradley and Siegel,
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Next consider natural rights: The freedoms of speech and
religion are rights governments are instituted to protect.
Therefore all branches of government must respect them.
Next consider ethos and political tradition: Freedoms of
speech, press, and religion are central to a free society and to a
democratic republic. Failing to apply these guarantees to all
federal officials would be inconsistent with the character of our
institutions and the American people themselves.
Given these arguments, does our initial the textual argument
look so clear cut? No, it does not. In fact, these reasons may spur
us to think of other textual arguments.
Perhaps the term “Congress” is a nonliteral usage.258 Just as
the words “speech” and “press” apply to more than just speaking
and to using a printing press, perhaps the word “Congress” is
actually a synecdoche—a figure of speech in which a part stands
for a greater whole. So maybe “Congress” means something like
“the Federal government as a whole” or “the Federal government
acting according to law.” That would make sense given that
Congress was by far the largest and most important branch of
government at the Founding.
There are two other reasons why we should read the text to
subsume the other branches of government in the term
“Congress.” First, as noted above, Congress was widely expected
to be the most important branch in 1791. Second, it was generally
assumed that government agents could and should only act
according to law; i.e., consistent with the norms that bind the
legislator, Congress. All other actions would be ultra vires. Thus,
the inclusion of other branches literally goes without saying, and
that is why nothing is explicitly said in the text.
Finally, the fact that the text requires Congress to respect
guarantees of speech, press, and religion does not preclude other
branches from being bound for reasons of structure, prudence,
precedent, ethos, or tradition. Unless we have strong reasons to
the contrary, we should not read “Congress shall make no law” to
mean that “All other branches may make law.”
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, supra note 254, at 1244 (“American
constitutional practice, however, has always viewed the First Amendment as relevant to
the conduct of the entire federal government, not just Congress.”).
258. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 34 (2012); BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM,
supra note 2, at 204–05.
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By the time we finish working through the other modalities,
our initial textual argument looks much less convincing; and we
might decide that one of the other textual arguments is actually
the best one, all things considered. Because arguments from the
other modalities seem so strong, we may revise our initial
impression about which argument is best within a given modality.
Put another way, our judgments using one tool or perspective for
problem-solving can be influenced—and perhaps should be
influenced—by what we learn from using other tools and
perspectives.259 By using all of the forms of argument to check and
inform each other, we may often converge on a best answer.
Fallon calls this approach “constructive coherence.”260
That experience would make little sense if the modalities
were truly incommensurable with each other. But once again, if
one thinks about them as special topics—that is, heuristics or aids
to understanding and analyzing a problem—this process of
mutual influence seems entirely natural.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IS SOCIAL
Bobbitt emphasizes the incommensurability of modalities
because he wants to clear a space for individual conscience.
Accordingly, he distinguishes between how we decide—through
the exercise of individual conscience—and how we explain our
decisions to others—through shared modalities of legal argument.
This, however, might generate a mistaken impression: On the one
hand, we have social processes of persuasion; on the other we
have the individual moment of decision far from the madding
crowd’s ignoble strife. If we think of the modalities as rhetorical
topics, we will get a more realistic picture of how constitutional
judgment really works.
First, people make, evaluate, and choose among legal
positions using rhetorical tools of analysis, not outside them. They
are tools to think with, not to think around. Moreover, these tools
of thought offer contrasting perspectives on problems that people
can consider together, rather than in isolation from each other.
Reflective equilibrium in a community of mutual influence is a

259. See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, supra
note 254, at 1243 (“[A] variety of modalities come into play, often in an interactive fashion,
in constructing understandings about clarity and ambiguity in the constitutional text.”) .
260. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1192–93.
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better account of legal decision making than a solitary retreat to
individual conscience.
Second, individual conscience does not operate in a vacuum.
Our sense of what is just and unjust, as well as what is reasonable
and unreasonable, on-the-wall and off-the-wall, is shaped by the
opinions and beliefs of the people around us, even when we reject
it in part. A strong distinction between social influence and
individual conscience is spurious, a point on which Bobbitt and I
agree.261
Constitutional judgment, even within the mind of a single
individual, is social and subject to multiple forms of social
influence. Constitutional judgment occurs within a social practice
of arguing with other people, reflecting on their best arguments,
finding ways to persuade them, and readjusting and recharacterizing one’s best arguments in light of what one imagines
other people will think. That is, constitutional judgment is
performed before the imagined audience of one’s community (or
communities).262 These audiences include fellow judges, lawyers,
professionals, scholars, family members; members of the same
political party, religion, organization, or social movement; media,
and the general public.263 In forming constitutional judgments, we
take into account what these real or imagined audiences think,
whether they will find what we say reasonable or unreasonable,
plausible or implausible, and we shape and revise our judgments
accordingly. This is true even of the iconoclast or of those who
pride themselves on their individuality, authenticity, and
261. See id. at 1966 (“That an act of conscience may be motivated by many conscious
and unconscious cultural, historical, political, and moral convictions is probably true. But
these convictions cannot legitimate the act, nor is it necessary that they do so, so long as
the decisions can be retrospectively explained in terms of the accepted modal
arguments.”).
262. See LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2006) (arguing that
judges decide cases with actual or imagined audiences of colleagues, acquaintances, family
members, and others in mind).
263. See Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 61, at 14, 21 (“[T]he audiences from
which assent must be won are often multiple. In many a Supreme Court opinion . . . one
can detect the Court’s attempts to address different listeners: dissenting Brethren first of
all, then lower court judges, then state legislatures and the police forces of the nation, then
the public at large.”); James D. Hopkins, Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions, 8 Trial
Judges’ J. 49, 49–50 (1969) (explaining that judicial opinions are exercises in persuasion
before different kinds of audiences); Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1357, 1366 (1988) (“It is clear . . . that the audiences for judges’ opinions have
gradually grown in both size and diversity.”).
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incorruptibility. The effect of audience influence is obvious for
lawyers, who need to persuade judges. But it is also true of judges,
who want to decide cases and justify their views in ways that will
be persuasive to fellow judges, other lawyers, and to the public at
large.
Third, individual constitutional judgment does not float free
from the socially shared tools of constitutional reasoning and
constitutional argument. The distinction between how people
decide questions and how they explain their decisions to others is
not clear-cut. People may use some of the same tools to reason
that they use to persuade others, even if the processes of decision
and persuasion are not identical. The process of constitutional
interpretation is social, even—and especially—when different
kinds of arguments conflict.
The notion of decision according to individual conscience can
be misleading: People do not reason in isolation, like lonely
hermits. They reason in discussions and arguments with other
people. Even when we are alone, we imagine the responses of
others in our heads. And when people reason, they employ
common tools of argument and analysis. Rhetorical topics have
this dual character: they are simultaneously individual and social.
They are tools for individual thought and invention, and they are
also tools that people share with others for analysis and
persuasion.
Both Bobbitt and I offer theories of constitutional rhetoric,
but we emphasize different things. Bobbitt emphasizes grammar;
I emphasize problem-solving; Bobbitt emphasizes clear
distinctions among forms of argument; I emphasize pragmatic
boundaries; Bobbitt emphasizes the necessity of decision; I
emphasize the role of persuasion; Bobbitt emphasizes individual
conscience; I emphasize mutual social influence.
E. COMMON TOPICS ARE CONSISTENT WITH MANY DIFFERENT
KINDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES

Bobbitt holds that all constitutional theories that attempt to
justify the constitutional system and judicial review are doomed
to failure, as well as all constitutional theories that privilege some
modalities over others. This view excludes most other
constitutional theories. Does this mean that the social practice of
using the modalities is inconsistent with most constitutional
theories? It does not. Because the modalities are nothing more
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than rhetorical topics, they are consistent with many different
theories of constitutional interpretation, including the many
theories that Bobbitt rejects.
Bobbitt is correct in one respect. A good constitutional
theory should try to explain most of our existing practices, even if
it is quite critical of some of them. An interpretive theory that
claimed that the only valid arguments are arguments from original
intention or natural law, for example, will have a great deal of
difficulty explaining our current practices of constitutional
argument. But most theories of constitutional interpretation—
and most theorists—make space for all of the standard topics in
constitutional argument; they simply give them different degrees
of weight and emphasis.
Topics are shared tools for solving problems and inventing
persuasive arguments; and the modalities in particular are
commonplaces about interpretation. By their nature, such tools
are likely to be compatible with many different theories of
constitutional interpretation, and can fit into many different kinds
of theoretical structures. That is why lawyers and judges with very
different theoretical commitments can and do employ the same
topics. It follows that the modalities will be compatible with most
theories of interpretation, including both originalist and nonoriginalist theories, theories that treat all of the modalities as
having equal status, and theories that give priority to some kinds
of arguments over others.
Bobbitt correctly views the modalities as offering a common
language, but it is precisely for that reason that people can use
them in many different ways, based on different theoretical
commitments. Although lawyers and judges will use the same
common topics when they attempt to persuade each other, this
does not tell us very much about which interpretive theory is the
best theory.
Each interpretive theory will employ and order common
topics according to its theoretical structure—its distinctive set of
theoretical commitments, and its distinctive answers to the
question of how to interpret the Constitution and why
interpreting in this way is appropriate. Thus, constitutional
theories may use the same topics in very different ways,
depending on their internal structure. We can see this by
comparing different kinds of pluralist and originalist theories.
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Pluralist theories argue that interpreters should consider
multiple factors in interpreting the Constitution and that no single
factor controls all the time. Bobbitt’s theory is an example.
Yet pluralist theories may have very different theoretical
structures.
Consider
David
Strauss’s
common
law
constitutionalism. Descriptively, it contends that constitutional
law changes through common-law development and through the
evolution of conventions; normatively, it claims that lawyers
should analyze and interpret the Constitution in this way.264
In Strauss’s model, doctrinal argument is the standard
aproach, but lawyers may use all of the modalities as they develop
doctrine and conventions in common-law fashion. (Recall that
“doctrinal argument” in the broader sense uses many different
topics; it does not merely apply existing doctrine to new factual
situations.) The constitutional text has no special status;
interpreters adhere to the text as a matter of convenience and in
order to promote stability and predictability.265 Strauss argues that
his common-law approach is justified because the common law is
a useful and legitimate way to develop law generally, and
constitutional law in particular. The common law approach
promotes stability, it conforms to rule of law values, and it
economizes on wisdom.266 (Bobbitt, of course, would reject any
attempt either to justify or to legitimate constitutional argument
by offering these kinds of reasons.)
Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading is also a pluralist theory,
but it has a different structure. It argues that to interpret the
Constitution interpreters should construct the best account of
existing legal materials that is also consistent with the best
available moral theory.267 Dworkin believes that this is the correct
approach because in interpreting the Constitution—or the law
generally—interpreters should promote the political value of
integrity and strive to make the Constitution the best it can be.268
People might associate Dworkin’s moral reading solely with
arguments from consequences, or with arguments from natural
264. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 35 (stating that
precedents of the Supreme Court and traditions and understandings that have developed
outside of the courts “form an indispensable part” of our living Constitution).
265. Id. at 104–05.
266. Id. at 38–45.
267. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 139, 230–32, 379 (1987).
268. Id. at 53, 77, 225, 233, 262–63, 338.
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law and natural rights. But this is incorrect: moral readers will use
all of the modalities in rationally reconstructing doctrine and
constitutional conventions.269
Pluralist theories can also differ in the weight and priority
they give to different kinds of considerations. Some pluralist
theories, like Bobbitt’s or Stephen Griffin’s, argue that all
different kinds of arguments are on an equal footing.270 But other
theories do not. Consider, as an example, William Eskridge and
Philip Frickey’s “funnel of abstraction,” originally developed for
statutory interpretation.271 This approach gives a general but
defeasible priority to some considerations over others. Richard
Fallon’s constructivist coherence theory also has a priority rule:
when there is an irreducible conflict between different kinds of
arguments, interpreters should give priority to arguments in a
certain order.272
Now consider originalist theories. Originalist theories share
a common structure. They postulate that something is fixed at the
time of adoption—whether original meaning, intention, or
understanding—and that constitutional interpretations must be

269. Jack M. Balkin, History, Rights, and the Moral Reading, 96 B.U.L. REV. 1425,
1439–41 (2016) (arguing that Dworkin’s moral reading is realized through standard forms
of legal argument); James Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 515, 518 (2014) (“[T]he multiple modalities of argument in constitutional
interpretation . . . . are sites in which we argue about, and sources through which we justify,
change: in particular, how best to realize and thus to be faithful to our constitutional
aspirations. Or, as Dworkin put it, how to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the
best it can be.”).
270. Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1753, 1765–67 (1994) (arguing that the plurality of methods suggests that legal scholars
should not try to create grand theories to resolve individual cases).
271. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION
361-63 (2016) (applying the model to constitutional argument); see also Barry Friedman &
Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 103
(2013) (proposing a hierarchy of constitutional arguments that asks judges to consult, in
order, Text, Framing Understandings, Ratification Understandings, Post-Ratification
Process, Judicial Precedent, Evolving Practice, Consequential Arguments, and Ethical
Arguments). These versions have their own distinctive set of topics.
272. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1193–94 (“[T]he implicit
norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to arguments from text,
followed, in descending order, by arguments concerning the framers’ intent, constitutional
theory, precedent, and moral and policy values.”); see also id. at 1243–46 (proposing a
hierarchy of text, historical intent, theory, precedent, and value.)
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consistent with what is fixed.273 Beyond this, however, originalists
differ greatly among themselves.
People might be tempted to think of originalism as a monist
theory—one that hopes to reduce all of interpretation to a single
consideration.274 But this is incorrect. Most originalists are
actually dualists, because their theories usually have a two-level
structure; namely, figuring out what is fixed and then applying it
to new facts. This is most obvious in the case of the New
Originalism, but it is true even for originalists who reject the
distinction between interpretation and construction.
New Originalists use the same common topics that pluralists
do, but in two different ways and for two different purposes: The
first is to clarify what is fixed at adoption (interpretation); the
second is to implement original meaning in practice
(construction).
In the first task, New Originalists will use topics to clarify any
ambiguities in original meaning/intention/understanding. For this
purpose, some kinds of arguments will probably be more salient
and useful than others. The most prominent are textual
arguments, which include a broad range of subtopics: arguments
about evidence of contemporaneous use, dictionary definitions
and textual canons of construction. In addition, one might clarify
or resolve ambiguities in original meaning through considerations
of purpose, structure, adoption-era practice, adoption-era judicial
precedent, and adoption-era ideas about natural law and natural
rights. New Originalists may well give priority to some kind of
arguments over others, even if the priority is defeasible.
In constitutional construction, New Originalists will also use
all of the common topics in the construction zone. Here the goal
is to develop, implement, and apply doctrine consistent with
original meaning. In the construction zone, New Originalists can
place all of the modalities on an equal footing, or they can have a
soft priority for some kinds of arguments akin to Eskridge and
Frickey’s funnel of abstraction. Barnett and Bernick’s theory of
273. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 1, at 456.
274. Brett G. Scharfs, Adjudication And The Problems Of Incommensurability, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412 (2001) (arguing that formalism and originalism are
examples of legal monism because “each posit[s] a single value that should be consulted in
determining the outcome of a case.”); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical
Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 388 (2013) (noting, but rejecting the argument
that originalism involves “argumentative monism” that contrasts with pluralist methods.).
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good faith construction emphasizes fidelity to original purpose
and function.275 That is, their theory simultaneously makes a claim
about interpretive attitude and a claim about proper interpretive
technique. Therefore their theory might give arguments from
purpose and structure priority over other kinds of arguments.276
What about originalists, like Judge Bork and Justice Scalia,
who reject the interpretation/construction distinction? They are
also dualists. To ascertain original meaning, these originalists will
also use various topics such as text, purpose, structure, and natural
rights, although they may place a different emphasize on some
topics depending on their particular version of originalism.
Moreover, as I argued previously, all originalists, even those who
reject the interpretation/construction distinction, allow for some
degree of doctrinal development, and some degree of deference
to custom, tradition, and past practice. That is especially so if they
are lower court judges or arguing before lower court judges—then
they will mostly reason from and apply previous precedents. Even
originalists who reject the interpretation/construction distinction
must still fill in gaps, consult tradition and past practice, and
reason from case to case. They must still apply original meaning—
and doctrines consistent with original meaning—to new facts and
new technologies. They will use all of the modalities for these
tasks, not simply one.
A final example of how originalism incorporates multiple
modalities is Bruce Ackerman’s theory of dualist democracy.
Ackerman’s is an originalism with multiple starting points, one
following each constitutional moment. As its name implies, the
theory’s method of interpretation is also dualist. First, interpreters
must articulate the basic commitments of each successive
regime—Ackerman’s equivalent to original public meaning. Then
interpreters must engage in what Ackerman calls
“intergenerational synthesis.”277 They must ask how each
275. See supra text accompanying notes 43–49.
276. A topical approach helps us understand the similarities and differences between
originalists and pluralists. In the construction zone, for example, the New Originalism
resembles how pluralists think of constitutional interpretation generally; except that
pluralists might be willing to discount clear evidence of original meaning because of other,
stronger, considerations, while New Originalists would not. This difference marks them as
originalists who have a two-step theory, and not pluralists, who have only one.
277. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 88–90 (defining the
problem of multigenerational or intergenerational synthesis); id. at 113–19, 141–62 (1991)
(describing the technique of intergenerational synthesis).
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successive regime’s commitments build on, alter, or affect the
others. As with Dworkin, one might think that Ackerman’s model
relies only on a handful of modalities: namely, purpose, political
tradition, ethos, and honored authority. In fact, figuring out the
commitments of each regime and combining them together
artfully requires all of the tools in the lawyer’s toolkit, and
therefore all of the standard forms of argument.
When lawyers and judges with very different theories of
interpretation argue about contested cases, they may often sound
very much alike. The reason is that they use common topics that
are compatible with many different theories.
Original meaning originalists, for example, hold that original
meaning trumps other considerations. But in appropriate
circumstances originalists can and do use topics that are unrelated
to original meaning—for example, arguments from doctrine,
political convention, custom, tradition, and institutional
prudence. Originalists may turn to these arguments when original
meaning does not offer a determinative answer. Originalists may
also use these arguments if they are otherwise consistent with
original meaning but are likely to be the most persuasive to their
audience.
To be sure, when originalists write amicus briefs, they may
exclusively argue in originalist terms, because they want to draw
attention to evidence of original meaning. But when originalists
represent parties in litigation before judges who may or may not
share their theoretical views, they are likely to make every kind
of argument that might convince a court. Doing this does not
mean that they have abandoned originalism for pluralism or that
they are secretly non-originalists. It means only that they shape
their arguments to their audience. That is what sound lawyering
requires.
Conversely, non-originalists deny that original meaning,
intention, or understanding trumps all other considerations. Yet
non-originalists very often make arguments about original
meaning, intention and understanding, especially when they
discuss questions about which there is very little judicial
precedent—for example, war powers or presidential
impeachment. They will also make these arguments if they think
that they will be most persuasive before a particular judge or
decisionmaker.

1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION

7/21/18 3:15 PM

251

Non-originalists are usually pluralists of some kind; they
believe that interpreters should consider multiple approaches to
interpretation and use whatever arguments are most persuasive
given the available materials. It follows, then, that when the most
persuasive arguments concern original meaning, intention, and
understanding, non-originalists will make these kinds of
arguments. Doing this does not mean that they have converted to
originalism. What it does mean, however, is that nonoriginalists
cannot, in general, claim that arguments from original meaning,
intention, or understanding are impossible or futile—for example,
because doing the necessary historical work is too difficult. That
is because non-originalists will turn to the very same kinds of
arguments if they believe that they are the most persuasive.
One can multiply examples, but the point should be clear.
People with very theoretical views can and often do make the very
same arguments before decisionmakers. They can do this because
constitutional argument builds on common topics for persuasion
that, in turn, rest on widely accepted commonplaces about
interpretation.
F. THE TOPICS AND LEGITIMACY
I have just argued that the modalities are consistent with
many different theories, and do not play favorites among them.
Bobbitt disagrees. He claims that the existence of the modalities
renders other constitutional theories incorrect because they rest
on a flawed conception of legitimacy. But this objection proves
little, because Bobbitt’s conception of legitimacy is unique to him,
and most constitutional theories are not concerned with it.
Bobbitt’s theory has different goals than most other
constitutional theories. His central focus is securing legitimacy.
But by “legitimacy,” Bobbitt means general acceptance and use
of common modalities for constitutional argument, and nothing
more.278 He rejects all constitutional theories that attempt to
establish the legitimacy of judicial review or of the constitutional
system by force of theoretical argument. But most theories do not
try to establish “legitimacy” in Bobbitt’s sense of the word. They
have other fish to fry.
278. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1938 (explaining that “there is nothing
more to legitimacy” than following the rules of how to make a constitutional argument
using the modalities).
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There are many different kinds of constitutional theories,
with many different kinds of projects. These projects include, but
are not limited to:
• explaining how to interpret the Constitution correctly;
• explaining how judges should do their jobs;
• explaining the historical development of the constitutional
system and constitutional doctrine;
• explaining how the Constitution, or certain features of it,
would be more just, democratic, efficient, or reasonable or
just if it were interpreted differently;
• explaining why the Constitution, or certain features of it, is
sufficiently just, democratic, efficient, or reasonable under its
current interpretation;
• explaining how constitutions in general serve important
political values, including democracy, human rights, justice,
and the rule of law;
• explaining the pros and cons of constitutional design, and
arguing for or against particular design features.
• explaining how the current constitutional system, or parts of
it, could be improved by redesigning or amending it; and
• defending the adequacy and/or the justice of the current
constitutional system against proposals for redesign or
amendment.
I agree with Bobbitt that none of these projects will establish
legitimacy in his sense of the word. But that is largely because his
definition of legitimacy is idiosyncratic.
Legitimacy is a complex concept with many different
versions. For purposes of present discussion, one can distinguish
four different kinds of legitimacy. Sociological legitimacy is the
general acceptance of the regime’s right to rule, including the
right of state officials to employ coercion. Procedural legitimacy
concerns whether the people clothed with state power in the
system make decisions according to law—that is according to
official legal rules and procedures. Moral legitimacy concerns
whether the constitutional or political system is sufficiently just or
morally admirable. Finally, democratic legitimacy concerns
whether the constitutional or political system makes government
action responsive and accountable to public opinion, public will,
and public values, or otherwise allows the members of the
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political community to govern themselves.279 A regime can have
more or less of each kind of legitimacy, because legitimacy is a
comparative and contextual term, like “tall.” Nevertheless, in
some contexts, one might say that a regime is so deficient in some
respect that it lacks legitimacy and is therefore illegitimate, just as
one might say that people below a certain height are not tall.280
What does Bobbitt mean by “legitimacy?” He means the
acceptance and continuation of a practice of argument by a
community of participants—the fact that people accept and
reason in a certain way within a particular constitutional order.281
Such a concept of legitimacy is not directed to either moral
legitimacy or democratic legitimacy. It could be a limited form of
procedural legitimacy, because Bobbitt believes that using
modalities in argument helps ensure that decisions are made
according to law.282 But there is a great deal more to procedural
legitimacy than using the modalities. A legal system can be
thoroughly corrupt and disregard all sorts of rule of law values
even if officials employ standard legal arguments.
Bobbitt’s concept of legitimacy could also be a limited form
of sociological legitimacy. Bobbitt focuses on a particular social
fact: that the sort of people who write briefs, make legal
arguments, and decide cases accept certain ways of making
constitutional arguments as appropriate for resolving
constitutional controversies and directing the exercise of state
power. But this, too, falls well short of a full version of sociological
legitimacy in several important respects.
Most people in American society never read judicial
decisions or briefs, and therefore have no idea what kinds of
constitutional arguments lawyers make. So the fact that lawyers
and politicians use the modalities is unlikely to be the basis of
sociological legitimacy in the United States. It does not explain
why ordinary Americans think that government officials have a
right to rule and use coercion.

279. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 64–65; see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2005)
(distinguishing between moral, sociological, and legal legitimacy).
280. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 64–65.
281. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1938.
282. Id. at 1881 (“[L]aw is legitimated by adherence to practice; this occurs when a
decision is rendered according to law.”).
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It is true that everyone in the United States has the right to
make legal arguments about the Constitution using the
modalities, but most Americans do not do so. Most citizens, if they
discuss the Constitution at all, are likely to engage in what Bobbitt
calls “constitutional discourse,” which, Bobbitt asserts, plays no
role in legitimating constitutional law or judicial review.283
Moreover, if Bobbitt did claim that the general public’s
acceptance of the modalities bestows legitimacy, he would have
to account for a troubling fact: Public opinion surveys suggest that
a large part of the public does not agree with the equal status of
the modalities. Many Americans think that judges should decide
cases according to one modality—what the founders intended.284
To the extent that Bobbitt’s account of legitimacy is
sociological, it offers a very limited version of sociological
legitimacy. The practice of making arguments helps bestow
sociological legitimacy for constitutional law and judicial review
among a limited class of educated professionals—lawyers and
judges, political actors and a small number of citizens who
regularly make constitutional arguments or otherwise pay
attention to constitutional arguments.
This limited form of sociological legitimacy is valuable and
important. Rhetorical topics allow people to reason together from
common ideas and premises. This is the point of rhetorical
invention—to appeal to other people in a community by means of
premises held in common.285 As Bobbitt himself notes—albeit
disapprovingly—people with a range of different constitutional
theories build on or incorporate these topics, and so these topics
offer them a common language for theoretical disputes.
Moreover, as argued in Part III, the use of common topics allows
lawyers and judges to explain to each other why their
interpretations are connected to and further the Constitution.286
283. See id. at 1952–53 (“The whole population is rarely called upon to make legal
decisions with respect to the Constitution, although they are involved in constitutional
discourse almost continuously.”).
284. See NATHANIEL PERSILY, JACK CITRIN, AND PATRICK J. EGAN, PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (2008) (collecting public opinion surveys
about constitutional interpretation); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen
Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 363 (2011) (noting opinion
polls taken over seven years indicating that somewhere between 37 and 49 percent of the
public believe that the Supreme Court should focus primarily on original intention.).
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See supra Part III.F-J.
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For these reasons Bobbitt rightly emphasizes the importance of
modalities—which are really commonplaces and shared
rhetorical topics—as a source of sociological and procedural
legitimacy.
Yet this conception of legitimacy remains quite limited. First,
it does not secure sociological legitimacy among the members of
the general public, most of whom never read constitutional
decisions and pay little to no attention to what lawyers and judges
say in their briefs, oral arguments, and decisions. Second, it does
not secure procedural legitimacy in the work of legal officials,
because one can use the topics to justify any number of practices
that violate procedural legitimacy and rule of law values.
When most constitutional theorists talk about legitimacy,
they are interested in something quite different from Bobbitt’s
very limited account. They want to know whether our current
system is sufficiently morally legitimate, procedurally legitimate,
or democratically legitimate; and what kinds of reforms, changes
in practice, or changes in constitutional design and
implementation would promote, improve, or increase these kinds
of legitimacy. One might grant that the modalities help ensure a
limited conception of legitimacy—in Bobbitt’s sense—and yet
think that there is much more work for constitutional theory to
do.
One cannot help concluding that Bobbitt has engaged in a
certain rhetorical sleight of hand. He notes that constitutional
theorists have been asking about legitimacy; he then redefines
legitimacy in a way that makes most of their inquiries superfluous,
and then concludes that their inquiries are superfluous. But
constitutional theorists might well respond that they really are
interested in legitimacy, just not in Bobbitt’s version.287
Bobbitt claims that “the forms of argument that can
legitimate judicial review cannot justify it.”288 Conversely, he
argues, the forms of argument that might justify the practice of
judicial review—for example, in moral or political theory—cannot

287. See Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1938–39. In this passage, Bobbitt rejects
Mark Tushnet’s view that constitutional theorists are asking a different question than
Bobbitt. He argues that Tushnet has changed the meaning of “legitimacy” so as to avoid a
certain set of objections. But given that Bobbitt’s concept of legitimacy is unique to him, it
is probably Bobbitt himself who has engaged in this maneuver.
288. Id. at 1938.
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legitimate it.289 He has no objection to people outside the system
of legal argument offering arguments for why the system (or the
institution of judicial review) is just or unjust, democratic or
undemocratic, efficacious or inefficacious. Likewise, he has no
problem with people offering proposals for reform, or engaging in
comparative studies. All of this falls into the realm of what he calls
constitutional discourse. But the kinds of arguments that lawyers
make before courts should never be confused with moral or
political theory; and in any case, these arguments, even if
transposed into a treatise or article on political theory, cannot
legitimate the system.
Once again, because Bobbitt is relying on a very special
definition of legitimacy, this is hardly an objection to most
constitutional theory. Even if these projects involve constitutional
discourse (because they propose reform of our institutions and
practices), they do not aim at establishing Bobbitt’s very narrow
brand of legitimacy. Instead, they want to know whether the
system is morally or democratically legitimate, the very questions
in which Bobbitt disclaims interest.
G. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
INTERPENETRATE
Bobbitt’s general rejection of constitutional theory—and his
attempt to establish a clear distinction between constitutional
argument and constitutional discourse—create two additional
problems for his approach. First, the practice of constitutional
argument often includes constitutional theory—i.e., claims by the
participants about what would make the system more morally or
democratically legitimate. Second, although Bobbitt argues that
justification cannot affect legitimacy, arguments about
constitutional theory can be part of a reform project in political
and legal culture that seeks to alter legal practice through social
influence and persuasion. If such a reform project succeeded, it
would alter the conditions of legitimacy in Bobbitt’s sense of the
word.
The boundary between constitutional argument and
constitutional discourse, or between constitutional practice and

289. See id.; see also id. at 1898 (“It would be a mistake to think that a political theory
(like majoritarianism), which can justify a system, can also legitimate it.”).
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constitutional theory, is porous.290 Much of constitutional
argument in legal briefs and judicial opinions involves disputes
about constitutional theory. There we will find arguments about
the proper role of judges, various justifications for judicial review,
debates about the kinds of legal arguments that are appropriate
and inappropriate in a given situation, and disputes about when
some kinds of legal arguments should take priority over other
kinds of legal arguments.
Constitutional argument, in short, seems saturated with
constitutional theory. This should not surprise us. The
participants in the practice of constitutional argument think that
arguments about theory are potentially persuasive or winning
arguments before their intended audience, and that is why they
make them. One of the best ways to outflank an opponent is to
question the theoretical justifications behind his or her
arguments; hence the ascent to theory is a fairly standard
rhetorical move. It would be bizarre if it did not regularly occur in
legal argument, that most rhetorical of disciplines.
Perhaps equally important, disputes about constitutional
theory can have significant consequences for the practice of
constitutional argument over time. That is one reason why the
people who train lawyers care about theory so much. If
constitutional theories are taken up by a social or political
movement, or if they are widely adopted and taught in American
legal education, they may eventually convince many other lawyers
and judges to change the way that they think about and engage in
constitutional argument. Then the practice of constitutional
argument will eventually change.
Originalism, for example, has become the de facto
interpretive theory of the modern conservative movement, just as
living constitutionalism earlier was the de facto premise of much
of American liberal legal thought. If political conservatives
eventually control the judiciary and win out in institutions of legal
education, they will reshape the practices of constitutional
interpretation. We have already seen such a transformation, to a

290. This is a point on which Bobbitt and I have long disagreed. See Bobbitt,
Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911–12, 1916. Bobbitt argues that I see no distinction
between the two categories; I argue rather that the two interpenetrate and their boundaries
are always provisional and porous.
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certain degree, in constitutional litigation and in the practice of
statutory interpretation.291
Bobbitt is of two minds about such changes. On the one hand,
he accepts that the practice of constitutional argument changes.292
He purports merely to describe the practice correctly, rather than
impose his own normative views on it.293 He denies that he plays
the role of a normative grammarian, who demands that people
speak the language correctly. That would suggest that if the
practice of constitutional argument does change—for example, if
originalism becomes dominant, or if lawyers and judges make
appeals to natural law and natural rights—Bobbitt will simply
accept the result. Perhaps, he will even rewrite his theory so that
it is a characteristic feature of constitutional practice that certain
kinds of arguments do have priority over others. If it turns out that
lawyers and judges regularly engage in coherence-based
reasoning, perhaps Bobbitt would jettison the strong version of
his incommensurability thesis as well.
On the other hand, Bobbitt does not seem to treat some
features of the practice as mutable in this way. He views himself
as a defender of the practices of constitutional argument (and thus
of constitutional legitimacy) from those who would abuse them.294
This is the reason for his strong opposition to originalism, which,
he argues, undermines the legitimacy of American constitutional
law. But what Bobbitt calls “abuse” might turn out to be nothing
more than the cultural evolution of the system. It might represent
American lawyers and judges arguing about the best way to
engage in their practices, and slowly evolving to a new norm.
Originalism offers a good example. Originalism is a reform
project that seeks to get lawyers and judges to alter their practices
of constitutional argument and judicial review. It is part of a larger
set of social and political movements that characterized the last
291. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Justice Scalia and The Federal Court: Justice Scalia,
Implied Rights of Action, and Historical Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2077, 2077
(2017) (noting Justice Scalia’s influence in pushing lawyers toward originalism in
constitutional interpretation and textualism in statutory interpretation).
292. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911, 1919; BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE, supra note 18, at 8.
293. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1917, 1919.
294. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 185 (“We
should be especially vigilant therefore to answer attacks on the legitimacy of our
constitutional forms—forms that are likely to be among the most enduring and admirable
of the American contributions to human history.”).
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part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.
If Bobbitt accepts changes in practice through social evolution, it
is not clear how this reform project should undermine the
legitimacy of American constitutional law—at least, as Bobbitt
defines the term. Americans would have one practice before
originalism’s triumph, and another, somewhat different practice
after its success, but in both cases they would still engage in a set
of shared practices of argument. The system would still be
legitimate in Bobbitt’s sense. Perhaps Bobbitt’s point is that, like
any good traditionalist, he should resist originalism until it has
won the day; at that point, he will simply change sides and defend
the newly constituted order.
Nevertheless, I am not sure that Bobbitt would willingly
jettison either the incommensurability thesis or the equal priority
of the modalities just because most lawyers and judges no longer
accepted them. I say this because they are necessary to his concept
of decision according to conscience; and the role of conscience is
central to his system. The lack of a decision procedure among the
modalities, and the inevitable conflicts among them, create a
space for the exercise of individual moral judgment. For Bobbitt,
conscience is what allows a constitutional system that may be very
wicked at times nevertheless to aspire toward justice.
Without the saving grace of conscience, Bobbitt’s vision of
the constitutional system might be very bleak indeed. That is why
I suspect that although Bobbitt claims that his theory will continue
to apply however the practice of constitutional argument might
change, he must assume that certain features are more or less
permanent conditions of constitutional legitimacy, in order to
preserve the role of individual conscience. If so, he is a
prescriptive grammarian of a certain sort, and there is a fixed star
in his system. But that fixed star is not the modalities themselves;
its name is conscience.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that constitutional argument is
a form of rhetorical invention that is structured in shared topics
for persuasion, analysis, and problem-solving. Common topics do
three things for the practice of constitutional law. First, they
provide a common language for persuasion. Second, they offer a
common way of showing that our legal arguments are connected
to and further the Constitution. Third, they allow people with very
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different values, policy preferences and theoretical commitments
to engage in a common discourse about what is faithful to and
what furthers a Constitution to which they all claim fidelity. The
use of common topics allows each of the contending sides, in their
own way, to express their fidelity to the Constitution through the
thrust and parry of constitutional argument.
Merely making arguments, of course, is not enough. The
participants must not only go through the motions of using
common topics, they must back them up with a particular attitude
of interpretive fidelity. One can think of the topics as an
orthopraxis that directs us toward fidelity, even if it does not
guarantee it. To the extent that the Constitution is part of
America’s civil religion, American constitutional argument
emphasizes orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy.
The use of rhetorical topics in constitutional argument does
not commit us to any particular constitutional theory. Different
theories will have different theoretical structures. But all of them
will share a common starting point. That is because the topics are
held in common within American constitutional culture. So it is
not surprising that most if not all prominent constitutional
theories find a way to make themselves consistent with the fact
that American lawyers use these topics in constitutional
argument. The topics make American constitutional culture
pluralist, but not in the way that Bobbitt imagined. Their
existence does not confine us to one possible constitutional
theory—Bobbitt’s. Rather, precisely because they are shared
aspects of our constitutional culture, they are consistent with any
number of constitutional theories, including originalism. Indeed,
lawyers who construct constitutional theories will inevitably find
a space for the topics, because that is how lawyers with very
different values, views, and interests, reason together about the
Constitution.

